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This paper argues that the Commission forecasts dispose of a reasonable track record. Most of
the traditional tests for examining the quality of predictions are passed in a satisfactory way.
The comparisons with forecasts made by the IMF, OECD and national forecast institutes are
not unfavourable for the European Commission. In particular it is found that there is no strong
evidence of presenting an overly optimistic picture of the economy in the European
Commission short-term forecasts. The rosy gloss which, according to some, sometimes hangs
over the Commission forecasts is related to some form of cycle denial. This could maybe lead
to an optimistic bias further ahead in the future, but applying this to the short-term forecasts of
the European Commission is unjustified.
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I. Introduction
Twice a year (in spring and autumn) the European Commission produces short-term
macroeconomic projections, which concentrate on the Member States of the European
Union. The forecasts are not based on a centralised econometric model, but are the result of
the analysis of the country desks using to a different degree statistical methods. With
respect to the time horizon, the focus is on the current year and the next, but in the autumn
exercise an additional year is added. The forecasts mainly concern annual data.
These forecasts are most relevant for short-term economic policy analysis, where the
objective is to take timely corrective action if appropriate. In the recent past they have
attracted more attention than usual because they contained projections on key variables,
notably the government deficit/GDP ratio, which was part of the Maastricht criteria for
entering Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Note, however, that the decisions in May
1998 on EMU participation were not based on forecasts, but on outcomes or their
estimates. With the central role that the Stability and Growth Pact plays in EMU, the
attention given to the Commission forecasts, and the therein included budgetary
projections, is also unlikely to decrease.
Because of the single monetary policy in EMU, euro-zone aggregates will receive more
attention in the future. Indeed, monetary policy decisions will be based on euro-zone wide
variables. However, forecasts for individual countries consistent with the EU-11 aggregate
will remain important. Knowledge about the impact of the monetary stance on an
individual country cannot be obtained without a country analysis. Examining a country is
indispensable if it is necessary to formulate a reply to commonly defined monetary
conditions which may be less appropriate at the level of a single country. Within the
constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact Member States could use fiscal
policy to arrive at a better policy-mix.
The purpose of this study is to examine the (ex post) accuracy of the projections both at the
level of the EU and its Member States. Although this type of assessment is important to
judge the value of the forecasts, it should not be the only criterion. The outlook (ex ante) is
useful for many observers as it offers a coherent framework in which recent and expected
economic developments can be analysed. Furthermore, it reflects the opinion of the
services of the European Commission, which could be interesting in comparison with other
private and public forecast institutions.
The forecast accuracy ex post does not only depend on the quality of the forecaster, but
also on the set of external assumptions and policy hypotheses taken into account. Although
providing a weak excuse for large discrepancies between forecasts and realisations, it could
influence the forecast error. In the absence of certain information on policy measures, the
projections are based on the assumption of unchanged policies. In particular the practice of
incorporating in the forecasts only the policy measures which are adopted by the authorities
or known in sufficient detail, could colour the results. This practice is common to most
international institutions (Artis, 1996). Notably in the budgetary field the outcomes could
be sensitive. In the autumn when forecasts have to be made for the following year, national
budgets were often not known in sufficient detail to be taken on board1. Hence, the
forecasts will be produced under the unchanged policy rule, while the forecaster may have
1 Nowadays national budgets for most Member States are known by early October, but not for Greece,
Ireland, Portugal and the United Kingdom.2
preferred to introduce some changes which are evident given the economic situation and
which, he expects, will figure in the national budgets. The same applies to policy measures
that are likely to be taken if the forecast materialises.
The exchange rate and interest rate assumptions lead to similar problems. There is no
attempt to forecast exchange rates, which are instead based on technical assumptions.
Depending on the currency its value is set in accordance with purchasing power parity or as
a function of the exchange rate regime to which it belongs. Interest rates are fixed in a
neutral way. The economic situation may be such that these technical assumptions are
rather unrealistic, but uncertainties about the scale and timing of any future exchange rate
adjustment make such assumptions difficult to improve upon.
In the next section a brief account is given of the procedures followed in establishing the
Commission forecasts and how they have evolved over time. A description of the variables
selected and the data used to compare forecasts and their realisations is presented in section
III. In section IV an overview of the methods used to analyse the accuracy is presented. In
order to put the forecast errors into perspective, the basic descriptive statistics of the
sample data on which the analysis is based are presented in section V. A first impression of
the quality of the forecasts is given in section VI by presenting the basic facts. The
following sections VII to XVI go more into the detail of what the different techniques of
assessment have to tell about the forecast errors. A comparison with the forecasts produced
by the IMF and OECD is made in section XVII. Section XVIII summarises the main
conclusions.
II. Forecasting at the European Commission
In the beginning of the sixties existed the Conjunctural Policy Committee. It was composed
of representatives of the Member States and DG II (the directorate general at the European
Commission2 responsible for economic and financial affairs). This committee offered a
forum for discussion of the national budgets of the Member States. Starting from the
national budgets and underlying economic forecasts on which they were based, DG II
presented the overall view and gave comments on the national submissions. The European
Commission did not make forecasts on its own. As each country followed national
practices, the degree of harmonisation with respect to concepts and external assumptions
was low. In order to enhance the comparability a Working Group on Economic Budgets
was created in 1962 with representatives of the European Commission and the Member
States.
The 1964 budgets were prepared in three steps. Hence in 1963, before the summer a
preliminary forecast containing the broad lines concerning the world economy and trade
both inside and outside the EU was prepared. After the summer a revised forecast was
discussed. Finally, towards the end of the year a complete forecast was presented. From
1964 to 1970 the revision of the preliminary budget was skipped to arrive immediately at
the complete version, but in 1971 the three-step approach was resumed.
2 European Union (EU) and European Commission and are used throughout this study to indicate
respectively, the group of Member States as a whole and the organisation to which DG II belongs.
These terms were only introduced with the Maastricht Treaty (1993). Before reference should be made
to the European Economic Community (EEC) and its Commission.3
The time horizon was one year and the focus was on the national public finances.
Nevertheless, under the impulse of the European Commission because of its
responsibilities in trade policy a lot of attention was given to trade developments. The
discussions on the national budgets and the underlying economic forecasts occurred in the
Working Group on Economic Budgets. A report was addressed to the Conjunctural Policy
Committee which could formulate policy recommendations.
From 1969 onwards the “preliminary” forecasts became more “complete” so that a full set
of forecasts for the major macroeconomic variables was available more than once a year.
This development reflected similar ones at the level of the Member States where
forecasting and macroeconomic planning (fine tuning) became increasingly popular.
In the beginning of the seventies, there was a growing concern that the national approach to
forecasting was geared to a certain budgetary policy and could not be considered objective.
Furthermore, the timely preparation of the overview by DG II was dependent on Member
States’ respect of the deadlines for submission of the their projections. In Spring 1971 the
delays were such that DG II made at that occasion its first comprehensive forecasts. At the
end of that year, however, the outlook was again based on the national submissions. A
similar situation was encountered in 1972, but even at the end of the year some Member
States were missing. From 1973 onwards DG II produced a full set of forecasts in parallel
to the Member States.
One of the reasons for DG II to produce its own forecasts was the normative nature of the
national projections. However, the very early DG II forecasts could not be considered
completely objective as, to some extent, policy measures or economic development not yet
materialised were taken on board. Arguably their degree of realism was considered higher
than that of the national budgets. The unchanged policy assumption became the rule from
spring 1974, leading to what was then called “probabilistic” (or “positive“) forecasts. The
interpretation of the rule is that only measures decided upon or known in sufficient detail
are incorporated in the forecasts.
From providing a support to the preparation of the national budgets, the forecasting
exercises at the European Commission had gradually shifted to become the basis for the
discussions on policy co-ordination at the Community level. A Council Decision3 in 1974
formalised this evolution. The discussions took place in the Economic Policy Committee,
which replaced the Conjunctural Policy Committee and in the Monetary Committee which
was transformed into the Economic and Financial Committee in 1999. In order to facilitate
policy debate, DG II made on two occasions (in 1976 and 1977) an explicit distinction
between “normative” and “positive” forecasts. The former presented a detailed and
quantified set of desirable developments against which the latter type of forecasts was
assessed.
The exchange of views between DG II and the national experts4 in the Working Group on
Economic Budgets did not give rise to a formal revision of the DG II projections within the
same forecasting round until spring 1978. From then onwards the forecasts of DG II were
3 Council Decision of 18 February 1974 on the attainment of a high degree of convergence of the
economic policies of the Member States of the European Community (74/120/EEC).
4 The group of national experts is composed of representatives from Member States’ ministries (mainly
finance, economics, budget, labour), central banks, other public bodies (institute of statistics, planning
office).4
the basis of the discussions in the Working Group on Economic Budgets, where the
national experts were invited to comment on them. This is a reversal of the initial situation
where the national forecasts constituted the basis for the discussions in the Working Group.
Both sides continued to be independent with respect to economic analysis and outlook.
In the beginning of the 1980s the internal forecasting procedures (Colasanti, Jones and
Steinherr, 1982) were further improved leading to a structure which has broadly remained
in place until now. It has the following main characteristics:
· A considerable amount of human resources of DG II is involved in the forecasts. About
40 staff members participate in a forecasting exercise.
· A forecasting round starts with a position paper, including the monetary assumptions
and the outlook for the world economy and international trade. In the light of new
information these external assumptions can be adapted in the course of a forecasting
exercise.
· The major forecasting work is done by country desks which follow a judgmental
approach. By aggregation the EU-wide data are obtained. The forecasts by the country
desks are confronted with the econometric projections of DGII’s QUEST-model (for
documentation see: Roeger and in’t Veld, 1997). A separate trade consistency model is
used to check bilateral import and export flows and prices and to ensure consistency
both at the EU level and at the world level (Jones, 1983; Kieler, 1995).
· A preliminary forecast is discussed internally in DG II and eventually adapted to what
is called a provisional forecast which is sent to the national experts. An exchange of
views between national experts and DG II takes place in the Working Group on
Economic Forecasts5 leading to the final version of the forecasts the main figures of
which are published6.
· It has to be noted that the European Commission (i.e. the college of Commissioners)
does not formally adopt the forecasts but is informed of the outcome by the
Commissioner in charge of economic and financial affairs. After having informed his
colleagues, the Commissioner informs the European Parliament and releases the
forecasts usually through a press conference. The forecasts have to be considered a
technical exercise prepared independently by DG II.
· Until 1989 three forecasts per year were produced: in winter (or summer), spring and
autumn. From 1990 the winter exercise was dropped and the autumn round was
scheduled somewhat later.
5 This group is the successor of the Working Group of Economic Budgets. Note that in French the name
“Groupe d’experts des budgets économiques” reminding the origin of forecasting at the Commission is
still often used as well as “Budgets économiques” to indicate the forecasts.
6 The economic forecasts were published for the first time in Supplement A of European Economy, No 4,
April 1982.5
III. Variables and data
First a brief motivation is given for the selection of the variables assessed. The next topic
in this section is the treatment of the EU aggregates. Finally, the choice of forecast and
outturn data is explained.
1. Variables
The short-term economic forecasts cover a wide range of economic variables. Given the
relation which exists between them, a selection of the key variables will be sufficient to
have a fair idea about the accuracy of the projections. The examination is done in terms of
annual changes (not levels) except for three equilibrium variables where relevant ratios are
used. The growth rate of GDP in volume terms and the inflation rate as measured by the
private consumption deflator are chosen for the key role they play in any economic
analysis. As far as domestic demand components are concerned only total private
investment (representing a share of about 20 % of GDP) was chosen as it seemed
interesting to look at the forecasting record of this volatile series. Private consumption
which accounts for 60 % of GDP was not selected because its forecast performance is
likely to be similar to that of GDP. Because of the importance they play in the policy
debate, three major equilibrium variables are examined: the unemployment rate (the
number of unemployed as a percentage of the labour force), the general government
deficit/GDP ratio and the current account (as a percentage of GDP). The importance of the
international context is examined with the growth rates of global export and import
volumes of goods and the change in the associated export and import prices.
The definition of the variables may have shifted over time. This could lead to a difference
between projection and outturn which cannot be qualified as a forecast error. No attempt
has been made to correct for this. In the early days GNP was used rather than GDP. The
unemployment rate moved from national concepts to a harmonised one. While the deficit
concept used was always based on general government, changes in definition cannot be
excluded. From 1994 the Maastricht definition of the general government deficit was
applied. The definitions of total investment, exports and imports of goods were probably
less subject to revisions.
2. Member States and EU aggregates
The focus of the Commission forecasts is on the Member States. In the beginning they
were six, now they are 15. Countries not belonging to the EU or preparing accession are
not examined in as much detail. Hence, the time series with forecasts/outturns is much
longer for the original countries than for those joining later. Austria, Finland and Sweden
which joined the EU in 1995 are not included in the study as not enough data are available
to say something meaningful on the forecast accuracy for these countries. The significance
of the results for Portugal and Spain, which entered the EU in 1986 is lower than for the
other Member States for which more data are available.
German unification took place in 1990; the data set takes account of this from 1993
onwards. There was no mismatch of coverage of forecasts and realisations as the
Commission made projections both for West Germany and unified Germany between6
Spring 1992 and Spring 1994; the EU aggregates were adapted accordingly in the
published forecasts.
The variable composition of the EU also implies that the meaning of the EU aggregate is
not the same through time. In the beginning it was composed of only 6 Member States
whose weight gradually decreased when the number of Member States increased. From
1995 all 15 Member States are in the EU aggregate used in this study even if Austria,
Finland and Sweden are not individually examined due to shortage of data. When new
countries joined there was usually a mismatch for the year of entry and the year before as in
general the forecast for the EU average made prior to entry did not include the new arrivals
while the realisations taken from publications after entry did. This unequal coverage of the
EU average has been corrected in this analysis. More precisely, the outturn data for the EU
aggregate were recalculated without the newcomers (see annex B for details).
3. The choice of forecast and outturn data
The selection of the series representing forecasts and outturns is not without importance as
it might influence the size and the meaning of the forecast error. In order to examine the
sensitivity of the forecast performance with respect to the time horizon, two types of
forecasts and their associated outturns are analysed. The current year forecast is concerned
with the quality of the projection made in the beginning of the year for the same year while
the year ahead forecast deals with the following year. The month of the finalisation of the
forecasts is used as decision criterion with respect to the calendar (see figure 1). Other
possibilities like the date of the press conference which is one to three weeks later or the
cut-off date for inclusion of information which is somewhat earlier than the finalisation
date were not withheld due to lack of information (see annex A).
a. The forecast calendar
Figure 1: Finalisation dates of the forecasts
Over time the forecast calendar has
varied (see figure 1). Since 1990
only two exercises per year have
been organised, one in Spring and
one in Autumn. This was different
earlier on: from 1971 to 1989 an
additional forecasting exercise was
conducted in Summer or Winter
bringing the number to three.
Furthermore, the month of
finalisation has varied. The Spring
forecasts were most often released
in May. The Autumn forecasts7 were most often released in October, but there was a
tendency to delay to November in the nineties when there were only two forecasting
rounds. Special factors have influenced the forecast calendar. For example, due to the
severe exchange rate tensions in the ERM at the end of 1992 leading to the departure of
pound sterling and Italian lira from the exchange rate mechanism, the Autumn forecasts
were postponed until January 1993. Another example was the publication of the Spring
7 In the seventies some of the projections were finalised in December or January and Winter forecasts
would be a more appropriate label.
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1998 forecasts as early as 25 March (finalisation date: 18 March), in order to have a data
set coherent with the one in the Commission Convergence Report (released on the same
day) used for deciding on EMU entry at the European Council of 2-3 May.
b. The forecast data
The current year forecast is represented by data selected from projections finalised in
Spring, typically May (see figure 1). In the early 70’s an alternative was offered by
forecasts released in the Summer. In the late 70’s and 80’s a January publication formed
an alternative. No use was made of these possibilities as it would interfere with the
analysis of the stability of the forecast accuracy over time. Moreover, the January forecasts
should be considered more a year ahead forecasts as most of the work is done earlier. The
later (earlier) in the year a forecast is made for the current year, the more (less) information
is available and the more (less) precise a projection is likely to be.
The year ahead forecasts are taken from the Autumn forecasts. As illustrated in figure 1
their timing has been less stable compared to the Spring forecast. The months in which year
ahead forecasts have been selected, varied from September (of the year before) to January
(of the year to be forecast).
c. The outturn data
There again exists a wide choice for the selection of the outturn data and it can be expected
that the forecast accuracy is sensitive to it. A universally accepted definition does not
exist. Following Kenen and Schwarz (1986) and Artis (1988, 1996) the realisation data for
the current year forecasts (“first available estimates” in their terminology) are found in the
Spring forecasts following the year to be forecast. The outturn data for the year ahead
forecasts are taken from the Autumn forecasts following on the year to be forecast (“first
settled estimates”). Figure 2 represents schematically the time relation between forecast (F)
and outturn (R), both in the case of current year and year ahead projections.
The use of first available estimates in the assessment of current year forecast accuracy is
motivated by the greater attention usually attracted by first available estimates, compared to
later revisions. Indeed, a quick evaluation is necessary if a policy reaction is required. The
greater precision of the first settled estimates is an attractive feature and they have been
used in the analysis of the year ahead forecasts.
Figure 2: The time perspective of forecast and outturn data
Realisations are continuously
revised as a result of new
information and of
methodological changes (e.g.:
change of base year, change of
treatment of particular
transactions in the government
accounts, ...) and another
approach would be to identify
them with the most recent revised
data, presumed to reflect best the truth. According to some authors “it is crucial to use the
most accurate estimate of the actual data in order to avoid penalising the best prediction of
what actually happened as opposed to the best prediction of what initially was mistakenly
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thought to have happened”. The quote is from Mc Nees and Ries (1983) and reproduced
by Artis (1996). For a recent application see Verbeek (1999). Such an approach is more
demanding for the forecaster as he not only has to predict the immediate evolution of the
variable, but also all future revisions and possibly also definitional changes. Furthermore,
it is likely that older data have been subject to several revisions, while the recent data just
to a few. This would alter the nature of the forecast error through time and make the
affirmation that the forecast accuracy has increased through time less robust. Therefore, it
was preferred to work with a constant vintage of outturn data, but the sensitivity of the test
results is analysed with an alternative set of realisation data. In section XVI the latest
available outturns are used for this analysis.
IV. Method and overview
There are numerous techniques for assessing the quality of forecasts. The simple
observation that mistakes are small is not enough. Some of the evaluation methods permit
to test the statistical significance of the results, other only give a qualitative indication.
This is particularly the case for graphical analysis, which has, however, the advantage of
being straightforward. With respect to the evaluation criteria this study applies the most
commonly used techniques for non-model based forecasts. As the Commission’s forecasts
are not based on an econometric model it is not possible to decompose forecast errors
rigorously into those resulting from assumption errors, data revisions, model-related
problems as for example done in Deutsche Bundesbank (1989).
With mean error (section V), mean absolute error and root mean squared error (section VI)
the essential information on the size of the forecast mistake is given. It is important to
assess the forecast performance relative to alternative prediction techniques. A first insight
is provided by a comparison of the forecast errors with those generated by easily available
alternative procedures. This analysis is traditionally conducted (Theil, 1966) in terms of a
no-change forecast and a trend forecast. Section VI also presents these results, but later in
the study (section XVII) the comparison with alternatives (the IMF and OECD forecasts) is
continued.
A desirable characteristic of a good forecast is absence of correlation in the errors and
absence of bias. Evidence of the contrary could be used to improve the forecast. These
topics are the subject of section VII and VIII, respectively.
By efficiency is meant that all information available at the time of the forecast is exploited.
Otherwise, the error could be reduced. Section IX restricts the information set to the
forecast values themselves and examines whether an improvement would have been
possible.
Have the forecast mistakes diminished through time ? This question is dealt with in
section X.
In the following three sections the size of the forecast error is left for what it is, and the
focus is on the direction of the change. Especially with respect to turning points
forecasting in the business cycle the sign of the change matters more than the forecast value
itself. Section XI examines the significance of the number of correctly predicted changes
as far as the sign is concerned. Section XII compares the projected cycle over a three-year9
horizon with the actual outcome. Section XIII analyses whether forecasts are revised in the
right direction when the forecast horizon shortens.
In section XIV attention is paid to the international context in which the forecasts for the
Member States are made. The accuracy of GDP projections for the United States and
Japan as well as some international trade variables is checked.
Economic theory suggests certain relations between variables, while economic integration
has made national economies interdependent. These relations should not only be reflected
in the variables as such, but may also have left a trace in the forecast errors. With a
correlation analysis of forecast errors across variables and across countries section XV
attempts to find some pattern in the mistakes.
Finally, as a complement to the error analysis by varying the forecast horizon, section XVI
examines the results against the light of an alternative set of realisation data.
V. Basic characteristics of the sample data
Some elementary descriptive statistics can be helpful in the interpretation of forecast errors.
They are given in tables 1 and 2. The mean value (MV) gives an idea about the order of
magnitude of a variable. The more volatile a variable, the more difficult to forecast in
general. A measure for this is the standard deviation8 (STD). Absence of skewness and
kurtosis are also desirable sample distribution characteristics.
The difference between the average forecast and the average outturn is the mean error
(ME). It can be interpreted only as a first impression of the quality of the forecast as
positive and negative errors can offset each other and thus reduce the size of the error. In
the next section the mean absolute error (MAE) takes account of this. A negative sign
indicates underestimation, a positive sign overestimation. Note that in the case of the
deficit/GDP ratio a negative sign indicates overestimation of the deficit as a net borrowing
requirement in the data is represented with a minus. One can read, for example, that the
average error in forecasting real GDP in the current year is 0.08 percentage points for the
EU as a whole, which increases to 0.32 percentage points if real GDP a year ahead is
forecast. Aggregate EU inflation is forecast very accurately in the current year (the mean
error is 0.02 percentage point), but the average error widens to –0.31 percentage point for
the year ahead.
Forecasting investment is apparently more difficult. The mean EU forecast error for the
current year is 0.58 percentage points which increases to 0.78 percentage points in the case
of the year ahead forecast. Volatility of the investment series explains this difficulty: the
standard deviation is about double the average value and larger than any other standard
deviation.
8 However, variables can move in large swings producing a high value for the standard, but to the extent
that the swing is regular, the increased difficulty to predict is questionable.10
Table 1: Basic characteristics of the sample data – current year
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LPU K E U
GDP
Sample 69/97 73/97 69/97 81/97 86/97 69/97 73/97 69/97 69/97 69/97 86/97 73/97 69/97
No of obs. 29 25 29 17 12 29 25 29 29 29 12 25 29
MV(F) 2.22 1.99 2.56 1.35 2.68 2.70 3.34 2.73 2.07 2.28 2.86 1.66 2.55
MV(R) 2.35 1.86 2.52 1.42 2.90 2.73 3.82 2.33 2.67 2.42 2.86 1.68 2.47
ME -0.13 0.13 0.04 -0.08 -0.22 -0.03 -0.48 0.39 -0.60 -0.14 0.00 -0.01 0.08
STD(R) 2.01 1.81 2.23 1.37 1.78 2.13 3.03 2.13 2.74 1.67 1.88 2.03 1.88
Skewness(R) -0.09 -0.08 -0.25 0.01 -0.72 0.36 0.08 -0.62 -1.78** -0.36 -0.83 -0.24 -0.12
Kurtosis(R) -0.26 -0.87 1.66 -1.32 0.79 0.70 -0.31 0.97 6.66** 0.44 0.41 -0.51 1.38
Inflation
Sample 69/97 73/97 69/97 81/97 86/97 69/97 73/97 69/97 69/97 69/97 86/97 73/97 69/97
No of obs. 29 25 29 17 12 29 25 29 29 29 12 25 29
MV(F) 4.99 5.96 3.66 15.86 5.32 6.22 8.68 9.70 4.85 4.41 8.02 7.96 6.31
MV(R) 4.89 6.25 3.58 15.83 5.51 6.25 8.57 9.79 4.73 4.42 8.40 7.85 6.29
ME 0.10 -0.29 0.08 0.03 -0.18 -0.02 0.11 -0.09 0.12 -0.01 -0.38 0.12 0.02
STD(R) 3.14 3.87 1.89 5.27 1.67 3.92 6.85 5.87 2.98 3.12 3.99 5.16 3.09
Skewness(R) 1.02* 0.45 0.16 -0.35 0.35 0.40 0.60 0.57 0.55 0.46 -0.34 1.12* 0.73
Kurtosis(R) 0.67 -0.75 -0.35 -0.62 1.42 -1.21 -1.24 -1.30 -0.71 -0.91 -1.42 0.77 -0.58
Investment
Sample 69/97 73/97 69/97 81/97 86/97 69/97 73/97 69/97 69/97 69/97 86/97 73/97 69/97
No of obs. 29 25 29 17 12 29 25 29 29 29 12 25 29
MV(F) 2.58 1.50 3.21 3.25 5.31 2.46 3.89 2.43 2.49 1.56 6.83 1.13 2.68
MV(R) 2.49 0.66 2.61 1.63 5.27 1.99 3.22 1.30 3.25 1.66 7.57 0.60 2.10
ME 0.09 0.83 0.60 1.62 0.04 0.47 0.67 1.13 -0.76 -0.10 -0.73 0.53 0.58
STD(R) 5.40 9.60 4.83 6.30 7.62 3.90 7.54 5.35 5.71 4.89 6.22 4.70 3.70
Skewness(R) 0.06 -0.01 -0.11 0.14 -0.58 0.02 0.07 -0.88 0.56 -0.58 0.27 -0.05 -0.26
Kurtosis(R) 0.19 -0.90 -0.01 -0.83 -0.19 -0.45 -1.16 1.11 0.89 0.65 0.54 0.90 0.09
Unemployment rate
Sample 69/97 73/97 69/97 81/97 86/97 70/97 73/97 69/97 75/97 69/97 86/97 73/97 69/97
No of obs. 29 25 29 17 12 28 25 29 23 29 12 25 29
MV(F) 8.42 7.22 5.35 7.97 20.24 7.81 13.32 8.64 1.66 7.07 6.54 8.20 7.51
MV(R) 8.38 7.24 5.31 7.79 20.03 7.80 13.01 8.74 1.68 6.85 6.14 8.16 7.56
ME 0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.18 0.22 0.00 0.30 -0.10 -0.02 0.23 0.40 0.04 -0.05
STD(R) 3.87 2.48 2.99 1.51 2.74 3.65 4.43 3.88 0.90 4.00 1.39 3.04 3.67
Skewness(R) -0.42 -0.90 -0.17 -1.92** -0.31 -0.44 -0.15 -0.33 0.84 0.57 -0.05 -0.36 -0.45
Kurtosis(R) -0.87 0.96 -1.29 5.51** -1.17 -1.25 -1.45 -1.26 0.15 -0.49 -0.61 -1.04 -1.38
Government balance as % of GDP
Sample 71/97 77/97 69/97 82/97 86/97 69/97 74/97 69/97 74/97 69/97 86/97 73/97 69/97
No of obs. 27 21 29 16 12 29 24 29 24 29 12 25 29
MV(F) -6.32 -2.31 -2.26 -11.46 -4.27 -2.09 -7.95 -8.64 0.70 -3.40 -6.47 -3.16 -3.80
MV(R) -6.55 -2.37 -2.10 -11.92 -4.55 -1.96 -7.72 -8.83 1.28 -3.13 -5.89 -3.32 -3.78
ME 0.23 0.05 -0.15 0.46 0.28 -0.13 -0.23 0.19 -0.58 -0.27 -0.58 0.16 -0.02
STD(R) 3.04 3.19 1.83 4.26 1.65 1.88 5.14 3.09 2.12 2.28 1.65 2.21 1.68
Skewness(R) -0.66 -0.46 0.40 0.07 -0.27 -0.37 0.11 0.60 0.10 0.56 0.36 0.18 0.80
Kurtosis(R) -0.19 -0.13 0.03 -0.77 -1.01 -0.36 -1.51 -0.39 -0.72 -0.24 0.57 0.29 -0.31
Current account as % of GDP
Sample 71/97 73/97 71/97 82/97 86/97 71/97 73/97 71/97 71/97 71/97 86/97 73/97 71/97
No of obs. 27 25 27 16 12 27 25 27 27 27 12 25 27
MV(F) 0.77 -1.59 0.84 -3.51 -1.20 -0.25 -1.53 -0.08 20.34 2.52 -0.96 -0.79 0.09
MV(R) 0.87 -1.69 1.01 -4.05 -1.24 -0.17 -1.07 -0.14 20.27 2.62 -0.58 -0.63 0.17
ME -0.09 0.10 -0.17 0.54 0.04 -0.07 -0.46 0.06 0.06 -0.10 -0.37 -0.16 -0.08
STD(R) 2.98 2.48 1.84 1.73 1.95 1.31 5.50 1.86 14.95 1.93 1.85 1.75 0.73
Skewness(R) -0.78 0.65 0.34 -1.17 0.06 0.21 -0.21 0.10 -0.39 -0.69 1.44 -0.48 -0.01
Kurtosis(R) 0.41 -0.65 -0.78 2.28 -1.40 0.16 -1.06 -0.44 -0.97 -0.02 2.35 0.34 -0.59
ME = MV(F) – MV(R): the mean error is equal to the mean forecast minus the realised average
STD(R): standard deviation of realisation data
*, ** indicate skewness/kurtosis of the realisation data at the 5 % , respectively 1 % significance level
The mean error is small in the case of forecasting the unemployment rate. The current year
average forecast error is –0.05 percentage point for the EU and it remains 0.02 percentage
point in the case of the year ahead forecast. The average error in forecasting the
government deficit as a percentage of GDP is –0.02 percentage point in the current year;
the year ahead mean forecast error widens to 0.16 percentage point. At the EU level the11
mean forecast error for the current account is –0.08 percentage point for the current year
and absent for the year ahead forecast.
Skewness and kurtosis are indications of the deviation of the observed frequency
distribution from the normal distribution. The presence of a flat tail (skewness) or a peak
(kurtosis) does not appear significant in most of the cases.
Table 2: Basic characteristics of the sample data – year ahead
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LPU K E U
GDP
Sample 70/97 74/97 70/97 82/97 87/97 70/97 74/97 70/97 70/97 70/97 87/97 74/97 70/97
No of obs. 28 24 28 16 11 28 24 28 28 28 11 24 28
MV(F) 2.37 2.15 2.67 1.46 2.79 2.82 3.27 2.85 2.27 2.16 2.84 1.92 2.66
MV(R) 2.15 1.97 2.35 1.51 2.86 2.54 3.91 2.19 2.17 2.26 2.74 1.64 2.34
ME 0.21 0.18 0.36 -0.04 -0.07 0.29 -0.64 0.66 0.11 -0.10 0.10 0.28 0.32
STD(R) 1.99 1.70 2.06 1.37 1.91 1.88 3.17 2.16 2.94 1.76 1.91 1.96 1.74
Skewness(R) -0.20 -0.25 -0.74 -0.04 -0.70 0.10 0.65 -0.59 -1.36** -0.49 -0.71 -0.56 -0.49
Kurtosis(R) 0.41 -0.91 1.03 -0.90 0.42 -0.11 -0.12 0.82 3.77** -0.08 0.27 -0.64 0.98
Inflation
Sample 70/97 74/97 70/97 82/97 87/97 70/97 74/97 70/97 70/97 70/97 87/97 74/97 70/97
No of obs. 28 24 28 16 11 28 24 28 28 28 11 24 28
MV(F) 4.98 5.55 3.51 14.34 4.86 5.76 7.88 8.73 4.76 4.58 7.23 7.53 6.06
MV(R) 4.88 6.07 3.59 15.25 5.22 6.24 8.20 10.05 4.87 4.37 8.29 7.95 6.37
ME 0.10 -0.52 -0.08 -0.91 -0.35 -0.48 -0.32 -1.32 -0.11 0.21 -1.06 -0.42 -0.31
STD(R) 3.09 3.91 1.93 4.82 1.30 4.03 6.95 5.81 3.02 3.18 3.90 5.43 3.18
Skewness(R) 0.94 0.52 0.06 -0.52 -1.04 0.45 0.66 0.54 0.41 0.51 -0.22 1.19* 0.72
Kurtosis(R) 0.33 -0.72 -0.39 -0.55 0.55 -1.19 -1.21 -1.36 -0.81 -0.93 -1.40 1.01 -0.54
Investment
Sample 70/97 74/97 70/97 82/97 87/97 70/97 74/97 70/97 70/97 70/97 87/97 74/97 70/97
No of obs. 28 24 28 16 11 28 24 28 28 28 11 24 28
MV(F) 2.87 2.20 3.18 3.76 5.44 2.91 3.77 2.95 1.09 1.31 6.77 1.88 2.96
MV(R) 2.06 0.80 2.56 2.32 5.47 1.97 2.93 1.48 2.52 2.08 7.41 1.01 2.19
ME 0.80 1.41 0.61 1.44 -0.04 0.94 0.85 1.48 -1.44 -0.77 -0.64 0.87 0.78
STD(R) 5.81 9.71 4.47 5.18 6.33 3.24 8.14 4.70 6.43 4.92 6.15 5.13 3.18
Skewness(R) -0.75 0.05 -0.35 0.24 0.21 0.04 0.09 -0.85 0.26 -0.51 0.82 0.05 -0.36
Kurtosis(R) 2.87** -0.97 0.40 -1.35 -1.32 -0.78 -1.28 2.11* -0.23 0.43 0.09 0.50 0.52
Unemployment rate
Sample 71/97 74/97 71/97 82/97 87/97 71/97 74/97 71/97 76/97 71/97 87/97 74/97 71/97
No of obs. 27 24 27 16 11 27 24 27 22 27 11 24 27
MV(F) 8.87 7.47 5.58 8.06 19.67 7.87 13.77 8.82 1.63 7.48 6.42 8.46 7.86
MV(R) 8.57 7.42 5.53 8.19 19.82 7.91 13.23 8.89 1.69 7.26 5.83 8.32 7.84
ME 0.31 0.06 0.05 -0.14 -0.15 -0.04 0.54 -0.07 -0.06 0.21 0.59 0.14 0.02
STD(R) 3.62 1.99 2.69 0.98 2.90 3.41 4.19 3.37 0.87 3.88 1.30 2.77 3.28
Skewness(R) -0.33 -0.46 -0.21 -0.06 -0.19 -0.47 -0.14 -0.54 0.53 0.59 -0.01 -0.34 -0.64
Kurtosis(R) -0.68 0.17 -0.99 -0.06 -1.35 -1.09 -1.45 -0.83 -0.33 -0.55 -2.06 -0.90 -1.03
Government balance as % of GDP
Sample 71/97 77/97 70/97 82/97 87/97 70/97 74/97 70/97 75/97 70/97 87/97 74/97 70/97
No of obs. 27 21 28 16 11 28 24 28 23 28 11 24 28
MV(F) -5.80 -2.34 -2.26 -10.87 -4.10 -2.03 -7.78 -8.54 0.29 -3.12 -5.98 -2.99 -3.67
MV(R) -6.31 -2.48 -2.20 -11.67 -4.64 -2.05 -7.73 -9.09 1.41 -3.01 -5.45 -3.42 -3.83
ME 0.51 0.14 -0.06 0.80 0.54 0.01 -0.05 0.55 -1.12 -0.11 -0.54 0.43 0.16
STD(R) 3.21 3.18 1.63 4.25 1.66 1.84 5.24 2.88 2.16 2.50 1.75 2.15 1.57
Skewness(R) -0.40 -0.40 0.39 -0.23 -0.50 -0.37 0.09 0.68 -0.05 0.54 0.18 0.13 0.93
Kurtosis(R) 0.01 -0.18 0.31 -0.22 -0.90 -0.29 -1.44 0.10 -0.88 -0.38 -0.35 0.10 -0.04
Current account as % of GDP
Sample 71/97 74/97 71/97 82/97 87/97 71/97 74/97 71/97 73/97 71/97 87/97 74/97 71/97
No of obs. 27 24 27 16 11 27 24 27 25 27 11 24 27
MV(F) 0.63 -1.13 0.93 -3.65 -1.60 -0.30 -1.39 0.06 20.22 2.53 -1.10 -0.85 0.12
MV(R) 0.89 -1.51 1.05 -4.09 -1.52 -0.08 -1.36 -0.23 20.94 2.68 -1.53 -0.80 0.12
ME -0.25 0.37 -0.13 0.44 -0.08 -0.21 -0.04 0.30 -0.72 -0.15 0.43 -0.05 -0.01
STD(R) 2.85 2.90 1.89 1.68 1.74 1.39 5.50 2.00 13.83 1.92 1.61 1.81 0.80
Skewness(R) -0.60 0.50 0.36 -0.97 0.07 0.28 -0.28 -0.10 -0.45 -0.66 0.50 -0.30 -0.07
Kurtosis(R) -0.12 -1.09 -0.81 1.64 -1.73 0.04 -1.15 0.22 -0.68 0.10 0.76 -0.65 -0.60
ME = MV(F) – MV(R): the mean error is equal to the mean forecast minus the realised average
STD(R): standard deviation of realisation data
*, ** indicate skewness/kurtosis of the realisation data at the 5 % , respectively 1 % significance level12
VI. Basic characteristics of the forecast errors
1. The mean absolute error
As positive and negative errors may offset each other, the mean error (discussed above)
could give a flattering picture of forecast accuracy. The mean absolute error (MAE) avoids
this problem. It can be compared with the mean absolute value (MAV) to put the size of
the error into perspective across countries. For variables which cannot turn negative (e.g.
the unemployment rate) the mean absolute value is equal to the mean value.
Both, for real GDP growth and inflation the mean absolute error at the EU level is about
0.5 percentage point (table 3: 0.53 and 0.37, respectively) for the current year, while about
doubling in the year ahead forecast (table 4: 0.94 and 0.99, respectively). Forecasting the
aggregate is clearly easier than at the country level. Especially for the smaller Member
States the mean absolute error is in some cases large: more than 2 percentage points for the
year ahead forecast of real GDP and inflation in Ireland. Inflation forecasting a year ahead
in Italy and the UK appears also difficult (MAE: 1.69 and 1.75, respectively).
Table 3: Basic characteristics of the forecast errors - current year
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LPU K E U
GDP
MAV 2.65 2.18 2.88 1.58 3.07 2.91 4.09 2.69 3.27 2.61 3.06 2.24 2.68
MAE 0.72 0.70 0.96 0.85 0.70 0.56 1.60 0.94 1.43 0.69 0.73 0.77 0.53
RMSE 0.87 0.91 1.23 1.03 0.94 0.77 1.93 1.32 2.01 0.86 0.89 0.98 0.77
THEIL1 0.42 0.37 0.45 0.61 0.61 0.35 0.64 0.45 0.54 0.57 0.62 0.45 0.37
THEIL2 0.44 0.51 0.56 0.77 0.55 0.37 0.65 0.63 0.74 0.52 0.50 0.49 0.42
Inflation
MAV 4.89 6.25 3.61 15.8 5.51 6.25 8.57 9.79 4.73 4.44 8.40 7.85 6.29
MAE 0.59 0.66 0.33 1.15 0.40 0.49 1.05 0.75 0.54 0.43 0.63 0.84 0.37
RMSE 0.74 0.80 0.44 1.53 0.52 0.73 1.44 1.03 0.71 0.58 0.86 1.35 0.49
THEIL1 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.48 0.37 0.44 0.45 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.48 0.42 0.31
THEIL2 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.30 0.33 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.24 0.19 0.22 0.27 0.16
Investment
MAV 4.56 7.79 4.39 5.11 7.48 3.51 6.57 4.19 5.16 4.19 8.22 3.60 3.53
MAE 2.31 3.94 2.26 3.59 3.24 1.60 3.48 2.85 3.07 2.58 3.67 2.05 1.14
RMSE 3.05 4.86 2.87 4.77 3.58 2.01 4.36 3.85 3.90 3.27 4.40 2.58 1.63
THEIL1 0.61 0.44 0.63 0.80 0.58 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.80 0.56 0.78 0.47 0.45
THEIL2 0.57 0.52 0.60 0.75 0.50 0.52 0.59 0.73 0.70 0.68 0.74 0.56 0.45
Unemployment rate
MAV 8.38 7.24 5.31 7.79 20.0 7.80 13.0 8.74 1.68 6.85 6.14 8.16 7.56
MAE 0.46 0.62 0.30 0.65 0.63 0.35 0.68 0.79 0.26 0.74 0.68 0.31 0.28
RMSE 0.61 0.95 0.48 0.96 0.80 0.47 0.93 1.25 0.33 1.26 0.83 0.35 0.41
THEIL1 0.61 0.66 0.37 0.90 0.44 0.59 0.54 0.88 0.83 0.75 0.89 0.24 0.46
THEIL2 0.16 0.39 0.16 0.66 0.31 0.13 0.21 0.33 0.37 0.32 0.62 0.12 0.11
Government balance as % of GDP
MAV 6.55 3.00 2.43 11.9 4.55 2.18 7.80 8.83 2.05 3.41 5.89 3.51 3.78
MAE 0.45 0.89 0.80 2.03 0.99 0.68 1.44 1.09 1.67 0.86 0.96 0.72 0.46
RMSE 0.66 1.23 0.94 2.43 1.29 0.92 1.89 1.54 2.03 1.13 1.20 0.93 0.56
THEIL1 0.51 0.56 0.62 0.82 0.85 0.83 0.93 0.76 1.04 0.91 1.00 0.60 0.54
THEIL2 0.22 0.40 0.52 0.59 0.82 0.50 0.38 0.51 0.98 0.50 0.76 0.43 0.34
Current account as % of GDP
MAV 2.47 2.61 1.67 4.05 1.84 1.05 4.73 1.56 21.4 2.91 1.53 1.34 0.59
MAE 0.90 0.75 0.57 1.21 0.79 0.48 1.55 0.75 2.33 0.81 1.14 0.85 0.31
RMSE 1.15 0.96 0.74 1.68 1.06 0.60 2.14 0.95 3.59 1.04 1.41 1.04 0.41
THEIL1 0.80 0.67 0.72 0.85 0.84 0.55 0.68 0.56 0.47 0.80 0.94 0.56 0.62
THEIL2 0.39 0.40 0.41 1.00 0.57 0.46 0.40 0.52 0.25 0.55 0.80 0.61 0.57
It is no surprise to find that forecasting total investment is difficult as it is among the more
volatile variables. At the country level the absolute error in year ahead forecasting is in
Ireland and Luxembourg more than 5 percentage points representing more than 80 % of the
mean absolute outturn.13
Errors in forecasting the unemployment rate appear small compared to its average level.
The mean absolute forecast error in forecasting the EU government deficit is 0.46 % of
GDP in the current year; at the country level this statistic varies between 0.45 (Belgium) to
1.67 (Luxembourg). In the case of year ahead forecasts, the mean forecast errors for all
Member States widen to more than 1 % of GDP except in France. It remains limited to
0.69 % for the EU as a whole.
The absolute forecast error for the current account is relatively large compared to its
average in absolute terms. This could be expected as the actual current account is often
close to zero producing the effect of relatively large errors.
2. The root mean squared error
Large errors are usually considered more harmful than small differences between forecasts
and outturns. To penalise large mistakes a root mean squared error (RMSE) can be used.
It has the same dimension as the mean absolute value to which it can be compared to have
an impression on the relative size of the error. The difference between the mean absolute
error and the root mean squared error suggests that in some cases large errors are registered
in certain years. This is notably the case for investment.
Table 4: Basic characteristics of the forecast errors - year ahead
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LPU K E U
GDP
MAV 2.54 2.20 2.75 1.66 3.06 2.70 3.97 2.63 3.07 2.52 2.95 2.25 2.56
MAE 1.19 1.03 1.31 1.14 1.06 0.94 2.36 1.36 1.89 1.08 0.99 1.25 0.94
RMSE 1.62 1.33 1.75 1.47 1.32 1.28 2.71 1.89 2.61 1.36 1.18 1.56 1.33
THEIL1 0.77 0.58 0.68 0.83 0.66 0.61 0.83 0.65 0.77 0.85 0.75 0.73 0.67
THEIL2 0.83 0.80 0.87 1.11 0.72 0.70 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.79 0.65 0.81 0.78
Inflation
MAV 4.88 6.07 3.62 15.25 5.22 6.24 8.20 10.05 4.87 4.40 8.29 7.95 6.37
MAE 1.13 1.38 0.76 1.57 0.57 1.15 2.08 1.69 1.49 0.75 1.43 1.75 0.99
RMSE 1.72 2.17 0.95 2.36 0.84 1.78 3.04 2.80 1.80 1.00 2.18 2.58 1.51
THEIL1 0.81 0.99 0.74 0.71 0.66 0.88 0.73 0.88 0.83 0.57 1.14 0.63 0.76
THEIL2 0.57 0.57 0.50 0.51 0.68 0.45 0.45 0.49 0.61 0.32 0.59 0.49 0.48
Investment
MAV 4.39 7.95 4.17 4.45 6.33 3.06 7.18 3.65 5.44 4.29 7.54 4.07 3.24
MAE 3.71 5.65 3.18 3.39 3.71 1.97 6.28 3.14 5.60 3.28 3.73 3.15 1.74
RMSE 5.22 7.17 3.78 3.88 4.35 2.63 7.35 3.97 6.82 4.04 4.67 3.97 2.51
THEIL1 0.96 0.67 0.76 0.77 0.70 0.74 0.83 0.57 1.13 0.73 0.93 0.65 0.66
THEIL2 0.92 0.75 0.86 0.77 0.75 0.83 0.92 0.86 1.08 0.84 0.80 0.79 0.80
Unemployment rate
MAV 8.57 7.42 5.53 8.19 19.82 7.91 13.23 8.89 1.69 7.26 5.83 8.32 7.84
MAE 0.86 1.18 0.83 1.27 1.53 0.64 1.15 1.18 0.36 1.27 1.15 0.71 0.52
RMSE 1.18 1.43 1.14 1.56 1.80 0.82 1.58 1.75 0.44 1.70 1.52 0.94 0.80
THEIL1 0.79 0.84 0.88 1.03 0.70 0.98 0.71 1.00 0.93 0.77 0.95 0.61 0.73
THEIL2 0.33 0.74 0.43 1.64 0.65 0.25 0.38 0.53 0.51 0.45 1.23 0.35 0.25
Government balance as % of GDP
MAV 6.31 3.06 2.39 11.67 4.64 2.23 7.80 9.09 2.10 3.41 5.45 3.56 3.83
MAE 1.19 1.79 1.07 2.56 1.21 0.75 2.28 1.51 2.32 1.14 1.39 1.36 0.69
RMSE 1.63 2.12 1.34 3.05 1.61 1.07 2.72 1.90 2.65 1.40 1.76 1.64 0.87
THEIL1 0.96 0.68 0.68 0.75 0.82 0.82 0.94 0.90 0.93 0.85 0.86 0.86 0.76
THEIL2 0.52 0.68 0.83 0.74 1.02 0.59 0.53 0.67 1.25 0.57 1.05 0.78 0.56
Current account as % of GDP
MAV 2.42 2.86 1.72 4.09 1.83 1.11 4.83 1.65 21.91 2.94 1.85 1.56 0.65
MAE 1.41 1.79 0.90 1.30 1.25 0.77 2.46 1.27 6.97 1.26 1.34 1.10 0.49
RMSE 1.78 2.45 1.18 1.63 1.57 0.96 3.16 1.75 9.42 1.57 1.57 1.69 0.68
THEIL1 0.81 1.03 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.93 0.98 0.91 1.05 0.91 0.74 1.03 0.88
THEIL2 0.63 0.86 0.64 1.00 0.95 0.70 0.59 0.89 0.69 0.83 1.02 0.95 0.8614
3. The errors of naïve alternative forecasting techniques
The value of a forecast should not only be appreciated in terms of its own errors, but
compared to naïve or easily available alternatives. Two easily available alternatives are the
“no change forecast” and the “average forecast”. If these easily available alternatives
perform systematically better than the Commission approach to forecasting, a
straightforward improvement of the accuracy is offered. It should, however, be remarked
that the “no change forecast” is often not that naïve as it is based on a random walk which
is a characteristic of many economic time series like asset prices and exchange rates (Artis,
1996). It would imply that the best forecast is the observed value in the preceding period.
The THEIL1-statistic is the ratio between the root mean squared error of the Commission
forecast to the root mean squared error of the “no change forecast”, while THEIL2 refers to
the ratio between the root mean squared errors of Commission forecast and “average
forecast”. The smaller the ratio the higher the quality of the Commission forecast
compared to the naïve alternative. If the THEIL-statistics are large than one, the competing
forecasts are better.
In general both THEIL statistics are smaller than one, implying that the forecast errors
made with the Commission approach are smaller than those obtained with the two naïve
alternatives. With respect to the current year forecasts the root mean squared errors are less
than or about half the size of those obtained from naïve projections in the case of GDP,
inflation, investment and unemployment. The score is somewhat less favourable in the
case of the government deficit and current account where the ratio is about 2/3.
Table 5: Persistence in current year forecast error
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LPU K E U
GDP
Signif r1=0 0.12 0.47 1.00 0.78 0.17 0.15 0.25 0.48 0.11 0.80 0.05 0.18 0.67
Signif r2=0 0.24 0.60 0.66 0.90 0.39 0.36 0.40 0.70 0.25 0.73 0.08 0.36 0.89
Signif r3=0 0.26 0.71 0.82 0.98 0.57 0.51 0.47 0.53 0.18 0.89 0.12 0.54 0.94
Inflation
Signif r1=0 0.95 0.56 0.46 0.54 0.07 0.37 0.07 0.35 0.78 0.41 0.27 0.85 0.47
Signif r2=0 0.92 0.70 0.61 0.57 0.19 0.52 0.19 0.46 0.86 0.70 0.19 0.52 0.47
Signif r3=0 0.16 0.65 0.14 0.68 0.13 0.69 0.34 0.35 0.96 0.80 0.33 0.63 0.31
Investment
Signif r1=0 0.14 0.35 0.37 0.80 0.18 0.95 0.50 0.97 0.36 0.86 0.92 0.28 0.59
Signif r2=0 0.33 0.58 0.66 0.92 0.38 0.95 0.66 0.26 0.61 0.64 0.96 0.50 0.59
Signif r3=0 0.17 0.35 0.37 0.82 0.59 0.88 0.35 0.36 0.72 0.28 0.91 0.51 0.73
Unemployment rate
Signif r1=0 0.03 0.19 0.07 0.57 0.57 0.19 0.53 0.21 0.13 0.27 0.10 0.12 0.90
Signif r2=0 0.01 0.42 0.16 0.83 0.29 0.38 0.56 0.40 0.20 0.51 0.10 0.30 0.92
Signif r3=0 0.00 0.47 0.25 0.79 0.11 0.58 0.76 0.60 0.32 0.69 0.18 0.14 0.08
Government balance as % of GDP
Signif r1=0 0.55 0.40 0.63 0.97 0.77 0.96 0.78 0.20 0.16 0.44 0.35 0.65 0.65
Signif r2=0 0.51 0.44 0.37 0.57 0.67 0.74 0.88 0.43 0.31 0.57 0.23 0.74 0.69
Signif r3=0 0.72 0.41 0.35 0.77 0.74 0.71 0.83 0.55 0.49 0.75 0.40 0.89 0.68
Current account as % of GDP
Signif r1=0 0.36 0.52 0.87 0.74 0.51 0.98 0.56 0.61 0.07 0.23 0.71 0.89 0.41
Signif r2=0 0.41 0.77 0.81 0.08 0.59 1.00 0.80 0.46 0.14 0.48 0.61 0.78 0.68
Signif r3=0 0.50 0.90 0.67 0.13 0.76 0.94 0.39 0.64 0.09 0.69 0.65 0.92 0.82
The test for serial correlation is based on the Ljung-Box Q statistic, which is asymptotically distributed as c
2. The significance level
of the null hypothesis of absence of autocorrelation up to three lags is reported. Numbers above 0.05 indicate no serial correlation at
the 5 % significance level.
The relative accuracy of the Commission projections deteriorate for the year ahead
forecasts, but in general continues to outperform the naïve alternative models. The current
account forecasts are best served with the naïve alternatives. In particular the high THEIL2-15
ratio (0.90 in some cases) suggest that using the average current account balance as next
year’s forecast will not produce a forecast error much larger than the one calculated from
the Commission forecasts.
VII. Persistence of forecast errors
Absence of correlation between prediction errors is a desirable property. It means that once
an error is made, it does not feed into the next forecast. It disappears or the next error bears
no relation to previous mistakes. If a systematic relation between errors would exist, it
could be exploited to improve the forecast.
Table 6: Persistence in year ahead forecast error
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LPU K E U
GDP
Signif r1=0 0.18 0.42 0.79 0.95 0.18 0.79 0.01 0.50 0.81 0.92 0.19 0.16 0.96
Signif r2=0 0.41 0.50 0.59 0.25 0.41 0.82 0.03 0.10 0.84 0.42 0.28 0.36 0.38
Signif r3=0 0.57 0.66 0.77 0.27 0.62 0.91 0.06 0.16 0.81 0.54 0.42 0.24 0.58
Inflation
Signif r1=0 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.15 0.65 0.75 0.04 0.41 0.00 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.04
Signif r2=0 0.27 0.24 0.01 0.29 0.40 0.95 0.10 0.66 0.01 0.20 0.14 0.13 0.10
Signif r3=0 0.24 0.26 0.01 0.47 0.60 0.96 0.09 0.31 0.01 0.36 0.26 0.21 0.09
Investment
Signif r1=0 0.53 0.39 0.22 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.99 0.38 0.04 0.17 0.40 0.35 0.28
Signif r2=0 0.59 0.68 0.40 0.55 0.58 0.47 0.90 0.04 0.02 0.38 0.66 0.21 0.06
Signif r3=0 0.53 0.63 0.52 0.75 0.16 0.43 0.95 0.09 0.03 0.21 0.75 0.02 0.06
Unemployment rate
Signif r1=0 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.21 0.02 0.38 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.21 0.00
Signif r2=0 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.18 0.07 0.68 0.00 0.02 0.33 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.00
Signif r3=0 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.18 0.09 0.77 0.00 0.03 0.21 0.32 0.15 0.02 0.01
Government balance as % of GDP
Signif r1=0 0.63 0.01 0.69 0.10 0.35 0.14 0.10 0.66 0.40 0.08 0.93 0.34 0.98
Signif r2=0 0.87 0.02 0.11 0.25 0.50 0.33 0.12 0.66 0.46 0.22 0.71 0.30 0.21
Signif r3=0 0.94 0.02 0.19 0.28 0.38 0.46 0.12 0.67 0.64 0.31 0.48 0.40 0.25
Current account as % of GDP
Signif r1=0 0.00 0.99 0.64 0.65 0.35 0.62 0.36 0.54 0.74 0.10 0.46 0.84 0.19
Signif r2=0 0.01 0.08 0.67 0.61 0.50 0.81 0.65 0.41 0.05 0.26 0.75 0.93 0.42
Signif r3=0 0.02 0.18 0.85 0.80 0.71 0.84 0.84 0.42 0.10 0.29 0.08 0.97 0.12
The test for serial correlation is based on the Ljung-Box Q statistic, which is asymptotically distributed as c
2. The significance
level of the null hypothesis of absence of autocorrelation up to three lags is reported. Numbers above 0.05 indicate no serial
correlation at the 5 % significance level.
The null hypothesis of no serial correlation among the forecast errors can be tested with the
Ljung-Box Q-statistic. The significance levels of absence of correlation up to three orders,
are reported in tables 5 and 6.
Serial correlation among current year forecast errors is absent or limited. There is only
clear evidence of correlation in the Belgian unemployment forecasts. The figures for GDP,
inflation and the government deficit illustrate that the forecast errors are in general small
and are soon reversed.
There are more cases of less satisfactory results with the year ahead forecasts. In particular
one failed to learn from past errors in forecasting unemployment. Also inflation
projections for the year ahead display some persistence in the errors (especially in
Germany). The figures, however suggest that the larger mistakes were committed in the
past. By contrast, the year ahead forecast errors for the government deficit were quickly
reversed except in the case of Denmark; the figure illustrates the long period of
overestimation of the deficit in the middle of the ‘80s and its underestimation in the early
‘90s. The persistence of the forecast errors with Irish GDP is also noteworthy.16
Figure 3: Real GDP growth – current year
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Figure 4: Real GDP growth – year ahead
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Figure 5: Inflation – current year
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Figure 6: Inflation – year ahead
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Figure 7: Government balance as % of GDP – current year
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Figure 8: Government balance as % of GDP – year ahead
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VIII. Unbiasedness
Are the Commission forecasts too rosy ? Public national or international forecasters are
often accused of presenting too optimistic forecasts. A rationale for this behaviour could
be the belief/attempt to influence the course of events by presenting coloured projections,
hoping that economic agents will act accordingly by adjusting their expectations. It is the
theory of the self fulfilling prophecy. For the variables examined here it would mean that
real GDP growth is systematically too high, inflation too low, investment too high,
unemployment too low, the government deficit too low and the current account balance too
high in the forecasts.
While projecting a too optimistic picture is in general the accusation, it can also go in the
other direction. Public authorities could have an interest to present a more pessimistic – for
the matter prudent – forecast in order to trigger a policy reaction. It would be a self-
destroying forecast. This could notably be the case in budgetary forecasting. By so doing a
safety margin is built in to meet budgetary targets, also in case of slippage in government
revenues or expenditures.
The issue at stake is the absence of bias. It means that on average the forecast error is zero
or in other words that there is no systematic over- or underestimation. It can be formally
examined by regressing the forecast error (e=F-R ) on a constant (a) and an error term
(m).
e=a + m
and testing the null hypothesis
Ho: a =0
In tables 7 and 8 the average forecast error is given (the estimate of the constant) and the
probability value of the null hypothesis. It is customary to accept the null hypothesis if the
probability value is larger than 0.05. In order to test whether the bias is hidden in a
subperiod and changes in nature, the sample period is cut in approximately two equal
halves. The first subperiod runs from 1969 to 1982; the second from 1983 to 1997. The
break in 1983 was selected because it corresponds to the establishing of the forecasting
procedures followed at this moment. Due to insufficient or absence of forecast data for
Greece, Spain and Portugal which joined the European union only in the ‘80s, these
countries are not covered in the first sub period. The number of observations is not equal
for all Member States because of differences in accession dates. With respect to the first
subperiod the sample for Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom is smaller; Spain and
Portugal have fewer observations in the second subperiod (see tables 1 and 2, basic
characteristics of the sample data, for the details)
In the case of current year forecasts, absence of bias taking the whole sample is generally
observed at the country level and as far as EU aggregates are concerned, only investment is
not very convincing. There is a tendency to overestimate investment growth by 0.58
percentage points.23
Although usually not significant in a statistical sense, with a few exceptions, there are
noteworthy shifts in the bias over time. While there was a tendency to overestimate GDP
growth in the first sub period, underestimation was the rule in the second period. Only in
the Netherlands is the shift from an overestimation of 0.24 percentage points to an
underestimation of –0.49 percentage points significant.
The shift from underestimation to overestimation of the unemployment rate is more
significant as several countries (Belgium, Germany, Netherlands) present statistics leading
to the rejection of the null hypothesis of equality of the coefficients.
With respect to the year ahead forecasts, a similar conclusion as in the case of the current
year forecasts of absence of bias in the sample as a whole is arrived at, although it would
have been preferred that the probability values exceeded by a more comfortable margin the
5 % threshold. The exceptions are Italy where inflation is significantly underestimated by
–1.32 percentage points and Luxembourg where the government deficit is overestimated by
–1.12 percentage points.
Table 7: Bias - current year
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LPU K E U
GDP
a -0.13 0.13 0.04 -0.08 -0.22 -0.03 -0.48 0.39 -0.60 -0.14 0.00 -0.01 0.08
Signif a=0 0.42 0.49 0.87 0.77 0.45 0.85 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.40 1.00 0.95 0.61
a1 0.01 0.52 0.44 0.19 0.31 0.61 -0.10 0.24 0.03 0.32
a2 -0.26 -0.13 -0.33 -0.27 -0.22 -0.23 -1.01 0.19 -1.07 -0.49 -0.00 -0.04 -0.15
Signif a1=a2 0.42 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.38 0.19 0.02 0.87 0.10
Inflation
a 0.10 -0.29 0.08 0.03 -0.18 -0.02 0.11 -0.09 0.12 -0.01 -0.38 0.12 0.02
Signif a=0 0.49 0.07 0.32 0.94 0.24 0.86 0.70 0.64 0.38 0.93 0.14 0.68 0.80
a1 0.14 -0.29 0.04 -0.11 -0.23 0.07 -0.02 -0.04 0.16 0.06
a2 0.06 -0.29 0.12 -0.13 -0.18 0.06 0.34 -0.25 0.25 0.02 -0.37 0.09 -0.01
Signif a1=a2 0.79 0.99 0.64 0.54 0.35 0.42 0.32 0.78 0.90 0.68
Investment
a 0.09 0.83 0.60 1.62 0.04 0.47 0.67 1.13 -0.76 -0.10 -0.73 0.53 0.58
Signif a=0 0.88 0.40 0.27 0.17 0.97 0.22 0.45 0.12 0.30 0.87 0.59 0.31 0.05
a1 0.31 3.22 0.64 -0.05 1.92 0.98 -1.11 1.06 0.57 0.59
a2 -0.12 -0.76 0.56 1.05 0.04 0.95 -0.16 1.27 -0.43 -1.19 -0.73 0.51 0.57
Signif a1=a2 0.72 0.04 0.94 0.18 0.26 0.84 0.65 0.07 0.95 0.98
Unemployment rate
a 0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.18 0.22 0.00 0.30 -0.10 -0.02 0.23 0.40 0.04 -0.05
Signif a=0 0.73 0.90 0.73 0.47 0.37 0.96 0.10 0.68 0.76 0.34 0.10 0.58 0.54
a1 -0.30 -0.22 -0.18 -0.04 0.13 -0.44 0.08 -0.31 0.03 -0.19
a2 0.36 0.11 0.23 0.36 0.22 0.04 0.42 0.23 -0.07 0.73 0.40 0.05 0.08
Signif a1=a2 0.00 0.42 0.02 0.68 0.44 0.16 0.32 0.02 0.91 0.09
Government balance as % of GDP
a 0.23 0.05 -0.15 0.46 0.28 -0.13 -0.23 0.19 -0.58 -0.27 -0.58 0.16 -0.02
Signif a=0 0.07 0.85 0.39 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.56 0.51 0.16 0.20 0.10 0.42 0.82
a1 0.51 0.48 -0.06 -0.31 0.71 0.44 -0.49 -0.17 0.17 -0.01
a2 0.01 -0.12 -0.25 0.68 0.28 0.04 -0.79 -0.04 -0.64 -0.37 -0.58 0.15 -0.03
Signif a1=a2 0.04 0.34 0.60 0.32 0.06 0.42 0.86 0.64 0.96 0.93
Current account as % of GDP
a -0.09 0.10 -0.17 0.54 0.04 -0.07 -0.46 0.06 0.06 -0.10 -0.37 -0.16 -0.8
Signif a=0 0.68 0.62 0.25 0.21 0.90 0.54 0.29 0.75 0.93 0.61 0.38 0.44 0.32
a1 -0.09 0.13 0.02 0.06 -0.92 0.10 -0.54 0.10 -0.48 -0.02
a2 -0.10 0.07 -0.31 0.43 0.04 -0.17 -0.15 0.03 0.55 -0.27 -0.37 0.05 -0.13
Signif a1=a2 0.98 0.88 0.25 0.34 0.39 0.84 0.46 0.38 0.23 0.51
a: coefficient in the regression e=a + m where is e is the forecast error; without subscript: whole period; subscripts 1 and 2 refer
to the first (until 1982) and second subperiod (from 1983); see table 1 (basic characteristics of sample data) for the exact years.
Signif a=0 and Signif a1=a2:respectively the significance level of the t-statistic for a=0 and of the F-statistic for a1=a2.
Numbers above 0.05 indicate absence of bias, respectively absence of change in bias between the two subperiods at the 5 %
significance level.24
Table 8: Bias - year ahead
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LPU K E U
GDP
a 0.21 0.18 0.31 -0.04 -0.07 0.29 -0.64 0.66 0.11 -0.10 0.10 0.28 0.32
Signif a=0 0.49 0.53 0.36 0.91 0.86 0.25 0.29 0.06 0.84 0.71 0.79 0.39 0.21
a1 0.75 0.48 0.77 0.47 1.16 0.92 0.93 0.49 0.80 0.66
a2 -0.25 -0.01 -0.09 -0.19 -0.07 0.13 -1.71 0.44 -0.61 -0.61 0.10 -0.03 0.02
Signif a1=a2 0.10 0.41 0.20 0.49 0.01 0.49 0.13 0.03 0.21 0.20
Inflation
a 0.10 -0.52 -0.08 -0.91 -0.35 -0.48 -0.32 -1.32 -0.11 0.21 -1.06 -0.42 -0.31
Signif a=0 0.76 0.25 0.67 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.62 0.01 0.75 0.27 0.11 0.44 0.28
a1 -0.49 -1.01 -0.61 -1.18 -2.47 -2.32 -1.08 0.10 -1.17 -0.87
a2 0.62 -0.22 0.38 -1.03 -0.35 0.13 0.97 -0.46 0.73 0.31 -1.06 0.03 0.17
Signif a1=a2 0.09 0.40 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.59 0.28 0.07
Investment
a 0.80 1.41 0.61 1.44 -0.04 0.94 0.85 1.48 -1.44 -0.77 -0.64 0.87 0.78
Signif a=0 0.43 0.35 0.40 0.14 0.98 0.06 0.58 0.05 0.27 0.32 0.67 0.29 0.10
a1 2.45 4.84 1.07 1.11 1.24 1.72 -1.22 1.15 1.73 1.22
a2 -0.62 -0.65 0.22 1.37 -0.04 0.79 0.61 1.27 -1.62 -2.43 -0.64 0.35 0.39
Signif a1=a2 0.13 0.07 0.56 0.75 0.84 0.75 0.88 0.02 0.42 0.37
Unemployment rate
a 0.31 0.06 0.05 -0.14 -0.15 -0.04 0.54 -0.07 -0.06 0.21 0.59 0.14 0.02
Signif a=0 0.18 0.85 0.83 0.74 0.80 0.82 0.09 0.83 0.54 0.52 0.21 0.47 0.90
a1 -0.52 -0.86 -0.47 -0.25 -0.10 -0.53 0.06 -0.54 -0.26 -0.40
a2 0.97 0.61 0.46 0.03 -0.15 0.13 0.93 0.29 -0.11 0.82 0.59 0.38 0.35
Signif a1=a2 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.25 0.11 0.25 0.41 0.04 0.12 0.01
Government balance as % of GDP
a 0.51 0.14 -0.06 0.80 0.54 0.01 -0.05 0.55 -1.12 -0.11 -0.54 0.43 0.16
Signif a=0 0.10 0.78 0.82 0.31 0.29 0.95 0.93 0.12 0.04 0.70 0.33 0.20 0.32
a1 1.23 1.31 0.03 -0.24 1.66 0.85 -1.36 0.39 0.40 0.23
a2 -0.07 -0.33 -0.13 0.68 0.54 0.23 -1.07 0.29 -0.99 -0.53 -0.54 0.45 0.11
Signif a1=a2 0.03 0.12 0.76 0.26 0.02 0.43 0.74 0.09 0.94 0.71
Current account as % of GDP
a -0.25 0.37 -0.13 0.44 -0.08 -0.21 -0.04 0.30 -0.72 -0.15 0.43 -0.05 -0.01
Signif a=0 0.47 0.46 0.59 0.30 0.87 0.26 0.95 0.39 0.71 0.63 0.39 0.88 0.96
a1 0.19 0.72 0.07 -0.06 0.53 0.70 -2.54 -0.25 0.01 0.23
a2 -0.61 0.17 -0.28 0.38 -0.08 -0.33 -0.38 -0.03 0.50 -0.07 0.43 -0.09 -0.19
Signif a1=a2 0.25 0.60 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.30 0.45 0.77 0.89 0.12
a: coefficient in the regression e=a + m where is e is the forecast error; without subscript: whole period; subscripts 1 and 2 refer
to the first (until 1982) and second subperiod (from 1983); see table 2 (basic characteristics of sample data) for the exact years.
Signif a=0 and Signif a1=a2:respectively the significance level of the t-statistic for a=0 and of the F-statistic for a1=a2.
Numbers above 0.05 indicate absence of bias, respectively absence of change in bias between the two subperiods at the 5 %
significance level.
The change in the bias from the first to the second subperiod is now somewhat more
marked. In addition to unemployment, also the year ahead inflation forecasts are widely
affected. In several Member States (Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg) there is a
significant shift from underestimation to overestimation. Note that in the case of Italy there
has been a significant reduction in the underestimation.
Summing up, there is some evidence of bias, and in certain cases it is significant.
However, it does not go in the direction of presenting a too optimistic picture in the second
subperiod. Investment is among the variables where the tendency to overestimate is
strongest, but not all Member States fit this generalisation.
Nevertheless, sometimes the Commission forecasts are considered too rosy. Later in the
note (in section XII on cycle recognition) the issue is taken up again to try to find out what
could provoke such critical remarks.25
IX. Efficiency
Forecasts are efficient if all information available in the data is used. Weak efficiency can
be tested with the realisation-forecast equation
R=a + bF+m
where the null hypothesis is
Ho: a = 0 and b =1
Table 9: Efficiency – current year
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LPU K E U
GDP
a -0.08 0.00 0.03 0.23 -0.11 0.02 -0.46 -0.03 0.48 0.30 -1.47 0.21 -0.15
Signif a=0 0.78 1.00 0.93 0.62 0.87 0.95 0.56 0.94 0.40 0.32 0.04 0.41 0.60
b 1.09 0.94 0.97 0.89 1.12 1.00 1.28 0.87 1.06 0.93 1.51 0.88 1.03
Signif b=1 0.35 0.57 0.83 0.68 0.60 0.96 0.18 0.28 0.78 0.51 0.03 0.23 0.76
Signif a=0, b=1 0.47 0.68 0.96 0.88 0.66 0.98 0.19 0.16 0.27 0.57 0.08 0.48 0.84
`R
2 0.81 0.74 0.67 0.38 0.69 0.86 0.62 0.64 0.48 0.73 0.84 0.76 0.82
DW 1.39 1.68 1.84 1.67 1.44 1.40 1.66 2.39 1.37 1.85 1.87 2.31 2.08
Inflation
a -0.15 0.31 -0.04 1.04 -0.19 0.21 0.12 0.74 -0.04 0.10 -0.51 0.34 0.37
Signif a=0 0.59 0.31 0.82 0.41 0.75 0.44 0.81 0.04 0.87 0.62 0.38 0.51 0.07
b 1.01 1.00 0.99 0.93 1.07 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.99 0.98 1.11 0.94 0.94
Signif b=1 0.83 0.94 0.81 0.37 0.52 0.42 0.56 0.03 0.75 0.59 0.11 0.29 0.03
Signif a=0, b=1 0.77 0.21 0.59 0.66 0.41 0.71 0.78 0.09 0.65 0.86 0.09 0.52 0.09
`R
2 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.91 0.90 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.93 0.98
DW 2.05 2.13 1.69 1.72 2.83 2.11 2.43 1.80 1.85 2.24 2.18 1.63 1.78
Investment
a -0.68 -1.48 -0.59 -1.83 -1.31 -0.64 -1.78 -0.75 1.12 -0.07 -1.05 -0.35 -0.74
Signif a=0 0.34 0.10 0.41 0.24 0.40 0.19 0.12 0.35 0.18 0.92 0.74 0.51 0.07
b 1.23 1.43 1.00 1.06 1.24 1.07 1.28 0.84 0.86 1.11 1.26 0.84 1.05
Signif b=1 0.15 0.01 0.98 0.83 0.26 0.57 0.12 0.32 0.35 0.58 0.53 0.14 0.57
Signif a=0, b=1 0.35 0.01 0.55 0.39 0.51 0.40 0.23 0.18 0.38 0.84 0.71 0.20 0.14
`R
2 0.68 0.81 0.64 0.43 0.78 0.73 0.68 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.44 0.72 0.82
DW 1.65 2.27 1.67 1.77 1.20 1.92 1.60 2.03 1.43 1.92 2.14 1.64 1.88
Unemployment rate
a 0.48 0.98 0.24 2.35 1.18 0.12 -0.21 0.78 0.08 0.46 1.35 0.16 0.23
Signif a=0 0.07 0.08 0.18 0.01 0.52 0.59 0.72 0.18 0.62 0.31 0.10 0.45 0.19
b 0.94 0.87 0.95 0.68 0.93 0.98 0.99 0.92 0.97 0.90 0.73 0.98 0.98
Signif b=1 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.45 0.54 0.88 0.19 0.69 0.08 0.04 0.31 0.25
Signif a=0, b=1 0.08 0.19 0.20 0.02 0.51 0.83 0.27 0.39 0.88 0.14 0.03 0.51 0.42
`R
2 0.98 0.86 0.98 0.73 0.91 0.98 0.96 0.90 0.86 0.91 0.79 0.99 0.99
DW 1.37 2.51 1.45 1.92 1.62 2.46 2.15 2.41 2.43 2.37 0.98 2.59 2.01
Government balance as % of GDP
a -0.14 -0.40 -0.28 -1.13 -1.51 0.11 0.52 -1.24 0.90 0.33 -1.62 -0.24 0.00
Signif a=0 0.65 0.22 0.27 0.60 0.23 0.72 0.53 0.16 0.02 0.45 0.07 0.51 0.99
b 1.02 0.85 0.81 0.94 0.71 0.99 1.04 0.88 0.55 1.02 0.66 0.97 0.99
Signif b=1 0.73 0.07 0.03 0.75 0.29 0.92 0.68 0.21 0.01 0.88 0.02 0.78 0.99
Signif a=0, b=1 0.18 0.17 0.06 0.73 0.44 0.76 0.78 0.36 0.01 0.44 0.01 0.70 0.97
`R
2 0.96 0.86 0.77 0.64 0.37 0.75 0.86 0.75 0.35 0.75 0.73 0.77 0.88
DW 1.75 1.64 1.96 1.78 1.84 1.86 2.10 2.39 2.10 2.06 1.61 1.69 2.06
Current account as % of GDP
a 0.17 -0.04 0.22 -1.90 -0.34 0.11 0.33 -0.06 0.50 0.34 0.13 0.18 0.09
Signif a=0 0.45 0.88 0.17 0.20 0.32 0.34 0.46 0.75 0.69 0.34 0.78 0.47 0.29
b 0.90 1.04 0.94 0.61 0.75 1.17 0.92 0.97 0.97 0.90 0.75 1.03 0.92
Signif b=1 0.18 0.68 0.42 0.33 0.08 0.16 0.29 0.82 0.58 0.41 0.35 0.88 0.51
Signif a=0, b=1 0.36 0.82 0.38 0.29 0.21 0.30 0.33 0.93 0.85 0.63 0.44 0.74 0.49
`R
2 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.10 0.74 0.80 0.85 0.72 0.94 0.70 0.41 0.62 0.68
DW 1.45 1.81 1.91 1.78 1.34 2.25 1.76 2.01 2.57 1.40 1.60 1.94 2.13
a and b: coefficients in the regression R=a + bF+m
Signif (.): significance level of the t-statistic (single test) or F-statistic (joint test) of the null hypothesis; numbers above 0.05
indicate that the null hypothesis can be accepted at the 5 % significance level.26
Table 10: Efficiency – year ahead
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LPU K E U
GDP
a 0.25 -0.39 -0.04 1.39 -1.01 -0.24 0.01 0.14 -0.24 0.34 -1.67 -0.35 -0.32
Signif a=0 0.68 0.59 0.97 0.11 0.46 0.68 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.54 0.16 0.60 0.63
b 0.81 1.10 0.90 0.08 1.39 0.98 1.19 0.72 1.06 0.89 1.55 1.04 1.00
Signif b=1 0.38 0.75 0.72 0.09 0.41 0.92 0.63 0.15 0.90 0.61 0.17 0.90 1.00
Signif a=0, b=1 0.53 0.78 0.62 0.22 0.69 0.51 0.48 0.06 0.97 0.82 0.35 0.69 0.46
`R
2 0.32 0.34 0.25 -0.07 0.46 0.52 0.26 0.33 0.15 0.37 0.63 0.33 0.41
DW 1.52 1.59 2.05 1.81 1.40 1.73 0.74 1.99 1.89 1.89 1.80 1.35 1.94
Inflation
a -0.30 0.87 -0.61 1.48 0.66 0.29 -0.99 0.47 -0.59 -0.17 0.41 -0.11 0.37
Signif a=0 0.70 0.32 0.21 0.48 0.60 0.67 0.38 0.64 0.50 0.64 0.81 0.92 0.59
b 1.04 0.94 1.20 0.96 0.94 1.03 1.17 1.10 1.15 0.99 1.09 1.07 0.99
Signif b=1 0.78 0.63 0.13 0.77 0.80 0.74 0.17 0.34 0.39 0.88 0.68 0.58 0.92
Signif a=0, b=1 0.92 0.47 0.29 0.31 0.40 0.36 0.34 0.02 0.65 0.54 0.27 0.64 0.57
`R
2 0.67 0.69 0.76 0.77 0.58 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.63 0.90 0.71 0.76 0.77
DW 1.44 2.04 1.13 1.22 1.54 1.94 1.05 1.93 0.98 1.42 1.04 0.89 1.25
Investment
a -0.91 -3.30 -0.22 -3.80 -0.82 -0.56 -0.57 -1.02 2.24 0.53 -0.91 -1.07 -0.61
Signif a=0 0.58 0.04 0.85 0.04 0.76 0.47 0.81 0.30 0.10 0.55 0.81 0.29 0.45
b 1.04 1.86 0.87 1.63 1.16 0.87 0.93 0.84 0.26 1.18 1.23 1.11 0.94
Signif b=1 0.93 0.02 0.65 0.12 0.70 0.52 0.87 0.47 0.07 0.59 0.67 0.71 0.80
Signif a=0, b=1 0.73 0.04 0.63 0.10 0.92 0.14 0.85 0.11 0.11 0.53 0.83 0.54 0.26
`R
2 0.15 0.56 0.26 0.54 0.43 0.39 0.12 0.35 -0.02 0.31 0.32 0.38 0.40
DW 1.78 2.00 1.39 1.86 1.35 1.50 1.88 1.72 1.21 1.58 1.12 1.59 1.57
Unemployment rate
a 0.88 2.70 0.75 6.03 2.90 0.53 0.94 2.01 0.29 1.00 3.10 0.83 0.73
Signif a=0 0.09 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.55 0.19 0.36 0.02 0.15 0.13 0.04 0.16 0.05
b 0.87 0.63 0.86 0.27 0.86 0.94 0.89 0.78 0.86 0.84 0.43 0.89 0.90
Signif b=1 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.57 0.18 0.14 0.01 0.20 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.03
Signif a=0, b=1 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.82 0.39 0.08 0.04 0.35 0.09 0.02 0.18 0.09
`R
2 0.92 0.68 0.83 0.21 0.55 0.94 0.88 0.77 0.75 0.83 0.26 0.89 0.95
DW 1.09 1.45 0.79 1.23 0.71 1.67 0.59 1.00 1.26 1.43 0.49 1.42 0.87
Government balance as % of GDP
a -1.01 -0.80 -0.82 -3.70 -2.42 -0.10 0.06 -2.36 1.30 -0.27 -2.47 -1.31 -0.72
Signif a=0 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.77 0.96 0.03 0.01 0.55 0.22 0.02 0.09
b 0.91 0.72 0.61 0.73 0.54 0.96 1.00 0.79 0.39 0.88 0.50 0.71 0.85
Signif b=1 0.41 0.04 0.00 0.14 0.16 0.76 0.99 0.08 0.00 0.31 0.13 0.05 0.16
Signif a=0, b=1 0.19 0.10 0.01 0.20 0.20 0.95 1.00 0.07 0.00 0.54 0.19 0.07 0.22
`R
2 0.76 0.61 0.50 0.53 0.19 0.64 0.71 0.62 0.15 0.68 0.14 0.50 0.71
DW 1.63 0.78 1.89 0.92 1.13 1.36 1.31 1.75 1.28 1.24 1.53 1.13 1.77
Current account as % of GDP
a 0.37 -0.71 0.25 -1.88 -0.67 0.27 -0.12 -0.27 5.04 1.02 -0.97 -0.30 0.04
Signif a=0 0.30 0.21 0.34 0.28 0.19 0.18 0.86 0.41 0.16 0.04 0.05 0.46 0.76
b 0.82 0.70 0.86 0.60 0.53 1.20 0.89 0.67 0.79 0.66 0.51 0.58 0.71
Signif b=1 0.16 0.17 0.32 0.39 0.02 0.37 0.40 0.13 0.15 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.17
Signif a=0, b=1 0.29 0.29 0.52 0.41 0.06 0.35 0.70 0.21 0.33 0.08 0.06 0.28 0.38
`R
2 0.62 0.30 0.60 0.05 0.46 0.53 0.65 0.27 0.54 0.41 0.38 0.15 0.29
DW 0.67 1.74 1.59 1.79 0.91 1.93 2.02 1.43 1.64 1.08 2.31 1.01 1.34
a and b: coefficients in the regression R=a + bF+m
Signif (.): significance level of the t-statistic (single test) or F-statistic (joint test) for the null hypothesis; numbers above 0.05
indicate that the null hypothesis can be accepted at the 5 % significance level.
If a is significantly different form zero and b significantly different from unity, the forecast
is correlated with the forecast error and the forecast can be improved exploiting this
information. In the tables both the probability values for the restrictions imposed on the
coefficients separately (t-test) and jointly (F-test) are given. The appropriate test is the
latter one as the estimates of a and b are likely to be correlated (Wallis, 1989). Attention
should also be paid to the presence of serial correlation in the error terms which makes
hypothesis testing less reliable. The analysis of the persistence of the forecast errors27
(section VII) and the Durbin Watson statistic (DW) in this section give indications on this
issue.
The forecasts are in general efficient, but the year ahead forecast to a lesser extent as the
significance levels for the joint test exceed by less the customary 0.05 level.
At the country level Italy often forms a problem and occasionally the forecasts of smaller
Member States are not efficient. Noteworthy is the doubtful efficiency of inflation
forecasting for the EU. The efficiency of German inflation and deficit forecasting appears
also doubtful, especially for the year ahead, and this despite the relatively good record in
terms of mean absolute error (tables 3 and 4) and bias (tables 7 and 8).
With respect to variables, the unemployment rate are among those which are least
efficiently predicted and where the accuracy could be improved by making better use of
past mistakes. This is indicated by the low significance of the joint F-test. Furthermore,
the low DW-statistic hints at the presence of autocorrelation.
X. Accuracy through time
In this section the issue is examined whether the forecast accuracy improved over time. To
that end the series are pooled for which a long forecast record exists at the European
Commission. These pooled series comprise the six founding Member States of the
European Union: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The
analysis is conducted in terms of two key summary statistics: the mean absolute error and
the mean error. In order to detect more easily the basic trend, the statistics are calculated as
5-year moving averages. The lower the statistics, the better the forecasting record.
Inspection of the sign of the mean error allows also a verdict on a possible shift over time
in the direction of the bias.
However, lower forecast errors are not necessarily an indication of improved accuracy. It
may well be that the economy is easier to forecast. This would then be the explanation and
not greater precision in the techniques or procedures used in forecasting. To control for
that, a measure reflecting the predictability of economic series is required. It is generally
thought that the greater the volatility of the series, the more difficult they are to forecast.
The standard deviation of the realisation data can be used as a measure of volatility. In
analogy with the error statistics, it is calculated in a 5-year moving window.
The general message of figure 9 is that the forecast accuracy improved, but that this is
largely due to the better predictability of the economy as evidenced by the lower moving
standard deviation of the underlying variable. The first oil price hike in 1973 and the
second oil price increase in 1979, culminating in the recessions of 1975 and 1981 have
made the first half of the sample more turbulent, leaving clear marks on forecast accuracy.
In the nineties the economy appears to be more stable compared to the seventies, but
volatility increased compared to the middle of the eighties. This can probably be linked to
the German unification shock in 1989, which contributed to a boom/bust cycle.28
Figure 9: Accuracy through time
Pooled data for 6 countries (B, D, F, I, L, NL)
in 5-year moving window
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Other interesting observations:
· The larger improvement over time is observed in the year ahead forecasts. In particular,
year ahead inflation forecasting improved significantly. The tendency to underestimate
inflation until the early eighties also disappeared.
· Contrary to the declining pattern observed for the other variables, the mean absolute
forecast error for unemployment gradually increased until the early nineties. It reflects
the unexpected increase in the unemployment rate. Since 1992, the forecast errors have
started shrinking. The largest forecast errors are associated with an overestimation of
the unemployment rate at a moment when a decline in the unemployment rate set in.
· Accuracy of GDP forecasting has hardly deteriorated, although the economy has
become more volatile since the mid-80’s, which is an encouraging result
XI. Directional accuracy
Up to now the forecast performance was assessed in a quantitative manner. At least as
important (Leitch and Tanner, 1991) is to have the direction of the change correct. It is a
first step to evaluate the timely prediction of turning points in the business cycle. Studies
of directional accuracy of forecasts can be found in Artis (1996), Ash, Smyth and Heravi
(1998).
The data can be arranged in a 2x2 contingency table (see Wonacott and Wonacott, 1977):
outturns
<³
Forecasts
< success failure
³ failure success
The rows indicate a forecast of either a decrease or an increase in the variable under
consideration compared to the previous year and the columns do the same for the outturns.
A success is obtained when the sign of the forecast change is verified ex post. The first
entry on the leading diagonal gives the number of forecast negative changes met by a
decline, while the second entry on the leading diagonal combines positive changes in
forecasts and realisations. Opposite changes in forecasts and results are a failure. The
larger the number of the successes, the greater the directional forecast accuracy. A score of
at least 50 % correct matches seems a minimum requirement. Otherwise one might as well
flip a coin.
It can formally be tested, applying a c
2-test, if there exists a significant relation between the
direction of change of the outturns and the one of the forecasts. If this is not the case, this
measure puts a question mark behind the usefulness of making forecasts. On the contrary,
if the null hypothesis of independence can be rejected, the association of correct signs
between forecasts and outturn is not by accident. The c
2-test statistic should be lower than
0.05 in order to reject at the customary 5 % significance level the null hypothesis of
independence. It corresponds to achieving a success rate of about 70 %.30
With respect to forecasts made in the beginning of the year, the score is very good. A
judgement on the significance of this result is of course more robust for the Member States
which belong to the European Union since the beginning and for which a long series of
observations exist. It is in particular noteworthy that sign prediction of the very volatile
investment series is good. Forecasts for Greece and Luxembourg are among the more
difficult. Forecasting the sign of the budget change correctly was most difficult in Ireland,
but also the result for France and the Netherlands is disappointing.
Table 11: Contingency table of directional accuracy – current year
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LPU K E U
GDP
DF³0a n dDR<0 3221122213122
DF<0a n dDR³0 2210121044223
DF<0a n dDR<0 13 10 14 6 6 14 11 12 14 13 4 10 12
DF³0a n dDR³0 10 10 11 9 3 10 10 14 9 8 4 10 11
Success rate 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.94 0.82 0.86 0.88 0.93 0.82 0.75 0.73 0.83 0.82
Signif indep 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00
Inflation
DF³0a n dDR<0 0001143112021
DF<0a n dDR³0 2111111032114
DF<0a n dDR<0 13 14 14 11 8 15 13 14 12 11 9 11 14
DF³0a n dDR³0 1 391 33 1 8 71 3 1 2 1 311 09
Success rate 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.88 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.96 0.86 0.86 0.91 0.88 0.82
Signif indep 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
Investment
DF³0a n dDR<0 2343142610122
DF<0a n dDR³0 3210213142121
DF<0a n dDR<0 10 10 13 5 5 12 7 11 11 14 4 8 12
DF³0a n dDR³0 1 391 08 31 1 1 2 1 0 1 2 1 251 2 1 3
Success rate 0.82 0.79 0.82 0.81 0.73 0.82 0.79 0.75 0.82 0.93 0.82 0.83 0.89
Signif indep 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00
Unemployment rate
DF³0a n dDR<0 4136031543111
DF<0a n dDR³0 4142001252112
DF<0a n dDR<0 787084943 1 1 587
DF³0a n dDR³0 13 14 14 8 3 20 13 17 10 12 4 14 18
Success rate 0.71 0.92 0.75 0.50 1.00 0.89 0.92 0.75 0.59 0.82 0.82 0.92 0.89
Signif indep 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.67 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00
Government balance as % of GDP
DF³0a n dDR<0 2542454422131
DF<0a n dDR³0 0122056369211
DF<0a n dDR<0 98 1 2 40977 1 1 1 0 28 1 3
DF³0a n dDR³0 15 6 10 7 7 9 6 14 4 7 7 12 13
Success rate 0.92 0.70 0.79 0.73 0.64 0.64 0.57 0.75 0.65 0.61 0.82 0.83 0.93
Signif indep 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.09 NA 0.13 0.51 0.01 0.18 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.00
Current account as % of GDP
DF³0a n dDR<0 5423222414122
DF<0a n dDR³0 4353243066141
DF<0a n dDR<0 7793499 1 1 1 2 569 1 0
DF³0a n dDR³0 10 10 10 6 3 11 10 11 7 11 3 9 13
Success rate 0.65 0.71 0.73 0.60 0.64 0.77 0.79 0.85 0.73 0.62 0.82 0.75 0.88
Signif indep 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.52 0.38 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.32 0.04 0.01 0.00
For each variable the first two rows indicate the number of failures, the next two rows the number of successes. The success rate
is the percentage share of successes. Signif indep is the significance level of the c
2-statistic for independence of forecasts and
realisations. With numbers below 0.05 the null hypothesis of independence can be rejected at the 5 % significance level.
While the success rate for current year forecasts is in general reassuring, directional
forecasts made at the end of the year for the year afterwards are less good for some
Member States/variables. The performance of sign prediction for the various EU
aggregates remains, however, very acceptable. In particular forecasting the change of the
deficit ratio in the following year appeared to be difficult. Only for the UK next year are
changes in the deficit ratio forecast with a significant degree of success. An explanation for
this rather poor result is the hypothesis of unchanged policies under which the forecasts are31
made if policy measures are not formally known. Nevertheless, the forecaster may have a
fair idea of the measures that the government will take, but cannot incorporate them in the
forecast because he/she is not sure about his/her information. This is often the case at the
end of the year for the budget.
Table 12: Contingency table of directional accuracy – year ahead
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LPU K E U
GDP
DF³0a n dDR<0 3344254486134
DF<0a n dDR³0 1221012326012
DF<0a n dDR<0 1 2 8 1 0 3597 1 1 794 1 0 9
DF³0a n dDR³0 11 10 11 7 3 12 10 9 10 6 5 9 12
Success rate 0.85 0.78 0.78 0.67 0.80 0.78 0.74 0.74 0.63 0.56 0.90 0.83 0.78
Signif indep 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.60 0.01 0.00 0.00
Inflation
DF³0a n dDR<0 6421224236100
DF<0a n dDR³0 3443151852245
DF<0a n dDR<0 10 10 12 10 6 15 12 12 10 6 7 11 14
DF³0a n dDR³0 859115659 1 3 088
Success rate 0.67 0.65 0.78 0.73 0.70 0.74 0.78 0.63 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.83 0.81
Signif indep 0.07 0.20 0.00 0.42 0.49 0.03 0.01 0.15 0.03 0.04 0.60 0.00 0.00
Investment
DF³0a n dDR<0 7655154765244
DF<0a n dDR³0 6261235485222
DF<0a n dDR<0 56 1 0 44 1 0 5878388
DF³0a n dDR³0 996539986939 1 2
Success rate 0.52 0.65 0.59 0.60 0.70 0.70 0.61 0.59 0.48 0.63 0.60 0.74 0.74
Signif indep 0.93 0.11 0.38 0.26 0.20 0.03 0.35 0.30 0.86 0.18 0.53 0.02 0.01
Unemployment rate
DF³0a n dDR<0 5445051542111
DF<0a n dDR³0 2145351934234
DF<0a n dDR<0 565052823 1 0 375
DF³0a n dDR³0 14 12 13 5 2 14 13 10 11 10 4 12 15
Success rate 0.73 0.78 0.69 0.33 0.70 0.62 0.91 0.46 0.67 0.77 0.70 0.83 0.77
Signif indep 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.91 0.00 0.39 0.31 0.01 0.20 0.00 0.01
Government balance as % of GDP
DF³0a n dDR<0 1 1 464376858446
DF<0a n dDR³0 2231263574122
DF<0a n dDR<0 28 1 0 3074355066
DF³0a n dDR³0 13 6 9 7 6 8 10 12 6 11 6 12 14
Success rate 0.54 0.70 0.68 0.67 0.55 0.54 0.61 0.54 0.48 0.57 0.55 0.75 0.71
Signif indep 0.88 0.07 0.05 0.18 0.34 0.70 0.38 0.90 0.85 0.51 0.43 0.02 0.03
Current account as % of GDP
DF³0a n dDR<0 3 1 0 40154735023
DF<0a n dDR³0 6365255293242
DF<0a n dDR<0 71654547 1 0 4486
DF³0a n dDR³0 1 091 05 31 1 1 0 1 021 44 91 5
Success rate 0.65 0.43 0.62 0.67 0.70 0.62 0.61 0.65 0.50 0.69 0.80 0.74 0.81
Signif indep 0.11 0.31 0.26 0.05 0.20 0.34 0.44 0.07 0.77 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.00
For each variable the first two rows indicate the number of failures, the next two rows the number of successes. The success rate
is the percentage share of successes. Signif indep is the significance level of the c
2-statistic for independence of forecasts and
realisations. With numbers below 0.05 the null hypothesis of independence can be rejected at the 5 % significance level.
XII. Cycle recognition
While in the previous section the focus was on directional accuracy one period ahead, it of
interest to examine if the forecaster spotted the broad movement of the business cycle9
beyond the next period. This is of help in the timely recognition of turning points.
Typically, the short-term forecasts of the Commission cover the current year and the next
year. In 1990 it was decided to add in each Autumn exercise one extra year to the forecast
9 The business cycle is here assessed in terms of GDP growth rates and not the output gap.32
horizon. From then onwards it means that in the forecast round at the end of the year, three
projections are available compared to only two before: for the year t, for the year t+1 and
for the year t+2. For this reason the comparison of cycle perception with the actual
development is limited to the nineties. The actual development in figure 10 is represented
by the outturn data collected in the following Autumn Forecast except for 1998, when the
Spring 1999 Forecast was used as the Autumn 1999 Forecast was not made at the time of
writing. To be concrete in respect to cycle perception: the forecast line starting in, say,
1991 in figure 10 represents the forecasts made in autumn 91 for the same year, 1992 and
1993.
Figure 10: Cycle recognition in real GDP growth
The figures suggest:
(i.) Swings from extreme values (very high growth or recession) appear well
anticipated, but not their size. Reference is made to the correct forecast of a
slowdown from high levels in Germany in 1991 and the pick-up after a recession
in all Member States. The intuitive reason for this success is the experience that
exceptional circumstances usually do not last very long. However, the swings have
been more marked than expected: the slowdown was sharper and the rebound
stronger (except in the United Kingdom where the rebound was weaker then first
expected). In particular, a recession was not anticipated. Note, in this respect that
in 1991 in Italy, the European Union and to a lesser extent France the perceived
business cycle direction was totally in opposition to what actually happened.
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(ii.) Small downward corrections, the so-called growth pauses, are ill perceived. The
decline in growth in 1995/96 from about 3 % came as a surprise in Germany,
France, Italy and the European Union as a whole. The slowdown from 4 % in the
United Kingdom was correctly anticipated, but this falls probably into the category
“exceptional circumstances do not last long”.
(iii.) Of the countries displayed and based on the experience in the nineties the broad
cyclical movement appeared to be best spotted in the UK case. Cycle recognition
is most difficult in Italy: in particular the interruption of the rebound in 1998 is a
disappointment.
Let us return to the issue of the optimistic nature of the Commission forecasts. It was not in
general verified in the error statistics concerning the current year and year ahead forecasts
discussed in section VIII on the possible existence of a bias. Figure 10 suggests that there is
some denial of the cycle in the Commission forecasts. A slowdown is projected to be minor
and an expansion is projected to last, leading to the failure of predicting, respectively, a
recession and a growth pause. This could explain where the optimistic gloss on the
Commission forecasts comes from. The distinction between short-term forecasting and
medium-term forecasting is not sharp enough.
XIII. Forecast revision through the cycle
Another way of looking at the ability to spot the development of the cycle over time, is by
examining the errors of successive forecasts for the same year. In figure 11 the outturn is
displayed as given in the Autumn forecast of the following year as well as 4 prediction
errors associated with forecasts made at a different time (May of the previous year, October
of the previous year, May of the current year and October of the current year). Because
presenting readable charts for all Member States would occupy too much space, long series
are given only for the European Union.
With the passing of time more information becomes available, so that one may expect that
the shorter the forecast horizon, the smaller the prediction errors. This is confirmed on
average, as illustrated by the decreasing mean absolute errors between the first and the
fourth forecast of the same year (far right bars, figure 11).
However, there are some exceptions.
· For 1995 the initial forecast (made in May 1994) was better than the following two
which is evidence that the incoming news was badly interpreted: rather than
accelerating, the economy was decelerating.
· In 1987 and 1988 the strength of the economy was not spotted because of the gloom
spread by the stock market in October 1987. Hence, the May 1986 forecast for 1987
was better than the later ones. The early pessimistic forecasts for 1988 proved also
particularly sticky.
· The strength of the recovery in 1976 appeared also incorrectly assessed.34
Figure 11: Forecast revision through the cycle of real GDP growth
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· While missing the trend for 1995 and 1987/88 was fairly general, the failure to
correctly adjust the consecutive forecasts was more limited with respect to 1990
(mainly Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and the United Kingdom). The strength
of the economy in 1997 appeared to be better assessed in some countries (Belgium,
Spain, United Kingdom) by the first forecast than in the following ones.
· Other more isolated cases of forecast adjustments in the wrong direction were:
Germany (1986, 1992), Greece (1991, 1994), Italy (1998), the Netherlands (1996),
Portugal (1996).
· The track record of the Irish GDP forecasts clearly illustrates the growth miracle: only
at the end one believes it. The absence of quarterly GDP statistics contributes also to
the explanation.
· The relatively high prediction errors for Denmark and Luxembourg in some of the
October forecasts made for the same year is curious. Instability in the statistical base is
a tentative explanation.
While in general the consecutive forecasts for the same year are corrected in the right
direction, the adjustment is slow and one sticks for too long to the initial guess. This is
evidence that the development of the cycle is only late taken into account. In particular, the
quantified forecasts do not indicate a recession.
Compared to the seventies, since the mid-80s the prediction errors have been smaller, but
there appear more adjustments in the wrong direction (1976, 1977 versus 1984, 1987,
1990, 1995, 1997). The cycle has become smoother, but more difficult to discover.
XIV. The international context
1. US and Japanese GDP
The EU represents about 20 % of world GDP and, obviously, its outlook depends on what
happens in the rest of the world, which in turn is influenced by developments in the EU.
This is reflected in the way the forecasting exercise is organised. At the same moment
when projections are done for Member States, forecasts for the major countries outside the
EU are made. Actually these forecasts come first, but revisions in the course of the
forecasting exercise are possible. Particular attention is given to the GDP forecasts for the
United States and Japan.
Measured by the mean absolute error the GDP predictions for the United States and Japan
are somewhat less good compared to the results obtained for the EU as a whole. For
example in the case of the United States: the current year MAE is 0.74 (table 14) compared
to 0.53 for the EU(table 3); the comparable year ahead figures are 1.13 (table 20) and 0.94
(table 4). Noteworthy is that the differences in year ahead RMSE between the EU as a
whole on the one hand and the US and Japan on the other hand are not proportional to the
differences which exist between the MAEs, suggesting relatively fewer big errors have
been made in forecasting US and Japanese GDP one year ahead. Compared to the four big
EU countries the accuracy of France is better, but Germany, Italy and the UK are less well
predicted than the US and Japan.36
GDP forecasts for the US and Japan pass the performance statistics, which have also been
reported for the EU Member States, with one exception. There appears to be some
persistence in the GDP forecast errors for the USA in the current year (table 15). The test
statistic suggests some first order serial correlation in the error meaning failure to learn
from the mistake made in the previous period. This type of error disappears for the year
ahead forecast. Alternative easily available forecasts (THEIL1 and THEIL2) are inferior
(table 14 and 20). Absence of bias can be accepted, although there is a tendency to
underestimate GDP growth in the second subperiod. Particularly accurate is forecasting
the direction of change.
Table 13: Basic characteristics of the sample data - current year
US Japan European Union World Rest
World Volumes Prices
GDP Import volume Export Import Export Import
Sample 74/97 74/97 74/97 74/97 69/97 6997 69/97 69/97
No of obs. 24 24 24 24 29 29 29 29
MV(F) 2.22 3.25 4.85 5.15 5.53 5.47 4.40 4.60
MV(R) 2.30 3.36 5.01 5.15 5.82 5.74 5.10 5.23
ME -0.08 -0.11 -0.16 -0.01 -0.30 -0.27 -0.70 -0.63
STD(R) 2.39 2.16 4.27 4.80 4.14 5.24 5.94 9.98
Skewness(R) -0.40 -0.65 -1.34 -1.20 -0.44 -0.52 1.28 2.23
Kurtosis(R) 0.01 -0.36 3.08 2.48 0.48 0.43 4.07 9.08
Table 14: Basic characteristics of the forecast errors - current year
US Japan European Union World Rest
World Volumes Prices
GDP Import volume Export Import Export Import
MAV 2.90 3.51 5.79 6.16 6.24 6.78 5.75 6.83
MAE 0.74 0.86 2.01 2.35 1.86 2.18 1.48 2.20
RMSE 1.03 1.15 2.85 3.21 2.41 2.76 2.46 4.07
THEIL1 0.36 0.60 0.46 0.50 0.45 0.42 0.44 0.35
THEIL2 0.44 0.54 0.68 0.68 0.59 0.54 0.42 0.42
Table 15: Persistence in forecast errors - current year
US Japan European Union World Rest
World Volumes Prices
GDP Import volume Export Import Export Import
Signif r1=0 0.04 0.34 0.10 0.36 0.12 0.53 0.45 0.44
Signif r2=0 0.10 0.39 0.24 0.56 0.25 0.60 0.40 0.59
Signif r3=0 0.20 0.45 0.42 0.76 0.30 0.52 0.57 0.77
Table 16: Bias - current year
US Japan European Union World Rest
World Volumes Prices
GDP Import volume Export Import Export Import
a -0.08 -0.11 -0.16 -0.01 -0.30 -0.27 -0.70 -0.63
Signif a=0 0.71 0.65 0.79 0.99 0.52 0.61 0.13 0.41
a1 0.04 0.04 1.14 1.80 0.16 0.24 -1.55 -1.81
a2 -0.15 -0.20 -0.94 -1.09 -0.73 -0.74 0.10 0.47
Signif a1=a2 0.66 0.64 0.09 0.03 0.34 0.35 0.06 0.14
Table 17: Efficiency - current year
US Japan European Union World Rest
World Volumes Prices
GDP Import volume Export Import Export Import
a 0.32 -0.29 -2.14 -2.18 -0.10 -1.24 0.07 -0.76
Signif a=0 0.28 0.60 0.13 0.15 0.92 0.19 0.91 0.34
b 0.89 1.12 1.47 1.43 1.07 1.28 1.14 1.30
Signif b=1 0.23 0.42 0.08 0.11 0.63 0.06 0.14 0.00
Signif a=0, b=1 0.45 0.65 0.20 0.27 0.72 0.15 0.10 0.01
`R
2 0.81 0.70 0.58 0.57 0.64 0.74 0.84 0.87
DW 2.16 2.04 2.60 2.35 2.49 2.14 1.83 1.7237
Table 18: Directional accuracy - current year
US Japan European Union World Rest
World Volumes Prices
GDP Import volume Export Import Export Import
DF³0a n dDR<0 00111021
DF<0a n dDR³0 23156422
DF<0a n dDR<0 10 10 11 10 13 14 13 12
DF³0a n dDR³0 11 10 10 7 8 10 11 13
Success rate 0.91 0.87 0.91 0.74 0.75 0.86 0.86 0.89
Signif indep 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2. The trade variables
An important mechanism by which external developments influence the EU, and vice
versa, is via trade links. The impact of financial variables like exchange rates and interest
rates can also not be underestimated, but they are not analysed in this paper. The EU
international trade (average of exports and imports outside the EU) represents about 20 %
of the world total, and amounts to about 10 % of EU GDP. If also trade inside the EU
(60 % of total EU trade) is brought into the picture, the share in world trade is 35 % and the
corresponding figure in terms of EU GDP is 25 %.
The focus is on export market developments, for which here two approximations are used:
world import volume growth and import volume growth outside the EU. Furthermore, the
accuracy of EU exports and imports in volumes and their prices, is examined. The EU
trade variables are forecast together with the other EU variables, but some degree of
exogeneity can be attributed to export volumes (linked to real developments at the world
level) and to import prices (influenced by exchange rates for which technical assumptions
are used and by commodity prices largely determined outside the EU). The reported EU
trade variables include flows among Member States as well as trade between Member
States and the rest of the world.
The trade variables are less correctly predicted than US and Japanese GDP. In particular
for the year ahead forecasts large mean absolute errors are observed. Also the naïve
alternative forecasts (THEIL1 and THEIL2) perform well compared to the Commission
procedures followed in forecasting world imports. There is some evidence of bias, not for
the period as a whole, but for the subperiods tables 16 and 22). There appears to be a shift
from overestimation to underestimation for the trade volume variables (both at the world
and EU level), while the opposite shift occurred for trade prices.
Directional accuracy remains, however, very satisfactory (tables 18 and 24). Persistence of
forecast errors in the trade variables is also generally absent; while only the current year
import prices seem inefficiently forecast (table 17).
Table 19: Basic characteristics of the sample data - year ahead
US Japan European Union World Rest
World Volumes Prices
GDP Import volume Export Import Export Import
Sample 75/97 75/97 74/97 74/97 70/97 70/97 70/97 70/97
No of obs. 23 23 24 24 28 28 28 28
MV(F) 2.40 3.81 5.14 5.46 5.72 5.49 4.39 4.41
MV(R) 2.63 3.58 5.37 5.72 5.87 5.35 5.03 5.34
ME -0.23 0.23 -0.22 -0.26 -0.15 0.14 -0.64 -0.93
STD(R) 2.26 1.92 3.73 4.18 4.01 4.42 5.89 9.39
Skewness(R) -0.47 -0.39 -0.48 -0.39 -0.58 -0.38 1.39** 2.17**
Kurtosis(R) 0.17 -1.13 0.27 -0.64 1.03 -0.29 4.11** 8.38**38
Table 20: Basic characteristics of the forecast errors - year ahead
US Japan European Union World Rest
World Volumes Prices
GDP Import volume Export Import Export Import
MAV 3.07 3.58 5.76 6.16 6.26 6.01 5.58 6.68
MAE 1.13 1.18 2.57 2.96 2.67 3.19 2.73 4.56
RMSE 1.39 1.40 3.63 3.80 3.57 4.09 4.44 7.71
THEIL1 0.42 0.74 0.84 0.42 0.73 0.67 0.79 0.76
THEIL2 0.63 0.74 1.00 0.93 0.91 0.94 0.77 0.84
Table 21: Persistence in forecast errors - year ahead
US Japan European Union World Rest
World Volumes Prices
GDP Import volume Export Import Export Import
Signif r1=0 0.35 0.34 0.24 0.64 0.17 0.91 0.58 0.80
Signif r2=0 0.32 0.56 0.48 0.65 0.21 0.10 0.85 0.97
Signif r3=0 0.48 0.75 0.63 0.82 0.34 0.18 0.96 0.98
Table 22: Bias - year ahead
US Japan European Union World Rest
World Volumes Prices
GDP Import volume Export Import Export Import
a -0.23 0.23 -0.22 -0.26 -0.15 0.14 -0.64 -0.93
Signif a=0 0.43 0.44 0.77 0.75 0.83 0.86 0.46 0.54
a1 0.44 0.83 1.46 1.66 0.39 1.27 -2.63 -4.19
a2 -0.59 -0.09 -1.23 -1.41 -0.61 -0.84 1.09 1.91
Signif a1=a2 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.48 0.19 0.03 0.04
Table 23: Efficiency - year ahead
US Japan European Union World Rest
World Volumes Prices
GDP Import volume Export Import Export Import
a -0.52 0.02 2.60 1.25 1.05 1.70 -0.37 -1.87
Signif a=0 0.38 0.99 0.34 0.61 0.62 0.37 0.80 0.43
b 1.31 0.93 0.54 0.52 0.84 0.66 1.23 1.63
Signif b=1 0.15 0.77 0.36 0.67 0.65 0.29 0.41 0.14
Signif a=0, b=1 0.26 0.71 0.63 0.86 0.88 0.55 0.53 0.28
`R
2 0.64 0.44 0.01 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.42 0.32
DW 2.16 1.44 2.19 2.08 2.40 1.92 1.90 2.06
Table 24: Directional accuracy - year ahead
US Japan European Union World Rest
World Volumes Prices
GDP Import volume Export Import Export Import
DF³0a n dDR<0 0 3 3 1 4 3 4 2
DF<0a n dDR³0 3 3 4 5 4 5 3 3
DF<0a n dDR<0 10 8 8 10 10 10 10 11
DF³0a n dDR³0 9 8 8 7 9 9 10 11
Success rate 0.86 0.73 0.70 0.74 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.81
Signif indep 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00
XV. The interdependence of forecast errors
The type of relation which exists between forecast errors can reveal something on the
source of the mistakes and on the mechanisms at work which propagate10 them. To that
end correlation coefficients between forecast errors are calculated across countries and
10 Forecast errors may also appear more than once and be the source of the detected relation. This could
be e.g. the case with GDP also showing up in the ratio calculations (current account as % of GDP,
government deficit as % of GDP). The explanation of the correlation is then of a technical nature and
not based on one or the other economic relationship.39
across variables. It should be stressed that correlations do not say anything on the direction
of causation. If in what follows some form of causality is suggested, this is based on other
considerations. The period covered by the correlation coefficients can vary depending on
the data availability. Hence, correlation coefficients involving Spain or Portugal cover a
period starting only in the mid-80s, contrary to the earlier EU entrants for whom the period
is longer.
1. Across countries
Positively correlated forecast errors for the same variable across Member States are an
indication that the unexpected event which caused the prediction mistake has similar
effects in each country. With other words, the dominant shock is symmetric and affects all
countries in the same way. In an increasingly integrated EU errors should be positively
correlated. Negative correlations can be rationalised, for example, by unexpected exchange
rate movements or because forecasters used a wrong model. Correlations involving the EU
give an idea how EU wide mistakes influence forecast errors at the country level and vice
versa, being aware of the own country bias in the calculation. As the message does not
change fundamentally, only the year ahead correlations are represented in table 25.
The large majority of positive error correlations in the domain of GDP, inflation and
investment forecasting suggest a high degree of integration. There is a common
mistake/unexpected shock or, if the mistake/unexpected shock is affecting first one
country, its consequences are symmetric. Given the weight of Germany and France it is
not surprising to find a leading role for them in the forecasting accuracy of the other
Member States. Italy and the United Kingdom come next. Mistakes with investment
forecasting have a somewhat smaller common ground. As far as countries are concerned,
Denmark and Ireland stand out with GDP forecast errors which can be less well related to
errors made elsewhere. The number of negative correlations among inflation forecast
errors declines drastically between current year and year ahead predictions (Artis (1996)
observes the same). This is puzzling and makes the explanation of the negative correlation
among current year inflation prediction errors less robust in terms of unexpected exchange
rate changes. The same negative correlations should be observed among year ahead
forecast mistakes if unexpected exchange rate changes are an important explanatory factor.
Correlation coefficients for unemployment, deficit and current account are generally lower
compared to the previous three variables and several entries bear a negative sign. The
latter does not necessarily mean lack of integration, but reflects the prevailing strength of
country-specific factors (labour market structure, budgetary procedures, direction of
exports).
In the case of unemployment the negative numbers are basically left unexplained. Negative
numbers would be compatible with unexpected migration, but cross border labour flows
are slow and their size compared to the overall labour market are small so that an impact
within the forecast horizon is hard to accept.40
Table 25: Cross country error correlations - year ahead
GDP
B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL P UK EU
B 1.00 0.50 0.73 0.43 0.83 0.80 0.39 0.49 0.71 0.62 0.75 0.65 0.84
DK 1.00 0.57 -0.06 -0.08 0.48 0.18 0.43 0.40 0.46 -0.26 0.27 0.53
D 1.00 0.43 0.36 0.78 0.44 0.62 0.61 0.83 0.22 0.45 0.91
EL 1.00 0.45 0.57 0.45 0.69 0.76 0.45 0.49 0.05 0.61
E 1.00 0.69 0.05 0.65 0.67 0.35 0.75 0.58 0.77
F 1.00 0.44 0.49 0.76 0.74 0.69 0.63 0.89
IRL 1.00 0.39 0.37 0.43 0.22 0.30 0.48
I 1.00 0.51 0.32 0.46 0.49 0.74
L 1.00 0.64 0.67 0.43 0.73
NL 1.00 0.50 0.41 0.76
P 1.00 0.37 0.61
UK
Number of negative correlations (EU, excl):
Year ahead: 3/66
(p.m.: current year: 3/66)
1.00 0.72
EU 1.00
Inflation
B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL P UK EU
B 1.00 0.50 0.53 -0.03 0.41 0.58 0.83 0.67 0.77 0.39 0.56 0.46 0.67
DK 1.00 0.29 0.46 0.41 0.70 0.35 0.57 0.14 0.20 0.67 0.32 0.61
D 1.00 -0.46 0.41 0.42 0.57 0.25 0.56 0.61 0.41 0.21 0.53
EL 1.00 0.16 0.13 0.01 -0.05 -0.18 0.24 0.53 0.51 0.40
E 1.00 0.50 0.75 0.38 0.65 0.27 0.81 0.23 0.66
F 1.00 0.59 0.73 0.34 0.29 0.78 0.55 0.85
IRL 1.00 0.73 0.73 0.36 0.62 0.51 0.70
I 1.00 0.52 0.07 0.13 0.55 0.76
L 1.00 0.44 0.78 0.48 0.47
NL 1.00 0.48 0.52 0.52
P 1.00 0.51 0.80
UK
Number of negative correlations (EU, excl):
Year ahead: 4/66
(p.m.: current year: 21/66)
1.00 0.75
EU 1.00
Investment
B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL P UK EU
B 1.00 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.60 0.47 -0.10 0.38 0.35 0.43 0.04 0.41 0.54
DK 1.00 0.20 -0.09 0.18 0.35 0.33 0.02 0.13 0.49 -0.37 0.23 0.40
D 1.00 0.01 0.10 0.49 0.26 0.01 0.13 0.48 -0.34 0.25 0.71
EL 1.00 0.16 0.03 0.46 0.33 0.05 0.34 0.08 -0.04 0.17
E 1.00 0.66 0.18 0.68 0.70 0.01 0.46 0.51 0.67
F 1.00 0.11 0.34 0.35 0.46 0.15 0.66 0.83
IRL 1.00 0.19 0.04 0.29 -0.19 -0.02 0.30
I 1.00 -0.06 0.12 -0.14 0.21 0.47
L 1.00 0.11 0.55 0.07 0.27
NL 1.00 0.16 0.43 0.64
P 1.00 0.51 0.17
UK
Number of negative correlations (EU, excl):
Year ahead: 9/66
(p.m.: current year: 15/66)
1.00 0.68
EU 1.00
Unemployment rate
B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL P UK EU
B 1.00 0.48 0.56 -0.03 0.89 0.56 0.20 0.57 -0.32 0.41 0.54 0.52 0.82
DK 1.00 0.43 0.41 0.31 0.32 0.39 0.20 0.13 0.57 -0.09 0.34 0.56
D 1.00 0.13 0.27 0.55 0.10 0.45 -0.34 0.21 0.36 0.37 0.80
EL 1.00 -0.29 -0.26 0.07 -0.31 0.30 0.58 -0.02 -0.48 0.02
E 1.00 0.68 -0.09 0.72 0.04 0.25 0.62 0.26 0.74
F 1.00 -0.08 0.52 -0.37 0.18 0.44 0.44 0.79
IRL 1.00 0.19 -0.06 0.39 -0.75 0.13 0.16
I 1.00 -0.38 -0.13 0.29 0.18 0.67
L 1.00 0.17 -0.27 -0.35 -0.34
NL 1.00 -0.24 0.15 0.40
P 1.00 0.45 0.50
UK
Number of negative correlations (EU, excl):
Year ahead: 19/66
(p.m.: current year: 33/66)
1.00 0.54
EU 1.0041
Table 25 (continued):Cross country error correlations - year ahead
Government balance as % of GDP
B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL P UK EU
B 1.00 0.56 -0.11 0.07 0.30 0.01 0.31 -0.06 0.29 0.28 0.51 -0.12 0.04
DK 1.00 0.07 0.20 0.23 -0.05 0.37 -0.43 0.48 0.35 0.09 -0.21 -0.04
D 1.00 0.02 -0.11 0.11 0.66 -0.11 0.19 0.33 0.27 0.38 0.67
EL 1.00 -0.12 -0.20 -0.14 0.39 0.06 0.21 -0.04 -0.38 -0.03
E 1.00 0.77 0.50 0.09 0.18 -0.01 0.61 0.62 0.69
F 1.00 0.00 0.31 0.16 0.11 0.68 0.42 0.58
IRL 1.00 -0.19 0.20 0.49 0.34 0.42 0.51
I 1.00 -0.23 0.17 -0.23 0.25 0.41
L 1.00 0.25 -0.06 0.32 0.29
NL 1.00 -0.27 0.18 0.46
P 1.00 0.24 0.50
UK
Number of negative correlations (EU, excl):
Year ahead: 19/66
(p.m.: current year: 24/66)
1.00 0.80
EU 1.00
Current account as % of GDP
B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL P UK EU
B 1.00 0.25 0.16 -0.09 0.34 0.16 0.24 0.38 0.47 0.07 0.05 0.23 0.64
DK 1.00 0.11 -0.13 -0.39 -0.05 0.39 0.11 0.07 -0.24 0.27 0.28 0.36
D 1.00 0.05 -0.55 0.22 0.02 -0.10 0.08 -0.12 -0.79 -0.29 0.38
EL 1.00 -0.13 0.17 -0.15 -0.08 -0.39 0.22 -0.32 -0.41 -0.16
E 1.00 0.45 -0.42 0.61 -0.14 0.45 0.19 0.22 0.36
F 1.00 -0.18 -0.02 -0.14 0.02 -0.16 -0.58 0.05
IRL 1.00 0.34 0.07 -0.43 -0.22 0.27 0.35
I 1.00 0.11 -0.42 0.04 0.41 0.73
L 1.00 -0.04 0.23 0.13 0.23
NL 1.00 0.63 -0.27 -0.33
P 1.00 0.01 -0.47
UK
Number of negative correlations (EU, excl):
Year ahead: 28/66
(p.m.: current year: 25/66)
1.00 0.54
EU 1.00
While jointly over- or underestimation of government deficits appear to be the rule
suggesting that common shocks dominate, it is striking to observe that in 14 of the 19 cases
where the coefficient is negative, one of the five large Member States is involved. The
foreign leakage of fiscal policy actions would be a rationalisation of the phenomenon. To
be concrete, an unexpected fiscal expansion in Italy, leading to an underestimation of the
deficit, would partially leak abroad and stimulate activity there producing more
government receipts and eventually an overestimation of the deficit. Admittedly, the
negative correlations are low.
The large number of negative correlation coefficients in current account prediction errors
should not come as a surprise. If international trade forecasts are consistent, then
overestimation of, say, exports in one country is equivalent to overestimation of imports
elsewhere. The ensuing current account forecast mistakes move in the opposite direction.
Against this background the number of negative correlations and their size may even
appear small. This is probably due to the absence of important trading partners like the US
or Japan in the reported table on current account error mistakes.
2. Across variables
The appearance of a negative correlation between GDP and inflation forecast errors is
usually explained in terms of supply shocks. Unexpected and favourable developments in
productivity, real interest rates, business climate, etc. can boost GDP (producing
underestimation) and at the same time reduce inflation (producing overestimation of this
variable). With demand shocks, overestimation of GDP and inflation go hand in hand.
Given that the correlation coefficients are relatively small it is not possible to arrive at firm42
conclusions with respect to the dominance of one or the other type of shock for the period
as a whole. The larger correlation coefficients are, however, negative pointing to a
prevalence of supply shocks in those Member States.
The correlation between GDP and government deficit forecast errors can be rationalised in
terms of the operation of the automatic stabilisers if one privileges a causality running from
GDP to deficit or in a Keynesian framework where fiscal policy influences demand (Artis,
1999) The working of the automatic stabilisers, in case of an adverse shock producing
overestimation of GDP, induces a deterioration of the fiscal account leading to
underestimation of the government deficit11. The correlation coefficient will be positive
(government deficits are entered with a negative sign !). The Keynesian transmission
mechanism would result in a negative correlation coefficient. Indeed, unexpected
government spending (underestimation of the deficit) boosts demand (underestimation of
GDP). Automatic stabilisers seem to govern the relation between GDP and deficit. Only
in the United Kingdom unexpected shifts in the government account could have an impact
on real GDP.
Table 26: Some cross error correlations between GDP, inflation, deficit
and unemployment - current year
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LPU K E U
GDP – inflation (6-/12)
0.04 0.29 -0.02 -0.06 -0.14 0.02 0.02 -0.38 -0.30 0.10 0.09 -0.44 0.06
GDP – deficit ratio (1-/12)
0.45 0.14 0.54 0.08 0.68 0.47 0.55 0.14 0.17 0.35 0.70 -0.29 0.66
D e f i c i tr a t i o-i n f l a t i o n(1-/12)
0.33 0.47 0.52 -0.02 0.56 0.32 0.60 0.43 0.11 0.32 0.66 0.12 0.53
Unemployment rate - inflation (8-/12)
-0.20 -0.26 -0.08 -0.39 -0.16 0.12 -0.19 0.03 0.09 -0.07 -0.15 0.06 -0.18
Between brackets: number of negative correlations on total, EU excluded
Table 27: Some cross error correlations between GDP, inflation, deficit
and unemployment - year ahead
BD KDE LE FI R LI LN LPU K E U
GDP – inflation (6-/12)
-0.40 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 0.16 0.02 -0.49 0.09 -0.24 0.10 0.49 -0.62 -0.14
GDP – deficit ratio (1-/12)
0.23 0.45 0.65 -0.01 0.70 0.62 0.67 0.28 0.22 0.56 0.68 0.57 0.84
D e f i c i tr a t i o-i n f l a t i o n(1-/12)
0.00 0.22 0.50 -0.14 0.71 0.67 0.11 0.51 0.07 0.41 0.64 0.12 0.58
Unemployment rate - inflation (6-/12)
0.30 -0.16 0.09 -0.41 -0.45 -0.17 0.19 -0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.53 0.20 -0.11
Between brackets: number of negative correlations on total, EU excluded
Automatic stabilisers versus the Keynesian transmission channel can again be used for the
interpretation of the interdependence between inflation and deficit forecast errors (Artis,
1999). Unexpected inflation (underestimation of this variable) could increase government
receipts if tax rates are not or only partially indexed leading to an overestimation of the
deficit so that the operation of the automatic stabilisers would produce a positive
correlation coefficient. The Keynesian transmission mechanism would again produce a
negative correlation coefficient: unexpected government spending (underestimation of the
deficit) would lead to unexpected inflation (underestimation of this variable). There
appears to be more evidence for the existence of the working of the automatic stabilisers
11 Also for technical reasons a negative correlation can be expected as GDP enters the deficit ratio in the
numerator. A lower value for nominal GDP will increase the deficit ratio.43
than the Keynesian transmission mechanism, confirming the result obtained in the previous
paragraph..
The Philips-curve with its trade-off between unemployment and inflation forms the
obvious candidate for a rationalisation of the observed correlation coefficients between
these two variables. The negative correlation in some countries suggests that there could
exist in the short-term a weak, given the low value of the coefficient, trade-off between
surprise inflation and unemployment. This observation would be compatible with an
expectation-augmented Philips curve which states that unexpected inflation permits to
lower real wages and reduce unemployment. Positive correlations indicate absence of a
Philips-curve trade-off (or an upward shift of the curve): surprise inflation will increase the
unemployment rate.
Table 28: International trade error correlations
- current year
EU World Rest of
world
ExV ImV
(ImP)
ImV ImV
ExV
(ExP)
1.00 0.74
(0.91)
0.82 0.75
EU
ImV 1.00 0.68 0.70
World ImV 1.00 0.93
Rest of
world
ImV 1.00
Ex/Im: exports/imports; V/P: volume/price
Table 29: International trade error correlations
-y e a ra h e a d
EU World Rest of
world
ExV ImV
(ImP)
ImV ImV
ExV
(ExP)
1.00 0.67
(0.98)
0.76 0.78
EU
ImV 1.00 0.41 0.49
World ImV 1.00 0.90
Rest of
world
ImV 1.00
Ex/Im: exports/imports; V/P: volume/price
In tables 28 and 29 the correlation coefficients among the trade variables is examined. A
strong positive correlation for the forecast errors among the trade variables is observed,
which suggests a common source to prediction mistakes. It is notably the case for the EU
export volume forecast errors and those with the world import variables. While this is not
a surprise, the high error correlation at the EU level between export and import volumes on
the one hand, and, export and import prices on the other hand is more of a surprise. One
may have expected a greater role for unanticipated exchange rate movements which would
have pushed the associated forecast errors in the opposite direction. The general over-or
underestimation of the buoyancy of international trade is more important as a source for
prediction mistakes than unforeseen exchange rate movements or other country-specific
events. Similar results are arrived at in Artis (1996). Deutsche Bundesbank (1989) and
Donders & Kranendonk (1999) also stress the importance of a correct assessment of
international economic developments to avoid forecast errors.44
XVI. The sensitivity of forecast errors to an alternative set of realisation data
In order to have an idea about the sensitivity of the error statistics to the selection of the
outturn data, some of the tests for examination of current year and year ahead forecast
accuracy are replicated using the latest available data set at the moment of this study (June
1999). These data have been subject to numerous revisions at various points in time
contrary to the outturn data collected in the year following the forecast year, which have
been used elsewhere in this study. The latest major revision under way concerns the
adaptation of the data to the new national accounts system (ESA95). The data set for
Denmark and the United Kingdom is already in the new ESA95 system, but not for the
other Member States in the sample.
Table 30: Deterioration of basic error statistics with latest available outturn data
GDP Inflation Unemployment rate Deficit ratio
worse
on 13
pm:
early
EU
latest
worse
on 13
pm:
early
EU
latest
worse
on 13
pm:
early
EU
latest
worse
on 13
pm:
early
EU
latest
Current year
MAE 12 0.53 0.57 13 0.37 0.56 13 0.28 0.80 11 0.46 0.51
ME 11 0.08 -0.14 11 0.02 -0.53 12 -0.05 0.45 11 -0.02 -0.22
RMSE 11 0.77 0.71 13 0.49 0.77 13 0.41 1.03 9 0.56 0.63
THEIL1 8 0.36 0.37 9 0.31 0.45 13 0.46 1.46 13 0.54 0.64
Succes rate 9 0.82 0.75 11 0.82 0.86 11 0.89 0.75 9 0.93 0.64
Year ahead
MAE 11 0.94 0.92 11 0.93 1.08 12 0.52 0.94 7 0.69 0.71
ME 6 0.32 0.13 11 -0.31 -0.83 11 0.02 0.49 9 0.16 0.03
RMSE 10 1.33 1.23 8 1.51 1.81 13 0.80 1.25 8 0.87 0.92
THEIL1 9 0.67 0.63 9 0.76 1.03 9 0.73 1.01 7 0.76 0.77
Succes rate 7 0.78 0.79 10 0.81 0.64 5 0.77 0.78 10 0.71 0.68
As an indication of how results may be influenced by the selection of an alternative data set
for outturn data the impact on 4 variables was examined: GDP, inflation, deficit and
unemployment. Table 30 indicates the number of worse error statistics with the latest data
set compared to the early one. The counting is based on the 12 Member States covered by
this study plus the EU. Hence, an entry 13 would mean that in all cases the error statistic
deteriorated. Pro memori, the error statistics for the EU are given for both data sets so that
one can put the size of the change into perspective. For the first four error statistics (mean
absolute error, mean error, root mean squared error and the naive no-change forecast) an
increase12 in the statistic means a deterioration in forecast accuracy, while in the case of
the success rate of correct sign predictions, it is the decrease which is equivalent to a
deterioration. In order to assure comparability, the EU aggregate in the latest set of outturn
data is constructed in the same way as in the current year and year ahead forecasts: new
Member States are taken on board when the Commission started to make forecasts for
them.
In a majority of the cases the forecast accuracy deteriorates when the latest available
outturn data are used but the change is small and does not alter the overall judgement on
the quality of the forecasts. It must, however, be reported that the deterioration of the error
statistics at the country level is somewhat larger than for the EU average.
The largest deteriorations are observed with the unemployment rate, which might be
explained by a change in definitions. The latest available outturn data are based on
harmonised unemployment rates, while certainly in the beginning of forecasting at the
12 With respect to the mean error the sign is ignored. An increase in the bias is a deterioration of the
forecast accuracy.45
Commission national definitions were used. With respect to inflation the appearance of a
significant underestimation is worth noting. The smallest changes are observed with GDP
and deficit forecasts.
XVII. Comparison with outside forecasts
The quality of the Commission projections has already been checked against naïve
alternative forecasts (section VI, tables 3 and 4). How does the Commission perform
compared with the fully elaborated forecasts prepared by the IMF, the OECD or the
national forecast institutes ?
1. IMF and OECD
The three international institutions follow a similar approach to forecasting, but some
differences should be kept in mind when analysing the comparative results presented in
tables 31 and 32. While all three institutions present forecasts in Spring and Autumn, there
are some slight differences in timing. The OECD is typically somewhat later in the season
(June and December), giving it an information advantage, compared to the IMF being the
early bird (April/May and October). The Commission takes a middle position, but leans
more towards the IMF calendar. Due to data limitations the sample periods in the quoted
studies are not the same across the institutions. Comparative results could also be sensitive
to this.
Table 31: Comparison of GDP and inflation forecasts between Commission and IMF
Germany France Italy Unit. Kingdom United States Japan
COM IMF COM IMF COM IMF COM IMF COM IMF COM IMF
Current year
GDP
Sample 69/97 71/94 69/97 71/94 69/97 71/94 73/97 71/94 74/97 71/94 74/97 71/94
ME 0.04 0.18 -0.03 0.09 0.39 0.13 -0.01 0.15 -0.08 0.08 -0.11 0.10
MAE 0.96 0.99 0.56 0.77 0.94 1.03 0.77 0.93 0.74 0.77 0.86 1.14
THEIL1 0.45 0.46 0.35 0.72 0.45 0.59 0.45 0.47 0.36 0.29 0.60 0.43
Success rate 0.89 0.70 0.86 0.83 0.93 0.74 0.74 0.96 0.91 0.83 0.87 0.78
Inflation
Sample 69/97 71/94 69/97 71/94 69/97 71/94 73/97 71/94 - 71/94 - 71/94
ME 0.08 0.04 -0.02 -0.26 -0.09 -0.54 0.12 -0.46 - 0.01 - 0.47
MAE 0.33 0.59 0.49 1.03 0.75 0.75 0.84 1.39 - 0.42 - 1.23
THEIL1 0.38 0.50 0.44 0.59 0.37 0.72 0.42 0.35 - 0.35 - 0.53
Success rate 0.96 0.83 0.82 0.74 0.96 0.91 0.88 0.91 - 1.00 - 0.78
Year ahead
GDP
Sample 70/97 73/94 70/97 73/94 70/97 73/94 74/97 73/94 75/97 73/94 75/97 73/94
ME 0.36 0.60 0.29 0.52 0.66 0.33 0.28 0.45 -0.23 0.27 0.23 0.76
MAE 1.31 1.54 0.94 1.18 1.36 1.58 1.25 1.47 1.13 1.24 1.18 1.73
THEIL1 0.68 0.60 0.61 0.74 0.65 0.61 0.73 0.50 0.42 0.36 0.74 0.46
Success rate 0.78 0.70 0.78 0.80 0.74 0.65 0.83 0.70 0.86 0.80 0.73 0.80
Inflation
Sample 70/97 73/94 70/97 73/94 70/97 73/94 74/97 73/94 - 73/94 - 73/94
ME -0.08 0.02 -0.48 -0.50 -1.32* -0.81 -0.42 -1.01 - -0.05 - 0.44
MAE 0.76 0.59 1.15 1.20 1.69 2.15 1.75 1.84 - 0.96 - 2.07
THEIL1 0.74 0.39 0.88 0.43 0.88 0.64 0.63 0.36 - 0.35 - 0.66
Success rate 0.78 0.95 0.74 0.80 0.63 0.75 0.83 0.80 - 0.85 - 0.70
Inflation: private consumption deflator (Commission), GDP deflator (IMF)
IMF: results published in Artis (1996); COM: results obtained in this study
*: indicates that the mean error is significantly different from zero at the 5 % level
Current year forecast errors for GDP and inflation (see table 31) are similar for the
Commission and the IMF. In general the results are slightly more favourable to the46
Commission, but this cannot be considered significant. With respect to year ahead errors,
the conclusion is similar for GDP forecasts. However, the comparative statistics suggest
that the year ahead inflation forecasts for Germany, France and Italy made by the
Commission fall short of the accuracy reached by the IMF. At least in the case for
Germany and France a partial explanation could be offered by the large forecast errors
concerning inflation in the years 70-72 (see figure 5 and 6), which are covered in the
Commission comparative statistics, but not in those for the IMF. The slightly more
favourable inflation errors for the UK in the Commission forecasts corroborates this view.
As the UK joined the European Union later, forecasting for this country started also later,
explaining the shorter sample period.
Table 32: Comparison of deficit ratio forecasts between Commission,
IMF and OECD
Current year Year ahead
this study Artis (1998) this study Artis (1998)
COM COM IMF OECD COM COM IMF OECD
Germany
Sample 69/97 83/97 81/94 76/95 75/95 70.69 83/97 85/94 76/95 77/95
ME -0.15 -0.25 -0.24 -0.02 -
0.42*
-0.06 -0.13 -0.05 0.05 -0.48
MAE 0.80 0.55 0.60 0.80 1.07 0.91 0.79 0.97
THEIL1 0.62 - 1.11 - 0.68 - 1.46 -
France
Sample 69/97 83/97 81/94 76/95 76/95 70/97 83/97 85/94 76/95 77/95
ME -0.13 0.04 0.14 -0.22 -0.20 0.01 0.23 0.32 -0.09 0.09
MAE 0.68 0.64 0.63 0.55 0.75 0.98 0.42 1.02
THEIL1 0.83 - 0.79 - 0.82 - 1.24 -
Italy
Sample 69/97 83/97 81/94 78/95 78/95 70/97 83/97 85/94 76/95 78/95
ME 0.19 -0.04 0.19 0.99 -0.49 0.55 0.29 0.10 0.80* -0.17
MAE 1.09 0.76 1.67 0.98 1.51 0.48 1.62 1.36
THEIL1 0.76 - 1.42 - 0.90 - 1.51 -
United Kingdom
Sample 73/97 83/97 81/94 76/95 75/95 74/97 83/97 85/94 76/95 77/95
ME 0.16 0.15 0.56* 0.44 0.03 0.43 0.45 0.41 0.75 0.26
MAE 0.72 0.97 1.72 1.04 1.36 1.13 1.22 1.32
THEIL1 0.60 - 0.90 - 0.86 - 1.29 -
*: indicates that the mean error is significantly different from zero at the 5 % level
Fiscal forecasting (see table 32) leads to similar types of errors across the three institutions
for Germany and the United Kingdom. There is a tendency, though usually not significant,
for the general government deficit to be overestimated in Germany and underestimated in
the United Kingdom. For France and Italy the direction of the, again usually not
significant, bias is less homogenous across the three institutions. At first sight, it is not
evident to distil an institution which systematically outperforms the others. The forecasting
record shifts across institution, country and time horizon.
2. The national forecast institutions
Öller and Barot (1999) compare the accuracy of real GDP growth rate forecasts made at the
end of the year for the coming year by the OECD and the national forecast institutes. The
latter are public bodies and some are involved to a varying degree in economic analysis and
forecasting on which national governments base their economic policy decisions, notably
in budgetary matters. The same reservations on the comparability of test statistics (unequal
sample period and different finalisation dates of the forecasts) apply as in the OECD and
IMF case. Furthermore, as outturn data Öller and Barot (1999) have taken the results
published in the OECD Autumn Economic Outlook of the following year, also for the
examination of the forecast accuracy of the national institutes.47
Table 33 completes the picture with comparative information on the forecast accuracy of
the European Commission obtained in this study. The differences cannot be considered
significant13 and the results confirm the relative quality of the European Commission
forecasts.
Table 33: Comparison of GDP forecasts between Commission, OECD and national
institutes – year ahead
Belgium Denmark Germany France
this
study
Öller and
Barot (1999)
this
study
Öller and
Barot (1999)
this
study
Öller and
Barot (1999)
this
study
Öller and
Barot (1999)
COM OECD FPB COM OECD DEC COM OECD IFO COM OECD INSEE
Sample 70/97 71/95 85/95 74/97 71/95 80/95 70/97 71/95 71/95 70/97 71/95 71/95
MAE 1.19 1.20 1.16 1.03 1.13 0.89 1.31 1.29 1.11 0.94 0.95 1.14
Success rate 0.85 0.60 0.64 0.78 0.68 0.31 0.78 0.60 0.68 0.78 0.72 0.76
Ireland Italy Netherlands United Kingdom
this
study
Öller and
Barot (1999)
this
study
Öller and
Barot (1999)
this
study
Öller and
Barot (1999)
this
study
Öller and
Barot (1999)
COM OECD ESRI COM OECD ISCO COM OECD CPB COM OECD NIESR
Sample 74/97 71/95 80/95 70/97 71/95 85/95 70/97 71/95 71/95 74/97 71/95 71/95
MAE 2.36 2.19 1.94 1.36 1.53 0.50 1.08 1.09 1.22 1.25 1.25 1.41
Success rate 0.74 0.76 0.69 0.74 0.76 0.91 0.56 0.52 0.64 0.83 0.88 0.80
Ireland, ESRI: excluding 1977 for which no data were available
Success rate: rate of successful directional predictions; with respect to Öller and Barot (1999): own calculation based on
data provided in their study
XVIII.Conclusion
The quality of the Commission forecasts has been assessed by examining the predictions
for real GDP growth, inflation (measured by the private consumption deflator), real
investment growth (total fixed capital formation), the unemployment rate, the government
deficit/GDP ratio and the current account as a percentage of GDP. The focus was on the
EU and its Member States, but also some variables out of the international context were
analysed. Attention was paid to real GDP growth of the USA and Japan, world trade and
with respect to the EU export and import volumes and prices.
The Commission projections generally stand up quite well to most of the classical tests on
forecast accuracy. In particular, systematic errors are avoided: there is absence of bias,
forecast errors do not persist in a regular way and predictions are efficiently made in the
sense that the information included in past mistakes is taken on board. Furthermore, the
Commission forecasts outperform naïve easily available alternative prediction techniques
of the no-change or trend type.
There is no evidence of presenting an overly optimistic forecast. Especially from the
eighties onward the contrary can be observed in several Member States. There was a
tendency to underestimate real GDP growth, overestimate inflation and overestimate
unemployment. The critique against the Commission forecasts as being too rosy is
attributed to some evidence of denying the cycle: a slowdown is always moderate and an
expansion is too easily extrapolated. The possibility of an optimistic bias for forecasts
13 This has not been formally tested. Öller and Barot (1999) applied formal tests and found no significant
differences between OECD and national institutes. They are, however, in general critical towards the
level of accuracy obtained as the MAE is large compared to the small variations in the real GDP growth
rate. Furthermore, they find that the number of cases where OECD and national institutes do
significantly better than naïve alternatives is too small.48
beyond the coming year (not examined here), should not be transposed on the current year
and year ahead predictions for which this study did in general not find such a bias.
The question whether the Commission forecasts improved over time is answered with
mixed feelings. It indeed appears to be the case, but this coincides with greater stability of
the economy. Hence, the predictability of the economy may have increased rather than the
Commission’s capacity to look into the future.
For real GDP growth, inflation and the government deficit ratio a comparison was made
with the forecast accuracy of the IMF and OECD. Further comparisons are made with
some national forecast institutes with respect to real GDP growth projections. It is found
that the Commission forecasts have a similar record to these international and national
institutions.
Forecast errors appear mostly related in a “logical” way. Cross country error correlations
for the same variable point to common origins for prediction mistakes and/or a high degree
of economic interdependence. Error correlations across the relevant variables can be
rationalised to some extent by referring to the effects of demand and supply shocks, the
working of the automatic stabilisers and the Philips-curve trade-off.
The accuracy declines with the time length of the forecasting horizon. To have an idea of
the order of magnitude of the forecast errors involved, table 34 presents an overview. The
mean absolute error and the success rate in directional accuracy is given for the European
Union, a big country (France) and a small country (Belgium). The results are based on the
full sample covering the seventies, eighties and nineties. In general, the forecasting
performance for the European Union is the best, then come the bigger countries, while the
smaller countries represent the worst record. This order is related to the volatility of the
underlying economic variables partly explained by the degree of openness of countries.
Small countries are more sensitive to international economic developments which are
found to be an important source of forecast errors.
Table 34: Key figures about forecast accuracy for the EU, a big country and a small country
Mean absolute error Success rate in directional accuracy
Eur. Union France Belgium Eur. Union France Belgium
Current
year
Year
ahead
Current
year
Year
ahead
Current
year
Year
ahead
Current
year
Year
ahead
Current
year
Year
ahead
Current
year
Year
ahead
GDP 0.53 0.94 0.56 0.94 0.72 1.19 0.82 0.78 0.86 0.78 0.83 0.85
Inflation 0.37 0.99 0.49 1.15 0.59 1.13 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.74 0.93 0.67
Investment 1.14 1.74 1.60 1.97 2.31 3.71 0.74 0.82 0.70 0.71 0.82 0.52
Unemployment 0.28 0.52 0.35 0.64 0.46 0.86 0.89 0.77 0.89 0.62 0.71 0.73
Deficit 0.46 0.69 0.68 0.75 0.45 1.19 0.93 0.71 0.64 0.54 0.92 0.54
Current account 0.31 0.49 0.48 0.77 0.90 1.41 0.88 0.81 0.77 0.62 0.65 0.65
Mean absolute error: As GDP, inflation and investment are expressed in growth rates, the corresponding errors have to be
interpreted as percentage points. With respect to unemployment, expressed as a percentage of the labour force, the error
is in terms of the labour force. The errors related to government deficit and current account are a percentage of GDP.
Finally, the following results can be of interest with respect to variables and countries.
With respect to variables:
While the GDP forecast errors could appear large, they will be hard to improve upon.
The quality of the GDP forecasts for the US and Japan is similar to that for the EU.
The GDP predictions by the Commission compare favourably with results obtained
for IMF, OECD and national forecast institutions.49
Despite general absence of bias in inflation forecasting, meaning that on average one
is correct, year ahead prediction is not entirely efficient at the EU level. This implies
that there is scope to improve further forecasts, despite the great progress which has
already been realised in reducing the year ahead forecast error between the seventies
and now. It was mainly the result of reduction in inflation and its volatility.
The investment series displays among the largest forecast errors, but this appears
related to the volatility of the series. There is also the presumption of an optimistic
bias.
The forecast errors for the unemployment rate are among the smallest, but
satisfaction is misplaced. One failed to learn from past prediction mistakes
producing underestimation in the seventies and overestimation from the mid-eighties.
Forecast errors tended also to increase over time.
Over- or underestimation of the government deficit ratio is in general not significant.
Concentrating on the second sub period examined (1983-97) there was a tendency to
make prudent deficit forecasts for Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal. The predictions were more ambitious,
but they failed to materialise (deficits were underestimated) in the following Member
States: Belgium, Greece, Spain, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. In general
one can be reasonably satisfied with the forecasting record of this important policy
variable. The comparison with the OECD and IMF is also favourable. Nevertheless,
it has to be noted that the additional accuracy provided by the Commission’s
sophisticated approach to forecasting compared the naïve no-change forecast is
smaller than with some other variables.
Though small the mean absolute forecast error for the current account appears large
in comparison to the average value for the current account. This is not a surprise
given the equilibrium nature of the current balance leading to an average value close
to zero.
The variables related to international trade are the most difficult to forecast. Errors
are very large and there appears a tendency to underestimate world trade and EU
exports and imports in volumes from the eighties onwards, while EU export and
import prices are overestimated. An incorrect assessment of international economic
developments is considered to be an important source of prediction mistakes. Their
effect on forecast accuracy seem to be larger than the consequences of unforeseen
exchange rate movements.
With respect to countries:
From casual inspection of the error statistics and without attempting to make a
correction for the volatility of the underlying series, France appears to present the
best forecasting record, followed by Germany. The latter country has, however, a
better inflation forecast record, but the GDP forecast is disappointing. The
Netherlands appear to precede Belgium and Denmark, with the latter disposing of
good GDP forecasts. Based on the error statistics related to investment and the
equilibrium variables (unemployment, government deficit and current account) the50
United Kingdom should come before the just mentioned group of three small
countries, but the quality of the GDP and inflation forecasts is weaker, but note that
the GDP forecast is better than the one for Germany. Forecasting the Italian
economy looks difficult, but even more so the Greek, where larger errors are noted
for the government deficit. GDP and investment forecasts in Ireland and
Luxembourg represent among the highest errors. The unemployment rate is best
forecast in Luxembourg.
Spain and Portugal have been left out of the above ranking as the period examined
for these countries starts only in the mid-eighties so that the big forecast errors
related to the two oil shocks of the seventies could not influence the test results. The
Spanish performance in inflation forecasting appears worth mentioning and the
prudence of the Portuguese deficit forecast.
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Annex A: Data sources
The table lists from 1969 all available comprehensive short-term macroeconomic projections made by the European Commission,
classified by finalisation date of the forecast document and indicates where the data for the analysis of the forecast accuracy are taken from.
When available the cut-off date for inclusion of information in the forecasts is also mentioned.
Cut-off Title of forecast document
a Publication in
forecast outturn forecast outturn date Supplement A
1969 June 1969 Preliminary Economic Budgets for 1970
December 1970 Complete Economic Budgets for 1970
1970 June 1970 1969 Preliminary Economic Budgets for 1971
December 1971 Complete Economic Budgets for 1971
1971 June 1971 1970 Preliminary Economic Budgets for 1972
July Revised Preliminary Economic Budgets for 1972
1972 January 1972 1970 Complete Economic Budgets for 1972
June 1972 1971 Preliminary Economic Budgets for 1973
August Revised Preliminary Economic Budgets for 1973
1973 January, 10 1973 1971 Complete Economic Budgets for 1973
June, 27 1973 1972 Preliminary Economic Budgets for 1974
August, 17 Revised Preliminary Economic Budgets for 1974
December 1974 1972 Complete Economic Budgets for 1974
1974 June, 20 1974 1973 Preliminary Economic Budgets for 1975
August, 10 Revised Preliminary Economic Budgets for 1975
December, 19 1975 1973 Complete Economic Budgets for 1975
1975 June, 23 1975 1974 Preliminary Economic Budgets for 1976
September, 26 1976 1974 Revised Preliminary Economic Budgets for 1976
1976 January, 23 Complete Economic Budgets for 1976
June, 9 1976 1975 Preliminary Economic Budgets for 1977
July, 29 Revised Preliminary Economic Budgets for 1977
1977 January, 12 1977 1975 Complete Economic Budgets for 1977
June, 7 1977 1976 Preliminary Economic Budgets for 1978
September, 23 1978 1976 Revised Preliminary Economic Budgets for 1978
1978 February, 20 Complete Economic Budgets for 1978
June, 25 1978 1977 Preliminary Economic Budgets for 1979
October, 20 1979 1977 Revised Preliminary Economic Budgets for 1979
1979 February, 20 Summary of January 1979 Economic Forecasts
June, 11 1979 1978 Summary of June 1979 Economic Forecasts
October, 10 1980 1978 Summary of October 1979 Economic Forecasts
Current year Year ahead
not used
not used
not used
not used
not used
not used
Finalisation
date
not used
not used
1980 February, 12 Economic forecasts, January 1980
June, 5 1980 1979 Economic forecasts, May 1980
October, 16 1981 1979 Economic forecasts, October1980
1981 February, 24 Economic forecasts, January 1980
June, 25 1981 1980 early June Economic forecasts, May 1981 No 7, July
September, 25 1982 1980 not available Economic forecasts, September/October 1981 not published
1982 March, 4 March, 2 Economic forecasts 1982 No 4, April
June, 8 1982 1981 not available Economic forecasts 1982-1983 not published
October, 6 1983 1981 October, 6 Economic forecasts 1982-1983 No 10, October
1983 February, 23 not available Summary of January 1983 Economic Forecasts No 2, February
June, 13 1983 1982 June, 9 Economic forecasts 1983-1984 No 6, June
October, 18 1984 1982 October, 9 Economic forecasts 1983-1984 No 10, October
1984 February, 3 February, 3 Economic forecasts 1983-1984 No 2, February
June, 5 1984 1983 June, 5 Economic forecasts 1984-1985 No 6, June
October, 9 1985 1983 October, 9 Economic forecasts 1984-1985 No 10, October
not used
not used
not used
not used
not used53
(table continued)
Cut-off Title of forecast document
a Publication in
forecast outturn forecast outturn date Supplement A
1985 February, 5 January, 31 Economic forecasts 1984-1985 No 2, February
June, 7 1985 1984 June, 7 Economic forecasts 1985-1986 No 6, June
October, 8 1986 1984 October, 8 Economic forecasts 1985-1986 No 10, October
1986 March, 4 not available Economic forecasts 1985-1986 No 3, March
June, 22 1986 1985 June, 22 Economic forecasts 1986-1987 No 6, June
October, 6 1987 1985 October, 6 Economic forecasts 1986-1987 No 10, October
1987 January, 30 not available Economic forecasts 1986-1987 No 3, March
June, 4 1987 1986 June, 4 Economic forecasts 1987-1988 No 5, May
September, 28 1988 1986 September, 28 Economic forecasts 1987-1988 No 10, October
1988 February, 3 February, 3 Economic forecasts 1987-1988 No 2, February
June, 14 1988 1987 June, 6 Economic forecasts 1988-1989 No 6, June
October, 7 1989 1987 October, 4 Economic forecasts 1988-1989 No 8/9, Aug/Sept
1989 January, 27 January, 26 Economic forecasts 1989-1990 No 2, February
June, 12 1989 1988 June, 25 Economic forecasts 1989-1990 No 5/6, May/June
October, 12 1990 1988 September, 29 Economic forecasts 1989-1990 No 10, October
1990 June, 16 1990 1989 June, 2 Economic forecasts 1990-1991 No 4/5, April/May
November, 21 1991 1989 November, 19 Economic forecasts 1991-1992 No11/12, Nov/Dec
1991 June, 15 1991 1990 June, 8 Economic forecasts 1991-1992 No 5, May
November, 18 1992 1990 November, 12 Economic forecasts 1992-1993 No 11/12, Nov/Dec
1992 June, 14 1992 1991 June, 6 Economic forecasts 1992-1993 No 5/6, May/June
1993 January, 15 1993 1991 January, 11 Economic forecasts 1993-1994 No 1/2, Jan/Feb
June, 18 1993 1992 June, 14 Economic forecasts 1993-1994 No 6/7, June/July
November, 10 1994 1992 November, 8 Economic forecasts 1993-1995 No 11/12, Nov/Dec
1994 June, 11 1994 1993 June, 5 Economic forecasts 1994-1995 No 5, May
November, 22 1995 1993 November, 17 Economic forecasts 1994-1996 No 11/12, Nov/Dec
1995 June, 10 1995 1994 June, 2 Economic forecasts 1995-1996 No 4/5, April/May
November, 15 1996 1994 November, 15 Economic forecasts 1995-1997 No 12, December
1996 June, 15 1996 1995 June, 10 Economic forecasts 1996-1997 No 5/6, May/June
October, 30 1997 1995 October, 23 Economic forecasts 1996-1998 No 12, December
1997 April, 18 1997 1996 April, 15 Economic forecasts 1997-1998 No 5, May
October, 14 1996 October, 9 Economic forecasts 1997-1999 No 10, October
1998 March, 18 1997 March, 16 Economic forecasts 1998-1999 No 3/4, March/April
October, 20 1997 October, 14 Economic forecasts 1998-2000 No 10, October
a: Until 1973 the preliminary, revised preliminary and complete budgets were bundled per year in "Raport sur les budgets économiques
pour (year)" and are only available in French. Afterwards, they are available in German, French and English.
In 1979 the title Economic Forecasts appeared, but in French it remained "Budgets économiques".
The main elements of the forecast were published in Supplement A of European Economy from July 1981 onwards.
not used
not used
not used
not used
not used
Finalisation Current year Year ahead
date54
Annex B: Data set
General notes to the tables.
The source for the forecast (F) and realisation (R) data is given in annex A, unless notes to
the tables indicate otherwise. Holes in the series are filled following a 'severe' approach
where possible. Hence, missing forecast data are selected from an earlier forecast, while
missing outturn data are selected from a later publication.
The calculation of the EU aggregate has evolved over time. Initially exchange rates were
used, but after the introduction of Purchasing Power Standards (PPS), Member States
volume data were converted into PPS of a fixed base year, simply added and consequently
the growth rate of the aggregate was calculated. In the early nineties this method to
calculate the growth rate after aggregation was replaced by a procedure of aggregation
of growth rates. The weights are the PPS values of the previous year.
Past publications often do not mention the EU average which had to be recalculated ex post
(indicated with "CAL") using the appropriate weighting scheme. For the volume growth
rates of GDP, total investment, exports and imports as well as for the annual changes
of the private consumption deflator, export prices and import prices the respective PPS
weights were used. Nominal ECU weights were used in the ratio calculation for the current
account and the government balance as a percentage of GDP. The civilian labour
force was the basis of the weighting scheme for the unemployment rate.
When new Member States joined the European Union the EU average did not comprise
the same countries in the forecast data and in the outturn data. The new entrants are
covered only from the accession year: Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973;
Greece in 1981; Spain and Portugal in 1986; Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995.
Outturn data for the EU have been recalculated to eliminate the impact of the new
Member States .
The year ahead forecast for the EU in 1995 is based on 16 countries as it includes Norway,
which was thought to join at the same time as Austria, Finland and Sweden. It turned out
differently and hence the corresponding realisation data for the EU aggregate are based on
only 15 countries. This has not been corrected.
West-Germany until 1992; unified Germany from 1993.55
Table B1: Real GDP growth rate - current year
Belgium Denmark Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Un. Kingd. Eur. Union
FRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFR
1969 5.1 6.0 5.5 8.0 6.8 8.1 6.5 5.0 4.5 7.0 4.5 5.0 6.0 6.9
1970 5.0 5.5 5.8 4.9 5.2 6.0 7.5 5.1 4.0 3.5 5.0 5.9 6.0 5.4
1971 3.9 4.2 3.4 2.8 5.4 5.0 3.8 1.4 1.3 0.7 4.0 4.2 4.1 3.3
1972 3.6 4.5 1.8 2.9 5.1 5.4 4.0 3.2 1.7 3.5 3.6 4.0 3.3 3.8
1973 5.2 5.9 6.5 4.9 5.9 5.3 6.0 6.0 5.8 7.0 5.2 5.9 5.5 7.4 4.5 4.7 6.0 5.8 5.8 5.6
1974 3.3 4.0 2.0 1.5 2.0 0.6 4.4 3.8 4.0 0.4 5.0 3.4 3.3 4.9 2.5 1.7 -1.4 0.3 2.4 1.9
1975 0.6 -1.3 1.5 -1.1 0.5 -3.5 0.5 -2.0 1.5 -1.5 -1.6 -3.7 -2.5 -7.7 1.1 -0.7 0.9 -1.6 0.4 -2.5
1976 3.7 3.0 5.2 4.8 6.0 5.7 6.0 5.2 3.2 3.5 1.6 5.6 4.2 3.0 4.0 3.5 2.4 1.8 4.5 4.6
1977 3.5 2.0 1.5 1.2 4.0 2.6 3.1 3.0 3.7 5.6 3.0 1.7 2.0 1.1 4.0 2.5 0.8 0.6 3.0 2.2
1978 2.6 2.3 1.1 0.9 2.7 3.1 2.9 3.3 6.0 6.0 2.2 2.6 1.8 3.2 2.2 2.9 2.7 3.3 2.6 3.0
1979 2.5 2.5 2.3 3.5 4.0 4.4 3.4 3.2 3.8 3.2 4.9 5.0 2.3 2.7 2.1 2.2 2.0 0.6 3.4 3.3
1980 1.4 1.1 -0.9 -0.8 2.5 1.9 2.2 1.8 0.9 0.9 3.9 4.0 1.9 0.4 0.7 0.9 -2.6 -1.4 1.5 1.5
1981 -0.7 -1.5 0.1 -0.9 -0.7 0.2 1.5 -0.3 0.5 0.5 1.9 3.4 -0.3 0.2 -1.8 -1.0 -0.6 -0.7 -2.6 -1.2 -0.6 -0.2
1982 0.5 1.9 2.9 3.0 1.0 -0.6 0.8 -0.2 2.2 1.8 2.2 1.4 1.8 -0.5 0.6 1.5 0.5 -1.4 1.3 1.0 1.5 0.6
1983 -0.7 -0.3 1.4 2.0 0.6 1.5 0.9 0.4 -0.8 0.7 0.5 -1.9 0.1 -0.2 -1.4 3.2 -0.4 1.4 2.4 3.8 0.5 1.4
1984 1.3 1.7 2.7 3.4 3.0 2.7 1.7 2.8 1.1 1.5 2.4 4.2 2.4 2.8 0.3 5.5 2.1 2.4 2.7 2.1 2.2 2.2
1985 1.6 1.3 2.9 3.8 2.5 2.5 1.9 2.1 1.1 1.3 2.9 2.1 2.6 2.3 1.2 2.1 2.0 2.3 3.5 3.3 2.3 2.3
1986 2.0 2.2 2.5 3.4 3.5 2.5 -0.4 1.3 2.7 3.0 2.3 2.4 3.2 0.5 2.7 2.7 2.2 2.3 1.7 2.1 3.9 4.3 2.6 2.4 2.7 2.5
1987 1.2 1.8 -0.2 -1.0 1.5 1.8 -0.7 -0.6 2.8 5.2 1.5 2.2 1.1 4.8 3.2 3.1 2.0 2.0 1.7 2.2 3.4 4.6 3.1 3.6 2.2 2.7
1988 2.0 4.0 -0.1 -0.2 2.1 3.5 1.6 3.5 4.3 5.0 2.3 3.2 1.7 3.8 3.1 3.9 1.9 5.0 1.5 2.6 3.6 4.0 3.1 3.7 2.6 3.6
1989 3.6 4.5 1.1 1.1 3.0 3.4 3.0 2.9 4.5 4.9 3.1 3.5 4.1 5.7 3.4 3.2 3.2 4.6 3.4 4.0 4.2 5.4 2.4 2.3 3.2 3.4
1990 3.0 3.7 2.0 1.6 3.7 4.7 1.6 0.1 3.8 3.7 3.2 2.8 4.6 5.2 3.1 2.0 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.3 4.0 4.0 1.6 0.6 3.0 2.7
1991 2.3 1.4 1.4 1.0 2.7 3.4 0.8 1.8 3.0 2.4 1.6 1.2 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.4 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.2 2.8 1.8 -2.2 -2.2 1.4 1.3
1992 1.6 0.7 2.4 1.1 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.3 2.5 1.0 1.9 1.3 2.2 3.5 1.5 0.9 2.9 1.8 1.2 1.7 2.3 1.1 0.6 -0.6 1.7 0.9
1993 -1.2 -1.3 0.1 1.1 -2.0 -1.2 0.8 -0.2 -0.4 -1.0 -0.7 -0.7 2.1 2.5 0.0 -0.7 1.0 0.3 -0.6 0.3 0.5 -1.2 1.5 1.9 -0.4 -0.3
1994 1.3 2.3 3.8 4.4 1.3 2.9 0.7 1.2 1.1 2.0 1.6 2.7 4.2 6.3 1.5 2.2 1.6 3.0 1.3 2.5 1.1 1.1 2.5 3.8 1.6 2.8
1995 2.7 1.9 3.3 2.6 3.0 1.9 1.6 2.0 3.1 3.0 3.1 2.2 6.9 8.6 3.3 3.0 3.3 3.2 3.2 2.4 3.0 2.5 3.1 2.4 3.1 2.5
1996 1.1 1.4 1.3 2.4 0.5 1.4 2.0 2.6 2.0 2.2 1.0 1.3 5.6 8.4 1.8 0.7 2.6 3.6 1.8 2.8 2.3 3.0 2.4 2.1 1.5 1.6
1997 2.3 2.7 3.0 2.9 2.3 2.2 3.1 3.5 2.8 3.4 2.3 2.4 7.2 10.0 1.2 1.5 3.7 4.1 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.7 2.8 3.5 2.4 2.7
Since 1974-VI: GDP, before GNP 1972(R) EU: idem for EUR9 1985(R) EU: idem for EUR12
1969(R) B, F: 69-XII; EU: CAL 1980(R) EU: 1.4 for EUR10 1994(R) EU: 2.7 for EUR15
1970(F) B: 69-XII; EU: CAL56
Table B2: Real GDP growth rate - year ahead
Belgium Denmark Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Un. Kingd. Eur. Union
FRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFR
1969
1970 5.0 6.1 4.4 5.4 3.6 6.0 7.6 5.1 3.0 3.5 4.0 5.5 4.7 5.5
1971 4.1 3.7 3.7 2.8 5.3 5.0 6.1 1.4 2.4 0.7 4.2 4.0 4.7 3.3
1972 4.2 5.4 1.0 3.0 5.0 5.4 3.5 3.2 2.0 3.5 2.0 4.5 3.0 3.9
1973 4.5 5.6 5.0 5.3 5.4 6.0 5.5 5.9 4.0 7.5 4.5 4.0 5.2 5.6
1974 6.0 2.0 3.5 1.6 3.5 0.6 5.1 3.8 5.6 0.4 6.5 3.4 3.3 4.5 3.0 2.8 3.5 0.7 4.5 2.0
1975 2.5 -2.0 1.5 -1.0 2.5 -3.3 3.0 -1.3 2.0 -0.5 1.4 -3.7 1.5 -7.7 2.4 -0.9 2.5 -1.3 2.5 -2.3
1976 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.8 3.5 5.7 5.0 5.2 2.0 3.2 3.0 5.6 3.9 2.7 2.8 4.4 0.1 1.6 3.1 4.7
1977 3.0 1.3 2.0 1.9 3.9 2.8 3.0 3.0 2.0 5.5 0.5 1.7 3.0 1.3 3.6 2.4 1.4 1.0 2.7 2.3
1978 3.1 2.5 2.0 0.9 4.0 3.2 3.6 3.3 5.5 6.1 3.3 2.6 2.8 3.2 3.1 2.4 2.5 3.7 3.4 3.1
1979 2.5 2.4 1.6 3.5 3.5 4.6 3.7 3.2 4.0 1.9 4.1 5.0 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.4 0.9 3.3 3.4
1980 2.5 2.4 0.8 -0.2 2.9 1.9 2.2 1.3 3.0 0.9 2.2 4.0 2.0 0.4 2.2 0.5 -1.0 -1.4 1.9 1.4
1981 0.9 -1.7 0.6 -0.2 1.0 0.1 1.2 0.3 2.5 1.1 0.2 -0.2 0.5 -2.4 0.3 -1.1 -0.6 -1.9 0.6 -0.4
1982 0.2 1.0 3.0 3.4 2.2 -1.0 2.1 0.0 3.0 1.8 3.6 1.2 1.8 -0.3 -0.3 -1.1 0.9 -1.6 1.2 1.5 2.0 0.4
1983 0.5 0.4 1.6 2.5 1.0 1.0 1.9 0.3 1.0 0.7 2.4 0.6 1.0 -1.2 1.0 -1.4 -0.3 0.6 1.7 3.3 1.1 0.9
1984 0.6 1.7 1.2 3.9 2.1 2.6 1.5 2.6 0.4 1.6 1.8 4.4 1.5 2.6 -1.0 3.2 0.0 1.7 2.2 1.8 1.5 2.2
1985 1.0 1.5 2.9 3.8 2.5 2.6 2.0 2.1 1.7 1.4 2.6 2.0 2.3 2.3 1.9 2.2 1.8 1.7 3.0 3.7 2.3 2.4
1986 1.7 2.3 3.2 3.4 3.5 2.6 1.0 1.3 1.9 2.0 2.3 -0.3 2.7 2.7 1.3 2.5 2.0 2.4 2.0 2.9 2.5 2.5
1987 1.3 1.8 1.8 -1.0 3.2 1.9 -0.2 -0.4 3.0 5.2 2.5 2.3 3.1 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.6 2.4 1.8 1.5 3.5 4.6 2.7 4.3 2.8 2.9
1988 1.8 4.0 0.9 -0.4 1.9 3.7 0.5 4.0 3.7 5.0 1.9 3.4 1.3 3.7 2.8 3.9 1.8 5.2 1.2 2.8 3.0 3.9 2.7 4.2 2.3 3.8
1989 2.2 4.0 1.7 1.3 2.5 3.3 2.1 2.6 3.9 4.9 2.8 3.6 3.2 5.9 3.2 3.2 2.4 6.1 2.3 4.0 3.6 5.4 2.6 2.2 2.8 3.3
1990 3.3 3.7 2.0 2.1 3.5 4.7 2.3 -0.3 4.0 3.7 3.2 2.8 4.6 5.7 3.0 2.0 3.3 0.9 3.0 3.9 4.6 4.0 2.1 0.8 3.1 2.8
1991 2.2 1.9 0.9 1.2 3.1 3.7 1.0 1.8 2.5 2.4 2.5 1.1 2.3 2.5 2.3 1.4 2.9 3.1 2.0 2.2 3.2 1.9 0.7 -2.2 2.2 1.4
1992 2.1 0.5 3.0 1.2 2.2 1.6 1.2 1.3 3.1 0.8 2.3 1.4 2.3 4.8 2.0 0.9 3.4 1.8 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.1 2.0 -0.5 2.2 1.0
1993 0.5 -1.7 1.8 1.4 0.0 -1.2 1.6 -0.5 1.0 -1.1 1.0 -1.0 2.1 4.0 0.8 -0.7 2.0 0.3 0.6 0.3 1.3 -1.2 1.4 2.0 0.8 -0.4
1994 0.5 2.2 2.6 4.4 0.5 2.9 0.9 1.5 1.1 2.0 1.0 2.7 3.3 6.7 1.6 2.2 2.0 4.4 0.9 2.7 1.4 1.1 2.5 3.8 1.3 2.8
1995 2.7 1.9 3.2 2.8 3.0 1.9 1.1 2.0 2.8 2.8 3.2 2.2 5.6 10.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.4 3.2 2.1 3.0 2.3 2.7 2.4 3.0 2.4
1996 2.2 1.5 2.6 2.7 2.4 1.4 1.9 2.6 2.9 2.3 2.4 1.5 5.6 8.6 3.0 0.7 3.3 3.0 2.5 3.3 3.1 3.3 2.7 2.3 2.6 1.8
1997 2.2 2.9 3.1 3.3 2.2 2.2 2.5 3.2 2.7 3.5 2.1 2.3 5.8 10.6 1.4 1.5 2.8 4.8 2.8 3.6 2.8 3.7 3.0 3.5 2.3 2.7
Since 1974-VI: GDP, before GNP 1972(R) EU: 3.7 for EUR9 1985(R) EU: idem for EUR12
1970(R) EU: CAL 1973(R) EU: 5.5 for EUR9 1986(R) EU: 2.6 for EUR12
1972(F) EU: CAL 1980(R) EU: 1.5 for EUR10 1994(R) EU: idem for EUR15
1972(R) DK, L: 73-VIII; EU: CAL 1981(R) EU: -0.6 or EUR10 1995(F) EU: in fact EUR16 (includes Norway)
1974(F) DK, D, I: 73-VIII; EU: CAL57
Table B3: Inflation (private consumption deflator, annual change) - current year
Belgium Denmark Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Un. Kingd. Eur. Union
FRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFR
1969 3.3 3.5 3.0 2.5 5.5 6.9 2.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 6.5 7.0 3.5 4.0
1970 4.5 3.5 3.8 3.8 5.1 5.2 5.2 4.8 4.8 4.6 4.0 3.5 4.5 4.4
1971 6.0 5.1 4.5 5.3 4.7 5.7 5.0 5.2 4.5 4.7 6.0 7.0 4.9 5.4
1972 4.7 5.4 5.0 5.8 5.5 5.6 5.5 5.9 4.3 5.2 7.0 8.0 5.3 5.9
1973 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.3 7.0 7.1 6.8 7.2 9.0 11.5 9.0 11.0 6.0 6.1 7.8 9.0 6.0 8.6 7.1 8.0
1974 11.3 12.5 14.0 15.3 8.5 7.3 13.3 12.8 15.0 17.3 18.0 19.6 9.0 9.5 12.0 10.3 14.5 14.6 12.8 12.1
1975 11.5 12.8 10.5 9.6 6.0 6.1 10.0 11.8 25.1 21.0 19.0 17.4 9.3 10.7 10.0 10.4 19.5 22.0 11.9 12.4
1976 10.3 8.8 9.1 8.5 5.0 4.4 10.5 9.8 17.0 18.0 20.5 17.5 9.5 9.8 9.5 9.3 15.5 15.2 11.0 9.9
1977 7.5 6.6 9.0 10.6 4.0 3.9 9.0 9.1 15.0 13.6 19.0 18.0 7.8 6.7 7.0 6.7 15.0 14.3 9.6 9.1
1978 5.0 4.0 9.0 9.4 3.3 2.6 9.0 8.8 7.0 8.0 13.0 12.7 3.5 3.1 4.8 4.6 8.2 8.6 7.2 7.1
1979 4.2 4.5 8.7 9.6 4.0 4.1 9.8 10.5 12.5 13.2 14.8 14.9 4.5 4.5 5.0 4.7 11.5 12.0 8.5 9.0
1980 7.0 6.3 12.5 11.0 5.5 5.4 13.2 13.5 19.5 18.2 19.6 20.3 6.7 6.3 6.5 6.9 20.3 15.5 12.3 12.4
1981 6.8 7.6 10.0 10.7 5.8 5.9 24.0 24.4 13.0 12.5 17.5 20.5 21.0 19.0 6.8 8.1 7.3 6.7 11.2 10.7 11.5 10.9
1982 10.2 8.8 10.1 9.8 4.7 5.3 24.0 21.1 13.3 10.9 18.5 17.1 15.0 16.8 12.0 10.0 5.8 5.7 9.5 8.1 10.2 8.8
1983 6.7 7.7 6.4 6.7 3.0 3.0 21.5 19.1 8.6 9.3 10.5 10.5 14.9 14.9 8.8 8.4 2.7 2.5 6.2 5.4 6.4 6.3
1984 6.6 6.3 5.3 6.6 2.9 2.6 19.0 18.1 7.5 7.3 9.0 8.3 11.3 11.1 7.7 6.7 3.0 3.0 5.2 5.1 6.6 6.3
1985 5.3 4.9 4.2 5.0 2.4 2.0 17.5 18.4 6.0 5.5 5.8 5.4 8.7 9.4 4.5 4.0 2.3 2.3 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.5
1986 1.2 1.3 2.4 3.6 0.0 -0.4 22.5 22.1 8.0 9.1 2.4 2.7 2.9 3.6 5.6 6.3 0.8 0.3 -0.1 0.0 12.0 11.7 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.4
1987 1.5 1.6 4.3 4.1 0.8 0.6 13.5 16.0 6.0 5.3 2.7 3.0 3.2 3.0 4.3 4.8 1.3 0.6 -0.9 -0.2 9.5 10.2 3.9 3.3 3.1 3.3
1988 1.4 1.2 4.8 5.1 1.0 1.3 14.1 13.5 4.3 5.1 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.2 4.8 4.9 1.7 1.4 0.8 0.8 7.8 9.6 3.4 5.0 3.2 3.6
1989 3.0 3.1 4.3 4.8 3.0 3.1 14.6 13.8 6.1 6.8 3.3 3.5 3.8 4.1 6.6 6.3 2.5 3.4 1.7 1.1 12.3 12.8 5.8 5.8 4.8 4.9
1990 3.2 3.5 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.5 17.0 20.5 6.6 6.4 2.9 3.0 3.0 2.6 5.5 6.2 3.5 3.8 2.3 2.6 11.7 13.6 6.6 7.2 4.7 5.0
1991 3.2 3.2 2.4 2.5 3.5 3.6 18.0 19.5 5.9 6.3 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 6.3 6.7 3.5 3.2 2.8 3.5 11.5 11.9 6.5 7.2 5.0 5.2
1992 3.1 2.4 2.2 1.9 3.9 4.1 16.0 14.9 6.3 6.2 3.0 2.4 3.8 2.6 5.2 5.4 2.8 2.8 3.5 3.3 9.0 9.7 5.3 4.8 4.6 4.5
1993 2.8 2.8 1.0 1.7 4.0 3.4 13.8 13.7 5.0 5.1 2.5 2.2 3.5 2.0 5.2 4.8 3.7 3.6 2.3 2.1 6.8 6.8 4.1 3.5 4.1 3.9
1994 2.6 2.4 2.0 1.7 3.0 2.7 10.2 10.9 4.8 5.1 1.8 1.8 2.8 3.0 3.9 4.7 2.9 2.2 2.3 2.2 5.6 5.1 3.5 2.5 3.3 3.2
1995 1.9 1.5 2.3 1.8 2.3 2.0 9.6 9.3 4.9 4.6 1.9 1.6 2.9 2.5 5.2 5.7 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.1 4.5 4.2 3.0 2.6 3.2 3.0
1996 2.0 2.0 1.8 2.1 1.6 1.9 8.3 8.3 3.6 3.6 1.8 1.8 2.3 1.7 4.1 4.4 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.0 3.1 3.1 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.7
1997 1.9 1.6 2.3 2.3 1.9 1.9 6.0 5.5 2.4 2.5 1.6 1.1 2.0 1.4 2.7 2.4 1.7 1.4 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1
1969(F) EU: CAL 1972(R) EU: 5.8 or EUR9 1985(R) EU: 5.5 for EUR12
1969(R) B, F: 69-XII; EU: CAL 1980(R) EU: 11.7 for EUR10 1994(R) EU: idem for EUR15
1970(F) B: 69-XII; EU: CAL 1984(F) EU: recalculated based on improved weighting scheme (originally 5.1)58
Table B4: Inflation (private consumption deflator, annual change) - year ahead
Belgium Denmark Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Un. Kingd. Eur. Union
FRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFR
1969
1970 4.5 2.8 2.8 3.9 5.8 5.2 5.5 4.8 6.0 4.6 5.0 4.0 4.6 4.4
1971 5.8 5.6 3.4 5.1 4.2 5.7 5.0 5.2 4.5 4.7 6.0 8.0 3.9 5.4
1972 4.7 5.0 4.5 5.8 4.3 5.6 6.7 5.9 3.5 6.1 6.5 8.5 5.2 5.9
1973 4.6 7.0 5.5 7.0 5.6 7.2 8.5 11.0 4.3 6.1 8.5 9.0 6.3 8.2
1974 6.1 12.3 7.5 15.0 6.5 7.3 7.2 12.8 8.0 17.3 9.5 19.6 5.5 9.5 9.5 10.0 7.0 15.2 7.4 12.5
1975 11.7 12.1 14.0 8.8 6.5 6.1 13.0 11.8 17.0 21.3 16.0 17.4 7.5 10.7 10.5 10.5 17.5 23.1 12.5 12.6
1976 9.0 9.0 8.0 8.5 5.5 4.4 9.0 9.8 16.0 17.0 12.0 17.5 7.8 9.8 10.5 9.2 15.5 15.3 9.6 9.9
1977 8.0 6.6 8.5 10.1 4.0 3.8 8.3 9.1 15.0 13.9 20.0 18.0 8.0 6.7 7.5 6.8 14.0 14.2 9.8 9.0
1978 6.8 4.5 10.5 9.4 4.0 2.6 8.4 8.8 10.0 7.9 12.0 12.7 5.7 3.1 7.0 4.4 11.4 8.5 8.0 6.8
1979 4.1 3.5 7.0 9.7 3.0 3.9 8.5 10.5 14.5 12.2 11.5 14.9 4.3 4.5 4.8 4.6 9.5 12.1 7.0 8.6
1980 7.1 6.4 9.8 11.9 4.5 5.4 9.6 13.5 13.0 18.2 14.5 20.3 6.5 6.3 6.8 6.9 12.7 15.5 9.1 12.4
1981 5.5 9.1 10.0 10.7 4.0 6.0 10.7 12.5 12.8 19.6 15.3 19.0 5.6 8.1 6.8 6.5 14.0 10.9 10.4 11.3
1982 7.0 7.4 9.5 9.8 4.5 5.3 22.0 21.1 13.9 10.9 16.0 17.1 16.4 16.7 7.0 10.0 6.0 5.7 10.7 8.0 10.7 8.7
1983 8.5 6.8 7.0 6.7 3.6 2.9 21.0 19.0 8.9 9.3 13.0 9.7 15.0 15.1 9.0 8.4 4.5 2.9 6.9 5.1 8.8 6.2
1984 6.5 6.2 5.4 6.6 3.2 2.5 18.5 18.1 7.2 7.3 8.8 8.5 11.5 11.1 7.7 6.7 3.6 2.6 5.8 5.1 6.8 6.2
1985 5.5 4.8 4.3 5.0 2.2 2.1 18.0 18.4 5.7 5.5 7.0 4.2 7.1 9.4 5.5 4.0 2.3 2.6 5.6 5.3 5.2 5.5
1986 3.2 1.3 1.7 3.6 1.5 -0.5 16.0 22.1 4.0 2.7 5.3 3.6 6.5 6.3 3.5 0.3 1.1 0.1 4.3 3.6 3.9 3.0
1987 1.5 1.6 2.8 4.1 1.1 0.5 12.5 15.8 5.3 5.3 2.3 3.0 3.2 3.1 4.0 4.8 1.3 0.6 -1.0 -0.4 9.0 10.2 3.9 3.8 3.0 3.3
1988 2.5 1.2 4.0 4.9 1.8 1.1 12.0 13.9 4.2 5.1 2.6 2.7 3.2 2.5 4.9 4.9 2.3 1.5 1.0 0.8 6.5 9.6 3.9 5.0 3.4 3.6
1989 2.4 3.4 3.7 5.0 2.5 3.2 12.8 14.4 4.3 6.6 2.7 3.5 2.8 3.9 4.6 6.0 2.2 4.0 1.3 2.1 7.0 12.8 4.7 6.1 3.7 4.9
1990 3.5 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.7 2.6 15.0 20.2 6.3 6.4 2.7 3.0 4.0 2.6 6.0 6.2 3.1 4.2 2.3 2.5 11.3 13.6 5.5 8.4 4.5 5.2
1991 4.5 2.9 3.3 2.4 3.9 3.9 18.5 18.4 6.6 6.3 3.6 3.0 3.5 3.2 6.3 6.8 4.0 2.9 2.8 3.3 12.6 11.9 6.3 7.2 5.3 5.3
1992 3.4 2.4 2.2 1.9 4.2 4.0 14.3 14.9 5.6 6.4 2.9 2.4 3.0 2.6 5.2 5.4 3.7 2.8 3.5 3.0 9.5 9.7 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.4
1993 2.8 2.6 1.6 1.7 3.6 3.3 13.5 13.6 5.5 5.6 2.7 2.2 2.2 1.6 5.8 5.1 4.7 3.6 2.7 2.1 6.8 7.9 5.1 3.5 4.4 3.9
1994 3.2 3.0 2.6 1.0 3.2 2.7 11.1 10.8 4.4 5.1 2.2 1.8 3.5 2.7 4.0 4.8 3.2 2.6 2.5 2.4 5.6 5.5 3.6 2.4 3.5 3.3
1995 2.5 1.6 2.1 2.1 2.2 1.9 9.5 9.3 4.5 4.7 1.9 1.6 2.7 2.0 3.5 5.8 2.5 2.0 2.4 0.9 4.6 4.2 2.9 2.6 2.9 3.0
1996 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.1 1.8 7.9 8.5 3.9 3.4 2.1 1.8 2.3 1.1 4.3 4.3 2.2 1.4 1.8 1.3 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.6 3.0 2.6
1997 2.1 1.6 2.4 2.2 1.7 1.8 6.9 5.5 2.9 2.5 1.4 1.1 2.2 0.9 2.9 2.5 2.1 1.1 2.0 2.0 3.0 2.5 2.4 2.6 2.2 2.1
1970(R) EU: CAL 1972(R) EU: 6.1 for EUR9 1985(R) EU: 5.8 for EUR12
1972(F) EU: CAL 1973(R) EU: idem for EUR9 1986(R) EU: 3.7 for EUR12
1972(R) DK, D, I: 73-VIII; EU: CAL 1980(R) EU: 11.9 for EUR10 1994(R) EU: 3.2 for EUR15
1974(F) DK, D, I: 73-VIII; EU: CAL 1981(R) EU: 11.8 for EUR10 1995(F) EU: in fact EUR16 (includes Norway)
1984(F) EU: recalculated based on improved weighting scheme (originally 5.6)
1985(F) EU: recalculated based on improved weighting scheme (originally 4.2)59
Table B5: Investment (total gross fixed capital formation, real annual change) - current year
Belgium Denmark Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Un. Kingd. Eur. Union
FRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFR
1969 7.0 9.5 12.5 12.8 7.4 9.9 11.7 8.2 15.0 16.0 5.5 0.5 9.7 9.6
1970 8.5 5.5 8.5 10.7 7.1 6.6 11.3 3.8 17.3 17.5 4.5 7.0 8.5 7.9
1971 5.0 1.2 2.8 4.0 6.1 6.0 1.3 -4.9 2.5 8.0 6.0 2.0 3.9 2.9
1972 2.0 2.3 -2.4 1.9 5.8 7.0 0.0 -0.2 -1.0 4.0 -4.0 -3.8 0.6 2.4
1973 3.0 8.2 12.0 12.5 6.9 0.5 7.5 8.7 8.7 12.8 5.7 9.9 -3.5 4.0 5.4 4.8 6.5 4.3 6.8 5.2
1974 3.3 7.1 2.1 -6.0 -0.5 -7.9 5.6 2.1 4.0 -3.4 8.4 4.2 -4.2 1.8 0.0 -7.3 -4.2 -2.6 1.9 -2.6
1975 -2.3 -3.2 -9.0 -12.8 -2.0 -4.8 -1.1 -5.8 0.0 -5.0 -8.2 -12.7 -2.8 -7.2 -0.1 -3.7 -1.1 -0.5 -2.5 -5.6
1976 -0.3 -0.2 11.0 13.7 5.5 5.1 1.0 4.5 1.0 3.0 -7.8 2.3 -2.5 -4.5 -3.5 -1.5 -2.1 -4.3 0.7 2.8
1977 2.7 0.4 0.5 -2.3 3.0 2.7 0.4 -0.6 8.0 8.0 2.0 0.1 4.3 3.2 4.5 11.3 -3.4 -3.9 1.3 1.1
1978 1.6 0.9 0.0 -1.8 4.4 6.3 1.3 0.7 10.0 12.0 -1.3 -0.4 1.1 5.4 2.0 3.4 4.1 2.8 2.5 2.8
1979 1.0 1.7 0.5 -3.0 6.3 8.5 2.3 2.5 10.5 14.3 4.9 4.5 1.9 4.9 -1.0 0.1 2.5 -3.0 3.7 3.7
1980 0.7 2.2 -8.5 -15.2 6.6 3.7 2.6 2.2 0.0 -9.8 5.5 10.0 2.8 2.0 -0.2 -1.6 -3.3 -2.2 2.9 2.8
1981 -2.5 -8.5 -7.4 -16.3 -3.8 -3.3 3.0 -10.1 -4.4 -2.0 8.0 5.0 -0.7 -0.2 0.4 -3.6 -5.4 -11.3 -9.0 -7.6 -4.2 -4.2
1982 -3.4 -5.1 3.5 3.7 -4.2 -5.6 -2.3 -1.0 -0.9 -0.4 1.7 -4.2 0.2 -5.3 1.2 -3.4 -2.0 -3.0 2.3 3.6 -1.3 -2.5
1983 -1.8 -5.5 0.3 2.3 2.4 2.9 3.4 -1.4 -1.7 -1.4 -9.0 -8.7 -3.0 -5.5 -4.1 -5.4 0.7 1.3 2.4 4.7 0.0 0.0
1984 0.7 4.6 5.0 12.8 5.4 1.3 2.6 -4.7 0.5 -2.4 -2.1 -1.1 2.3 4.1 -2.5 -1.4 1.7 4.2 5.1 7.7 3.1 2.3
1985 4.1 3.3 10.5 14.6 2.0 -0.3 -1.1 3.4 0.3 3.0 0.3 1.6 3.9 4.1 1.1 1.7 1.6 2.4 2.7 1.0 2.2 2.3
1986 5.3 5.3 10.8 16.8 5.8 3.3 -2.5 -4.8 6.6 12.0 3.9 3.7 2.5 -3.4 5.9 1.2 2.7 4.1 3.7 8.1 8.6 9.5 3.6 0.6 4.9 3.6
1987 4.9 5.2 -4.1 -9.0 2.6 1.8 -3.1 -2.2 10.0 13.8 4.0 3.6 -0.1 0.2 4.3 5.2 2.3 4.3 3.3 3.3 9.9 19.5 3.8 3.5 4.1 4.3
1988 4.3 12.9 -2.9 -6.9 2.3 5.8 5.3 10.1 11.3 14.0 4.2 6.1 -0.9 0.7 4.0 4.9 1.6 4.6 1.3 7.9 11.5 15.8 7.6 11.8 4.8 7.8
1989 10.5 14.4 -3.1 -0.5 6.0 7.2 9.6 8.8 13.6 13.6 5.6 5.1 6.6 11.4 5.2 5.1 4.0 4.5 6.2 4.5 12.0 8.3 6.3 4.8 6.8 6.7
1990 6.6 7.6 -0.8 -1.0 6.4 8.8 6.1 5.2 9.6 6.7 4.6 4.0 9.9 7.5 4.5 3.0 5.9 5.8 3.2 4.1 8.5 7.5 -1.0 -1.9 4.6 4.3
1991 1.0 -0.2 -2.1 -2.1 5.9 6.7 2.9 -1.9 4.9 1.6 1.1 -1.5 2.7 -4.9 1.1 0.9 5.8 6.3 1.2 -0.7 5.8 2.8 -10.4 -10.3 0.8 -0.1
1992 1.4 0.0 0.9 -10.4 2.8 1.5 3.0 1.1 1.6 -3.0 0.2 -2.3 3.5 -1.4 1.3 -1.4 4.7 -2.1 -0.7 1.6 3.1 4.5 -4.4 -0.6 0.7 -0.8
1993 -5.3 -7.0 -4.4 -1.8 -0.8 -3.2 2.8 -3.4 -5.4 -10.3 -2.7 -5.0 -0.1 0.3 -3.6 -11.1 5.8 4.0 -2.2 -3.8 2.9 -3.9 1.3 0.8 -1.9 -5.0
1994 1.4 -0.3 7.3 3.6 2.2 4.3 1.9 -0.1 -1.3 1.0 1.5 1.1 5.7 7.2 0.6 -0.1 -1.8 1.5 -0.4 2.4 1.1 3.5 3.6 3.2 1.6 2.3
1995 7.1 2.7 5.9 11.0 6.7 1.5 5.1 6.3 6.2 8.4 5.4 2.8 9.2 12.2 5.0 5.9 4.3 6.0 6.9 5.0 7.1 4.0 5.5 -0.7 6.3 3.5
1996 3.8 2.4 3.8 7.7 -1.7 -0.8 7.8 11.8 4.7 0.7 1.5 -0.6 8.3 10.1 4.2 1.2 6.5 0.0 2.4 4.9 4.8 7.4 4.2 1.0 2.2 1.1
1997 4.4 4.8 5.6 7.0 1.4 0.2 10.8 10.6 1.9 4.7 2.2 0.2 8.8 16.0 1.9 1.0 3.4 12.3 4.6 6.1 6.7 11.9 5.6 2.7 3.0 2.3
1969(R) B: 69-XII; EU: CAL 1972(R) EU: 5.8 or EUR9 1985(R) EU: idem for EUR12
1970(F) B: 69-XII; EU: CAL 1980(R) EU: 2.0 for EUR10 1994(R) EU: 2.3 for EUR1560
Table B6: Investment (total gross fixed capital formation, real annual change) - year ahead
Belgium Denmark Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Un. Kingd. Eur. Union
FRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFR
1969
1970 8.5 5.7 8.3 11.9 4.5 7.4 10.9 3.8 3.0 11.3 3.5 7.0 7.5 7.9
1971 5.0 -2.8 4.8 4.5 6.1 5.0 5.1 -4.9 -5.0 8.0 4.8 2.0 5.3 2.6
1972 3.5 4.9 -3.0 1.9 5.4 7.0 2.5 -0.2 -5.0 4.0 -5.0 -1.5 0.8 2.7
1973 2.2 7.3 5.5 1.1 6.0 6.5 6.0 9.9 -7.0 5.1 5.0 6.2 5.5 5.4
1974 5.2 6.1 6.0 -9.7 2.5 -8.1 6.2 2.1 5.8 -3.4 8.0 4.2 2.7 1.0 2.5 -5.2 3.5 -2.0 4.8 -2.4
1975 0.6 -3.3 -6.5 -10.7 -1.2 -4.1 3.0 -4.3 1.0 -5.5 -3.3 -12.7 -1.3 -10.1 1.0 -3.9 1.0 -1.2 0.0 -5.0
1976 2.8 -0.1 8.0 16.3 3.5 2.7 5.0 4.5 1.0 4.4 0.6 2.3 3.2 -4.6 -1.1 -1.9 -3.0 -4.4 2.4 2.8
1977 1.5 -0.7 2.5 -1.8 3.5 4.1 1.6 -0.6 3.0 8.4 -2.0 0.1 4.7 -2.4 2.8 11.1 -3.6 -3.8 1.0 1.5
1978 3.2 2.1 1.5 0.5 6.0 6.3 2.0 0.7 9.0 15.0 2.1 -0.4 2.0 5.4 1.3 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.9 2.9
1979 2.8 -0.5 -1.1 -3.0 4.3 8.7 3.0 2.5 8.0 15.6 5.5 4.5 1.5 4.9 1.8 0.0 2.5 -1.9 3.5 3.8
1980 2.4 5.6 -1.5 -13.7 5.5 3.7 1.8 2.2 5.3 -9.8 3.4 10.0 2.4 2.0 1.7 -2.6 -0.9 -2.0 2.9 2.9
1981 1.2 -16.2 -3.7 -16.3 -0.2 -3.8 0.2 -2.8 -4.1 5.2 -2.0 -0.2 1.5 -3.6 -3.3 -10.8 -3.3 -7.9 -1.0 -4.4
1982 -1.6 -2.6 3.7 3.7 -2.1 -5.4 1.4 -1.0 0.9 1.1 3.7 -8.4 -3.3 -5.3 0.2 -2.2 -1.5 -5.0 1.0 5.1 -0.8 -1.8
1983 0.5 -6.4 4.3 2.3 0.9 3.1 3.4 -1.4 -1.5 -1.4 1.2 -7.7 -0.7 -5.2 1.2 -5.4 -0.5 0.4 2.5 4.2 0.6 -0.1
1984 0.4 2.3 1.0 12.8 4.7 0.8 2.8 -4.7 -2.6 -2.3 -1.2 -1.8 3.7 4.1 -2.3 -1.4 0.5 4.3 3.1 8.2 2.0 2.3
1985 2.0 1.2 9.6 14.6 4.1 -0.3 2.2 3.4 3.3 3.1 -0.8 -0.3 3.3 4.1 1.1 1.7 2.6 3.7 3.8 1.8 3.6 2.4
1986 3.0 4.8 8.6 16.8 4.9 3.1 1.1 -4.8 1.9 3.0 2.3 -2.3 5.6 1.2 0.8 4.8 2.5 7.2 2.5 0.3 3.7 2.5
1987 5.0 5.2 -0.9 -9.0 5.5 1.8 0.5 -3.2 7.0 13.8 5.1 3.4 2.9 -1.0 7.2 5.2 1.9 16.4 2.8 1.6 8.5 19.6 3.5 5.5 5.1 4.6
1988 4.4 12.9 -3.2 -6.5 1.4 5.9 3.7 9.0 9.0 14.0 2.7 7.3 1.0 -1.7 2.8 4.9 1.7 4.5 0.7 9.7 10.5 15.8 3.9 13.1 3.3 8.4
1989 2.7 13.6 0.1 -0.1 3.7 7.1 8.0 8.6 10.0 13.6 5.4 5.9 3.6 12.1 3.8 5.1 1.7 11.5 2.9 3.9 11.0 8.3 6.3 4.8 5.2 6.8
1990 5.8 8.3 2.2 -1.9 5.1 8.8 6.4 4.8 9.9 6.7 5.5 3.8 10.0 7.5 4.0 3.0 4.0 3.3 1.4 4.2 10.0 7.5 1.7 -2.4 4.8 4.1
1991 3.5 0.3 0.0 -2.8 4.4 6.5 2.9 -1.9 5.2 1.6 3.3 -1.3 6.5 -7.2 3.3 0.9 5.6 9.8 0.8 0.1 6.3 2.8 -1.6 -9.9 2.9 0.0
1992 3.0 0.0 2.0 -10.3 3.8 1.1 3.5 1.1 3.6 -3.9 1.8 -2.1 3.8 -1.9 2.4 -1.4 4.7 -2.1 -1.1 1.1 3.0 4.5 -0.9 -1.1 2.2 -1.0
1993 -3.3 0.5 1.9 6.7 0.3 5.1 4.5 0.8 -1.9 -0.8 -0.7 0.8 2.2 8.8 -1.2 0.7 2.3 0.2 -0.7 1.0 3.3 -0.7 -0.8 3.9 -0.5 2.4
1994 1.2 0.5 3.1 3.1 2.9 4.3 2.2 0.4 -0.1 1.0 0.4 1.1 3.4 7.3 1.8 -0.1 -3.6 -7.3 0.4 3.0 2.7 2.2 4.4 3.7 2.0 2.3
1995 4.6 3.0 5.3 10.2 6.9 1.5 2.7 6.3 5.5 8.2 5.3 2.8 8.1 10.1 5.3 5.9 1.1 3.5 5.9 6.7 5.1 2.8 5.2 -0.1 5.8 3.6
1996 5.2 0.6 4.7 7.5 1.7 -0.8 6.3 10.2 6.8 0.9 3.6 -0.5 7.1 15.9 5.4 1.2 3.4 -1.7 2.1 6.1 8.9 7.4 6.0 1.8 4.4 1.3
1997 5.0 5.5 5.3 10.4 1.2 0.2 8.6 9.6 4.8 5.1 2.2 0.2 7.7 10.9 2.5 0.6 4.0 14.1 3.0 6.8 5.2 11.3 5.6 6.1 3.1 2.8
1970(R) F: 71-VII; EU: CAL 1972(R) EU: 2.4 for EUR9 1985(R) EU: idem for EUR12
1972(F) EU: CAL 1973(R) EU: idem for EUR9 1986(R) EU: 3.4 for EUR12
1972(R) DK, L: 73-VIII; EU: CAL 1980(R) EU: 2.2 for EUR10 1994(R) EU: 2.5 for EUR15
1974(F) DK, D, L: 73-VIII; EU: CAL 1981(R) EU: -5.6 for EUR10 1995(F) EU: in fact EUR16 (includes Norway)
1974(R) F: 75-VI61
Table B7: Unemployment rate (% of labour force) - current year
Belgium Denmark Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Un. Kingd. Eur. Union
FRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFR
1969 2.4 2.3 0.7 0.7 3.0 3.4 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.8
1970 2.0 2.0 0.5 0.5 1.8 1.7 2.9 3.1 1.1 1.2 1.6 1.6
1971 2.0 2.0 0.6 0.7 1.7 1.8 3.1 3.1 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.8
1972 2.3 2.4 0.8 0.9 1.9 2.4 3.2 3.7 2.4 2.4 1.9 2.2
1973 2.3 2.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 2.2 2.3 6.3 5.9 3.5 3.5 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.1 2.3
1974 2.6 2.6 1.4 1.8 1.7 2.2 2.7 2.3 6.3 5.7 3.5 2.9 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.6 2.5
1975 4.1 4.4 2.8 5.2 3.2 4.1 3.8 3.8 8.6 8.0 3.6 3.3 0.5 0.8 4.1 4.3 3.4 3.8 3.6 3.9
1976 5.3 6.1 4.9 5.1 3.8 4.1 4.1 4.4 10.2 9.4 3.8 3.7 0.9 0.4 4.7 4.6 5.0 5.2 4.4 4.5
1977 5.8 7.3 6.0 5.9 3.8 4.0 4.8 5.1 9.6 9.4 3.9 7.2 0.3 0.8 4.4 4.2 5.9 5.7 4.7 5.5
1978 7.1 8.3 7.1 6.7 4.0 3.9 5.6 5.0 8.9 8.9 7.6 7.0 1.4 0.8 4.4 4.2 6.0 5.7 5.8 5.5
1979 8.5 8.6 6.6 5.3 3.5 3.4 5.7 6.1 7.8 7.9 6.8 7.6 0.9 0.7 4.3 4.3 5.7 5.4 5.5 5.6
1980 9.0 9.3 5.8 6.2 3.3 3.4 6.5 6.5 7.6 8.2 8.2 8.1 0.8 0.7 4.5 5.0 6.5 6.9 6.0 6.2
1981 11.0 11.5 8.2 8.5 4.6 4.8 3.2 3.1 7.7 7.6 9.7 8.7 8.4 8.8 0.9 1.0 7.2 7.5 10.5 10.6 7.7 7.9
1982 13.4 12.7 8.9 9.2 6.7 6.8 3.6 6.1 8.7 8.7 10.8 12.4 9.6 12.0 1.3 1.2 9.9 13.1 11.7 11.2 9.2 9.8
1983 14.4 13.4 10.5 10.5 8.7 8.4 7.3 7.8 9.1 9.1 15.3 14.2 12.6 9.7 1.8 1.6 16.0 15.4 12.2 11.7 10.9 10.5
1984 13.7 14.5 10.3 10.0 8.4 8.4 8.5 8.1 10.3 9.9 16.2 16.4 10.6 11.9 1.9 1.7 16.5 14.2 11.6 11.8 11.1 10.9
1985 14.5 13.7 9.1 9.0 8.6 8.4 8.6 8.5 10.7 10.3 17.0 17.1 12.5 13.0 1.7 1.6 13.5 13.1 12.0 11.8 11.2 10.9
1986 13.2 12.7 7.7 7.6 7.7 8.1 9.4 7.4 22.1 21.5 10.6 11.5 17.2 18.3 12.9 13.0 1.4 1.4 12.0 12.1 10.3 8.6 11.8 12.1 10.8 12.0
1987 12.8 12.3 8.0 7.6 7.9 8.1 8.0 7.4 21.3 20.5 11.6 10.9 18.7 19.2 13.0 14.2 1.3 1.6 11.4 11.5 8.5 7.2 11.3 10.8 11.8 11.7
1988 11.6 11.2 7.9 8.4 8.2 8.1 7.6 7.3 20.0 19.5 11.1 10.6 18.7 18.6 14.3 15.0 1.4 1.6 11.1 7.3 6.7 5.8 9.0 8.7 11.3 11.0
1989 10.3 9.5 9.1 6.7 7.2 5.5 7.2 7.6 18.3 16.9 10.5 9.5 18.0 17.0 14.5 11.0 1.4 1.8 6.9 9.3 5.6 5.0 6.8 6.7 10.2 9.0
1990 8.9 8.1 6.7 8.6 6.0 5.1 8.0 7.5 16.3 16.1 8.8 9.0 16.3 15.1 11.0 9.8 1.7 1.7 8.9 8.1 4.9 4.6 6.1 5.7 8.5 8.2
1991 8.4 8.3 9.0 8.6 4.5 4.3 8.7 8.6 16.0 15.9 9.2 9.7 16.1 16.1 9.8 10.3 1.6 2.0 7.8 7.0 4.8 3.8 8.6 9.4 8.7 8.9
1992 9.2 8.2 9.2 9.5 4.4 4.5 9.5 7.7 16.3 18.0 10.2 10.0 17.6 17.8 10.4 10.2 1.9 1.9 7.4 6.7 4.0 4.8 11.0 10.8 9.5 9.5
1993 9.9 9.9 10.7 10.7 9.3 9.3 8.2 8.2 21.8 21.8 11.5 11.5 19.0 19.0 10.7 10.7 2.2 2.2 8.0 8.0 6.1 6.1 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5
1994 10.3 10.0 9.9 10.2 9.3 8.4 10.1 9.6 23.3 24.1 11.5 12.5 17.8 15.1 12.0 11.4 3.0 3.5 10.2 7.7 6.5 6.9 9.9 9.5 11.6 11.4
1995 9.6 9.9 8.6 6.8 7.8 8.3 9.6 9.1 23.7 22.9 12.1 11.5 14.1 14.4 11.4 11.8 3.6 2.9 7.6 7.3 6.7 7.2 8.3 8.8 10.7 10.9
1996 10.1 9.8 6.1 6.0 9.3 9.0 9.1 9.0 22.5 22.2 11.7 12.3 13.4 12.3 11.8 12.0 3.0 3.1 7.2 6.6 7.4 7.3 8.4 8.2 10.9 11.0
1997 9.5 9.5 5.1 6.1 9.7 9.7 8.9 9.5 21.3 20.9 12.5 12.5 11.7 10.2 12.0 12.1 3.3 3.7 6.0 5.3 7.0 6.4 6.8 7.1 10.6 10.7
1969(F) EU: CAL 1972(R) EU: 2.5 for EUR9 1985(R) EU: 11.1 for EUR12
1970(F) B: 70-XII EU: CAL 1980(R) EU: 6.1 for EUR10 1994(R) EU: 11.2 for EUR15
1973(F) DK: 73-VIII EU: CAL From 80-VI: harmonised eurostat definition, before national definition; for EL from 82-VI62
Table B8: Unemployment rate (% of labour force) - year ahead
Belgium Denmark Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Un. Kingd. Eur. Union
FRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFR
1969
1970
1971 2.1 2.0 0.6 0.7 1.9 2.1 2.9 3.1 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.8
1972 2.3 2.4 1.1 0.9 1.9 2.4 3.1 3.7 2.4 2.4 2.0 2.2
1973 2.2 2.5 0.8 1.0 2.5 2.1 3.4 3.5 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.1
1974 2.5 2.7 0.8 2.4 0.8 2.2 2.0 2.3 5.4 5.7 3.2 2.9 2.2 3.0 1.7 2.5 2.0 2.5
1975 3.1 4.5 1.8 5.0 1.5 4.1 2.8 4.1 7.1 8.0 3.5 3.3 3.5 4.3 2.9 3.9 2.7 4.0
1976 5.5 6.1 3.3 5.1 4.4 4.1 4.0 4.4 10.1 9.4 3.9 5.9 0.5 0.4 5.2 4.3 5.7 5.2 4.6 4.9
1977 6.6 6.9 5.6 5.9 3.7 4.0 5.1 5.1 9.5 9.4 4.3 7.2 0.3 0.5 4.4 4.2 5.9 5.6 4.9 5.4
1978 6.6 5.7 6.5 6.6 4.1 3.9 5.4 5.0 9.5 8.7 6.5 7.1 0.5 0.8 4.8 4.2 6.9 5.7 5.8 5.5
1979 7.6 8.6 7.6 5.3 3.7 3.4 5.6 6.1 8.0 7.9 7.0 7.6 1.5 0.7 4.5 4.2 5.7 5.4 5.5 5.6
1980 8.8 9.3 6.1 6.2 3.4 3.4 6.8 6.5 7.8 8.2 8.4 7.4 0.9 0.7 4.3 4.9 6.6 6.9 6.2 6.0
1981 9.8 11.7 6.5 8.4 4.1 4.8 7.0 7.3 10.1 10.3 7.7 8.5 0.8 1.0 5.6 7.5 8.2 10.6 6.8 7.9
1982 11.7 12.6 8.7 9.7 5.5 6.8 3.5 6.1 8.1 8.7 10.9 11.7 8.7 8.7 1.2 1.2 8.7 12.7 11.0 11.1 8.3 9.5
1983 14.8 13.4 9.2 10.5 8.3 8.4 4.0 7.9 9.3 8.4 14.0 14.8 10.5 9.7 1.3 1.6 13.1 15.6 12.5 11.7 10.3 10.4
1984 15.3 14.5 11.8 10.0 8.7 8.4 8.7 8.1 9.7 9.9 16.6 16.1 9.4 12.0 2.4 1.7 17.6 14.2 11.9 11.8 10.9 10.9
1985 13.8 13.7 9.8 8.8 8.5 8.4 8.8 7.8 11.6 10.3 16.3 18.0 10.5 12.9 1.8 1.6 15.9 13.1 11.8 12.0 11.4 10.9
1986 14.5 12.6 8.6 7.6 8.0 8.1 9.0 7.4 10.0 11.1 17.4 18.4 13.1 13.0 1.6 1.4 13.0 12.1 11.7 12.1 11.1 11.0
1987 13.4 12.3 7.7 7.6 7.7 8.1 8.3 7.4 21.5 20.5 10.7 10.8 18.0 19.2 12.8 14.0 1.2 1.6 11.1 11.5 11.1 7.2 12.0 10.6 11.7 11.6
1988 12.1 10.4 8.6 6.4 8.3 6.4 7.5 8.5 20.3 19.6 11.7 10.2 18.2 17.8 14.3 10.6 1.4 2.2 10.9 10.3 6.8 5.6 10.4 8.7 11.7 10.0
1989 11.0 7.3 9.0 8.2 8.2 6.0 7.6 8.1 19.6 15.8 10.8 8.9 18.2 16.5 14.5 10.2 1.3 1.7 10.9 7.4 6.4 4.4 7.2 6.4 10.9 8.5
1990 9.9 8.1 9.3 7.9 7.1 5.1 7.3 7.5 17.5 16.1 10.3 9.0 17.5 15.6 14.1 9.8 1.4 1.6 6.6 8.1 5.6 4.6 6.5 6.4 9.9 8.4
1991 7.6 7.5 8.7 8.9 6.5 4.2 9.6 7.7 15.0 16.3 8.5 9.5 16.6 16.2 10.2 10.2 1.6 1.6 6.9 7.0 5.0 4.1 8.0 9.1 8.8 8.8
1992 8.6 8.2 9.0 9.5 5.0 4.5 9.3 7.7 15.5 18.0 10.1 10.0 18.1 17.8 9.5 10.3 1.6 1.9 7.7 6.7 4.2 4.7 9.8 10.0 9.1 9.3
1993 9.3 9.4 9.5 10.3 8.5 7.0 8.5 9.7 19.5 21.8 10.8 10.8 19.2 18.4 10.6 11.1 2.0 2.6 7.6 8.8 5.4 5.1 12.3 10.4 11.0 10.6
1994 10.7 10.0 10.1 8.2 8.0 8.4 8.3 8.9 22.4 24.1 11.6 12.3 18.7 15.1 11.3 11.4 2.6 3.5 9.1 7.0 6.2 7.0 9.9 9.6 11.2 11.3
1995 9.8 9.9 9.0 7.1 7.0 8.2 10.6 9.1 21.9 22.9 11.0 11.5 16.8 12.4 11.1 11.9 3.2 2.9 9.8 7.3 6.0 7.3 8.5 8.8 10.4 10.9
1996 10.1 9.8 6.2 6.9 8.1 8.9 8.9 9.6 21.7 22.1 11.0 12.4 14.5 11.8 11.3 12.0 3.7 3.3 6.4 6.3 6.8 7.3 8.2 8.2 10.3 10.9
1997 9.9 9.2 6.0 5.5 9.1 10.0 9.0 9.6 21.5 20.8 12.4 12.4 12.0 10.1 12.3 12.1 3.0 2.6 6.3 5.2 7.1 6.8 7.8 7.0 10.8 10.7
1970(R) B: 71-VII; EU: CAL 1972(R) EU: 2.4 for EUR9 1985(R) EU 12.0 for EUR12
1972(F) EU: CAL 1973(R) EU: 2.2 idem for EUR9 1986(R) EU: 11.9 for EUR12
1972(R) DK: 73-VIII; EU: CAL 1980(R) EU:idem for EUR10 1994(R) EU: idem for EUR15
1973(F) EU: CAL 1981(R) EU: 7.8 EUR10 1995(F) EU: in fact EUR16 (includes Norway)
1 9 7 4 ( F )D ,F ,I ,N L ,U K :7 3 - V I I I ;E U :C A L
1975(F) D: 74-VIII; EU: CAL From 80-VI: harmonised eurostat definition, before national definition; for EL from 82-VI63
Table B9: General government balance as % of GDP - current year
Belgium Denmark Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Un. Kingd. Eur. Union
FRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFR
1969 0.3 1.5 -1.1 0.8 -3.4 -3.4 -1.3 -3.9 -1.1 -0.3
1970 2.3 1.3 -0.8 0.5 -2.7 -3.0 -3.0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1
1971 -1.9 -2.4 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.0 -2.8 -3.6 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.9
1972 -4.2 -4.0 -1.4 -0.4 -0.2 0.5 -4.4 -5.6 -0.3 1.1 -1.9 -1.3
1973 -3.6 -3.5 1.3 1.4 -0.2 0.5 -5.9 -7.9 0.7 2.1 -2.0 -2.8 -1.4 -1.7
1974 -2.7 -3.0 0.3 -0.9 0.6 0.5 -6.6 -8.8 -7.9 -5.0 3.1 1.5 0.4 0.9 -1.8 -4.4 -1.8 -2.2
1975 -2.2 -3.3 -4.7 -6.1 0.0 -2.3 -9.4 -13.3 -6.5 -11.0 0.9 0.0 -2.1 -2.3 -6.2 -5.2 -4.1 -5.8
1976 -4.8 -5.3 -5.4 -3.7 -1.9 -0.8 -14.5 -10.0 -8.8 -8.7 -2.9 -0.5 -3.6 -1.8 -5.3 -4.8 -5.2 -4.2
1977 -5.4 -5.4 -1.0 -0.4 -3.1 -2.7 -0.9 -1.3 -10.2 -10.4 -7.6 -9.1 -1.0 -0.7 -1.9 -2.2 -3.8 -3.3 -3.7 -3.3
1978 -5.7 -6.3 -0.4 -0.5 -4.1 -2.7 -1.3 -2.3 -12.7 -10.9 -11.0 -10.6 -1.6 1.8 -3.7 -2.3 -4.2 -3.9 -4.3 -4.0
1979 -7.4 -6.8 -0.9 -1.2 -3.1 -2.9 -1.7 -0.8 -9.2 -12.5 -11.9 -9.4 0.7 1.3 -3.3 -3.3 -3.5 -2.9 -4.2 -3.5
1980 -7.9 -9.3 -1.3 -5.4 -2.8 -3.5 -1.5 0.4 -11.4 -13.2 -10.2 -7.8 0.4 -1.4 -2.8 -2.8 -2.4 -3.7 -3.8 -3.6
1981 -10.9 -13.1 -8.3 -7.2 -4.0 -4.5 -1.6 -1.9 -15.2 -15.1 -8.5 -11.9 -2.9 -1.8 -3.3 -4.6 -2.3 -2.4 -4.3 -5.1
1982 -12.4 -12.7 -8.8 -8.9 -3.9 -3.9 -9.2 -6.4 -2.9 -2.7 -14.4 -15.8 -11.1 -11.9 -1.9 -1.0 -4.2 -6.4 -1.9 -1.7 -5.0 -5.3
1983 -11.7 -11.7 -9.5 -8.0 -3.8 -2.7 -6.5 -9.7 -3.1 -3.3 -13.2 -12.9 -11.3 -11.8 -3.0 -2.2 -6.8 -6.4 -2.2 -3.3 -5.4 -5.5
1984 -10.9 -10.8 -6.5 -4.6 -1.6 -2.3 -10.1 -9.5 -3.3 -2.8 -11.7 -10.2 -12.6 -13.5 -0.7 1.5 -5.8 -5.7 -2.9 -3.7 -5.2 -5.5
1985 -9.6 -9.3 -3.1 -1.9 -1.7 -1.1 -10.7 -13.9 -3.3 -2.6 -11.6 -11.4 -12.9 -14.0 2.0 4.2 -5.3 -5.1 -3.3 -3.1 -5.2 -5.0
1986 -8.9 -8.7 2.4 3.4 -0.7 -1.2 -9.5 -10.3 -5.1 -6.0 -2.4 -2.9 -9.6 -10.7 -12.7 -11.3 3.7 3.9 -5.2 -6.0 -11.2 -8.5 -3.2 -3.2 -4.6 -5.0
1987 -6.5 -7.2 2.4 2.1 -1.7 -1.7 -9.4 -10.3 -5.4 -3.6 -2.8 -2.5 -9.0 -8.5 -10.4 -10.5 2.4 5.6 -6.6 -5.1 -9.0 -8.1 -2.4 -1.4 -4.7 -4.1
1988 -7.0 -6.5 1.3 0.4 -2.6 -2.0 -11.8 -14.3 -3.4 -3.2 -2.4 -1.6 -6.7 -3.4 -10.0 -10.6 6.0 2.6 -5.3 -5.0 -7.9 -6.6 -0.7 0.8 -4.1 -3.6
1989 -6.2 -6.1 0.5 -0.7 -0.3 0.2 -14.5 -17.7 -3.0 -2.1 -1.7 -1.3 -4.6 -3.1 -10.4 -10.2 2.5 3.3 -4.5 -5.1 -6.3 -5.0 1.7 1.6 -3.0 -2.8
1990 -5.9 -6.0 -0.5 -1.5 -0.8 -2.2 -17.7 -18.9 -2.0 -3.7 -1.2 -1.6 -2.8 -3.4 -10.3 -10.6 3.9 4.2 -5.3 -5.7 -7.4 -5.8 0.2 -0.5 -3.3 -4.1
1991 -6.4 -6.2 -1.3 -2.0 -4.7 -3.1 -15.4 -16.5 -2.7 -4.4 -1.6 -1.7 -3.8 -2.3 -10.0 -10.2 1.7 2.5 -4.8 -3.9 -5.5 -6.4 -2.2 -2.0 -4.6 -4.4
1992 -5.9 -6.9 -2.1 -2.4 -3.4 -2.4 -13.2 -13.8 -4.3 -4.5 -2.0 -3.9 -2.5 -2.4 -9.9 -9.5 2.6 -1.6 -4.0 -3.3 -5.4 -5.4 -4.9 -6.2 -4.9 -5.1
1993 -7.0 -7.0 -4.4 -4.6 -4.6 -3.3 -13.1 -16.3 -4.4 -7.3 -5.9 -5.7 -3.4 -2.3 -10.4 -9.5 -2.0 1.4 -3.8 -2.9 -5.7 -7.1 -7.7 -7.7 -6.3 -6.0
1994 -5.4 -5.3 -4.6 -4.0 -3.1 -2.5 -17.9 -12.5 -7.2 -6.6 -5.6 -6.0 -2.5 -2.3 -9.5 -9.0 -0.4 2.3 -3.6 -3.1 -6.2 -5.8 -6.0 -6.9 -5.6 -5.4
1995 - 4 . 2- 4 . 5- 1 . 9- 1 . 4- 2 . 1- 3 . 5 - 1 1 . 3- 9 . 2- 6 . 0- 6 . 2- 4 . 9- 5 . 0- 2 . 8- 2 . 4- 7 . 9- 7 . 1 1 . 4 0 . 3- 3 . 2- 3 . 4- 5 . 6- 5 . 4- 4 . 8- 6 . 0- 4 . 5- 5 . 0
1996 -3.2 -3.4 -0.9 -1.6 -3.9 -3.8 -8.1 -7.4 -4.8 -4.4 -4.2 -4.1 -2.0 -0.9 -6.3 -6.7 0.7 1.8 -3.5 -2.4 -4.4 -4.1 -4.4 -4.4 -4.4 -4.3
1997 -2.7 -2.1 0.3 0.7 -3.0 -2.7 -4.9 -4.0 -3.0 -2.6 -3.0 -3.0 -1.0 0.9 -3.2 -2.7 1.1 1.7 -2.3 -1.4 -3.0 -2.5 -2.9 -1.9 -2.9 -2.4
1969-72(R)/73(F): government balance only in value and the ratio was calculated, but for 1971(F) and 1969(R) the ratio was available.
1969-76(R)/77(F) EU: CAL 1972(R) EU: -1.4 for EUR9 1985(R) EU: -5.2 for EUR12
1970(R): 71-VII 1980(R) EU: idem for EUR10 1994(R) EU: -5.5 for EUR15
1971(F): 71-VII Since 1994-VI: Maastricht definition64
Table B10: General government balance as % of GDP - year ahead
Belgium Denmark Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Un. Kingd. Eur. Union
FRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFR
1969
1970 0.0 0.7 -1.0 0.5 -2.7 -3.0 -1.0 0.2 -1.0 -0.3
1971 -1.9 -0.2 1.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 -2.2 -4.2 1.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.7
1972 -1.8 -3.7 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.5 -4.8 -6.5 0.5 1.0 -1.2 -1.4
1973 -0.3 -2.8 -0.5 1.5 -0.1 0.5 -5.5 -7.9 0.7 2.4 -1.2 -0.8
1974 -3.2 -2.0 2.1 -1.2 0.4 0.5 -6.5 -9.3 -6.8 -5.0 0.5 1.8 -2.3 -4.5 -0.8 -2.2
1975 -1.9 -3.9 -3.2 -5.9 0.3 -2.3 -8.4 -13.9 -7.5 -11.0 1.8 0.2 0.5 -1.9 -2.1 -5.2 -2.5 -5.3
1976 -3.4 -4.9 -6.5 -3.7 -1.5 -0.8 -14.8 -10.0 -8.6 -8.9 -4.9 -0.5 -3.0 -2.9 -7.6 -5.0 -5.8 -4.4
1977 -5.2 -5.1 -1.3 -0.4 -3.6 -2.6 -1.2 -1.3 -12.4 -9.0 -6.5 -9.1 -2.1 0.6 -2.0 -1.6 -3.8 -3.4 -3.4 -3.2
1978 -5.3 -6.3 -0.3 -0.5 -3.9 -2.7 -1.1 -2.3 -10.2 -10.8 -7.4 -10.6 -1.8 2.8 -2.6 -2.0 -2.9 -3.9 -3.7 -4.0
1979 -5.6 -7.2 -0.8 -3.3 -3.8 -3.0 -1.8 -0.8 -9.0 -12.8 -12.6 -9.4 -0.6 1.0 -3.5 -3.0 -4.3 -3.2 -4.6 -3.6
1980 -7.4 -9.1 -1.6 -6.1 -2.8 -3.5 -1.7 0.4 -7.8 -13.1 -11.4 -7.8 1.0 -1.3 -2.0 -3.7 -2.4 -3.5 -3.9 -3.6
1981 -7.7 -13.4 -3.9 -7.1 -3.3 -4.0 -1.7 -1.5 -12.8 -15.4 -11.0 -11.9 -0.7 -0.8 -1.8 -4.5 -2.3 -2.1 -3.9 -4.9
1982 -12.0 -11.9 -10.8 -9.1 -3.0 -3.5 -3.8 -6.4 -2.8 -2.7 -13.7 -16.2 -9.1 -11.9 -3.6 -2.0 -3.2 -6.9 -1.6 -2.1 -4.4 -5.2
1983 -12.1 -12.2 -9.6 -7.6 -4.1 -2.7 -8.6 -9.2 -3.0 -3.3 -14.4 -12.3 -11.0 -11.8 -1.0 0.0 -5.5 -6.1 -0.5 -3.4 -4.9 -5.5
1984 -11.1 -9.9 -7.8 -4.6 -2.1 -1.9 -6.3 -9.9 -3.3 -2.8 -11.8 -10.1 -10.0 -13.5 -1.5 1.5 -7.1 -6.3 -2.1 -3.8 -4.7 -5.4
1985 -10.5 -8.4 -3.7 -1.9 -0.6 -1.1 -10.1 -13.9 -3.6 -2.6 -10.9 -11.6 -12.2 -14.0 0.9 4.1 -6.0 -5.1 -2.4 -2.8 -4.8 -4.9
1986 -7.4 -8.7 -0.7 3.3 -0.8 -1.2 -10.5 -10.7 -3.3 -3.0 -10.4 -11.2 -12.8 -11.3 1.9 3.9 -6.5 -4.6 -2.8 -2.7 -4.8 -4.3
1987 -6.2 -7.2 2.8 2.1 -0.7 -1.8 -7.1 -9.5 -4.4 -3.6 -2.6 -2.5 -9.9 -8.8 -11.0 -10.5 2.6 5.2 -6.6 -6.2 -7.5 -8.4 -2.5 -1.4 -4.1 -4.2
1988 -6.1 -6.5 1.7 0.2 -2.0 -2.1 -9.8 -14.9 -4.9 -3.2 -2.3 -1.4 -7.5 -3.7 -10.4 -10.6 3.1 2.5 -6.0 -4.9 -7.8 -6.5 -2.0 0.8 -4.5 -3.6
1989 -6.5 -6.6 1.4 -0.8 -1.3 0.2 -13.3 -18.4 -2.9 -2.7 -1.8 -1.5 -5.9 -3.2 -10.0 -10.2 6.1 3.4 -4.5 -5.3 -7.8 -3.8 -0.1 0.9 -3.5 -3.0
1990 -5.7 -5.6 0.7 -1.5 -0.4 -1.9 -20.0 -19.8 -2.4 -4.0 -1.1 -1.6 -1.5 -3.6 -9.8 -10.6 2.8 4.7 -4.2 -5.3 -6.1 -5.8 1.1 -0.7 -2.9 -4.1
1991 - 5 . 9- 6 . 6- 1 . 6- 2 . 0- 4 . 8- 3 . 6 - 1 7 . 1 - 1 5 . 4- 1 . 8- 4 . 9- 1 . 1- 1 . 9- 3 . 5- 2 . 1- 9 . 4 - 1 0 . 2 1 . 1- 0 . 8- 4 . 7- 2 . 5- 5 . 6- 6 . 4- 0 . 7- 2 . 8- 4 . 1- 4 . 7
1992 -6.2 -6.9 -1.5 -2.6 -3.4 -2.3 -14.0 -13.2 -3.6 -4.6 -1.7 -3.9 -4.1 -2.2 -9.3 -9.5 2.0 -2.5 -4.1 -3.5 -4.6 -5.2 -3.6 -5.9 -4.4 -5.0
1993 -6.0 -6.6 -2.7 -4.4 -3.6 -3.3 -9.8 -13.3 -4.2 -7.5 -3.2 -5.8 -3.0 -2.5 -10.2 -9.5 -1.0 1.1 -3.5 -3.3 -4.8 -7.2 -8.2 -7.8 -5.7 -6.0
1994 -6.4 -5.3 -4.9 -3.8 -4.0 -2.6 -15.4 -11.4 -7.2 -6.6 -5.9 -6.0 -3.2 -2.1 -8.9 -9.0 -2.2 2.2 -4.1 -3.2 -8.2 -5.8 -6.8 -6.8 -6.1 -5.4
1995 - 4 . 7- 4 . 1- 3 . 0- 1 . 6- 2 . 4- 3 . 5 - 1 3 . 3- 9 . 1- 6 . 0- 6 . 6- 4 . 9- 4 . 8- 2 . 0- 2 . 0- 8 . 6- 7 . 1 1 . 6 1 . 5- 3 . 5- 4 . 0- 5 . 8- 5 . 1- 4 . 6- 5 . 8- 4 . 8- 5 . 0
1996 -3.1 -3.2 -1.3 -0.8 -2.8 -3.4 -8.3 -7.6 -4.7 -4.7 -3.9 -4.1 -2.0 -0.4 -6.0 -6.8 0.6 2.6 -2.7 -2.3 -4.7 -3.2 -3.7 -4.9 -3.8 -4.3
1997 -2.9 -2.0 -0.3 0.5 -2.9 -2.7 -6.5 -4.0 -3.0 -2.6 -3.0 -3.0 -0.9 0.9 -3.3 -2.7 0.5 3.0 -2.5 -0.9 -2.9 -2.5 -3.5 -2.1 -3.0 -2.3
1970-76(R)/78(F) EU: CAL 1973(F) I: 72-VIII 1977(F) IRL: 76-VII 1981(R) EU: -4.8 for EUR10
1970(F) D, F, NL: 69-VI; I: 70-VI 1973(R) B, F, IRL, I, L, UK: 74-VIII 1978(F) DK, IR: 77-VI 1985(R) EU:-5.1 for EUR12
1971(F) B: 71-VII 1974(F) D: 73-VIII 1972(R) EU: idem for EUR9 1986(R) EU: -4.8 for EUR12
1971(R) I: 72-VIII 1975(F) B, F, IRL, I, L, UK: 74-VIII; NL: 74-VI 1973(R) EU: -1.2 idem for EUR9 1994(R) EU: -5.5 for EUR15
1972(F) B: 71-VII 1976(R) IRL: 77-VI 1980(R) EU: idem for EUR10 1995(F) EU: in fact EUR16
Since 1994-VI: Maastricht definition65
Table B11: Current account as % of GDP - current year
Belgium Denmark Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Un. Kingd. Eur. Union
FRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFR
1969
1970
1971 0.4 2.3 1.5 1.4 0.3 0.5 0.0 1.6 -0.9 -2.7 -1.4 -0.3 0.5 1.1
1972 1.7 3.8 1.7 1.6 0.3 0.9 1.5 0.9 -3.4 -0.9 1.0 2.6 1.1 1.4
1973 3.7 2.8 -1.4 -1.6 1.6 2.8 0.7 0.7 -4.9 -5.8 -0.2 -1.7 5.9 5.9 2.0 3.0 -0.3 1.4 0.8 0.7
1974 0.9 0.8 -3.6 -3.1 2.6 2.3 -1.4 -2.2 -8.8 -9.3 -3.6 -4.2 5.2 4.4 1.8 1.9 -3.7 -4.6 -0.5 -1.0
1975 0.2 1.8 -1.1 -1.5 2.0 0.7 -0.6 -0.1 -6.3 -1.1 -0.7 -0.3 -7.3 -7.3 1.6 2.0 -3.0 -1.7 -0.1 0.1
1976 1.3 -0.5 -4.4 -4.7 0.5 0.7 -1.1 -1.7 -6.9 -3.7 -0.5 -1.7 -2.6 -4.1 2.6 2.8 -1.5 -1.2 -0.4 -0.6
1977 0.2 0.0 -3.7 -3.7 0.7 0.7 -0.9 -0.8 -5.3 -1.9 -0.4 0.9 -2.7 -0.8 2.7 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
1978 0.3 -0.2 -2.3 -2.7 0.6 1.3 -0.6 0.8 -2.9 -2.2 1.0 2.1 18.0 17.9 0.9 -0.9 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.7
1979 -0.5 -3.3 -2.9 -4.5 0.7 -0.6 0.7 0.3 -4.7 -8.9 1.0 1.4 15.2 19.1 -0.9 -1.3 0.3 -1.2 0.3 -0.4
1980 -4.8 -5.6 -4.7 -3.8 -1.8 -1.8 -0.7 -1.3 -8.1 -7.4 -0.4 -2.2 16.6 19.9 -0.5 -1.4 -0.3 1.2 -1.0 -1.4
1981 -7.5 -6.2 -3.8 -3.1 -1.9 -1.0 -1.4 -1.5 -11.9 -11.5 -1.8 -2.0 17.7 16.7 0.7 2.4 0.5 2.9 -1.3 -0.5
1982 -4.9 -3.8 -3.6 -4.2 0.6 0.4 -1.7 -3.8 -2.0 -2.9 -9.5 -8.2 -1.4 -1.6 39.6 39.5 4.5 2.7 1.0 1.5 -0.4 -0.6
1983 -2.9 -1.6 -2.7 -2.1 1.0 0.7 -3.3 -4.3 -2.0 -1.6 -3.4 -2.3 -0.6 0.1 38.6 39.0 3.2 2.7 0.2 0.7 -0.2 0.0
1984 -0.6 -0.5 -2.2 -3.2 1.2 0.9 -4.7 -4.0 -1.0 -0.7 -0.9 -5.2 0.2 -0.9 37.7 38.1 3.5 4.0 0.7 0.0 0.4 0.1
1985 0.5 0.6 -2.7 -4.4 1.6 2.2 -4.3 -8.7 -0.3 -0.8 -4.2 -3.2 -1.3 -1.1 36.1 29.4 4.4 4.6 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.4
1986 1.9 2.5 -2.5 -4.7 2.4 3.9 -5.0 -5.4 4.0 1.9 0.6 -0.2 -1.3 -1.8 1.0 0.8 31.5 41.5 4.0 2.9 2.0 3.9 0.1 -0.3 1.1 1.1
1987 3.5 2.0 -3.3 -3.0 2.8 3.9 -4.7 -2.1 0.7 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -1.4 1.3 0.5 -0.1 39.7 39.9 1.6 1.6 1.0 1.8 -0.8 -0.4 0.7 1.0
1988 2.1 1.0 -2.4 -1.7 3.3 4.1 -2.5 -1.9 -0.8 -1.1 -0.2 -0.3 2.1 2.1 -0.3 -0.6 38.3 31.6 1.6 2.4 0.9 -1.4 -1.2 -3.2 0.6 0.4
1989 0.4 1.0 -1.7 -1.8 4.3 4.5 -2.1 -4.9 -2.5 -2.9 -0.5 -0.4 1.8 1.6 -1.0 -1.3 27.9 32.1 1.6 3.2 -3.9 -1.2 -3.3 -4.1 0.0 0.0
1990 1.0 0.7 -1.3 0.8 4.3 3.0 -4.6 -5.7 -3.6 -3.5 -0.3 -1.0 1.2 2.7 -1.1 -1.4 30.0 29.3 3.0 4.0 -1.2 -0.1 -3.0 -2.3 0.2 -0.2
1991 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.3 -0.1 0.8 -5.0 -5.1 -2.9 -3.5 -0.9 -0.6 2.2 4.9 -1.3 -1.8 26.4 25.9 4.0 3.8 -1.2 -1.0 -1.1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4
1992 1.4 1.8 1.7 2.9 0.3 0.3 -3.4 -4.4 -3.3 -3.9 -0.4 0.1 5.8 5.9 -2.0 -2.1 27.7 27.7 3.9 3.4 -1.0 -0.3 -0.9 -2.0 -0.5 -0.6
1993 1.4 3.0 2.6 3.6 -1.6 -0.9 -3.7 -3.6 -3.3 -1.8 -0.1 0.9 4.7 5.8 -1.4 1.1 25.9 28.3 3.0 3.8 -2.9 -1.2 -2.5 -1.7 -1.1 0.1
1994 5.1 5.1 1.9 1.9 -1.8 -1.8 -2.4 -2.4 -1.8 -1.8 1.0 1.0 7.0 7.0 1.5 1.5 27.4 27.4 4.6 4.6 -1.9 -1.9 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2
1995 5.8 5.0 1.4 0.4 -1.8 -1.0 -2.3 -2.7 -1.9 0.3 0.9 1.8 6.9 6.6 2.7 2.3 26.1 17.5 4.7 4.8 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -1.0 0.3 0.7
1996 4.6 4.5 0.6 0.6 -0.9 -1.2 -2.8 -3.5 0.0 0.7 1.6 1.9 6.3 4.0 2.5 3.5 16.3 17.6 5.0 5.3 -1.1 -2.4 -1.1 0.0 0.7 1.0
1997 4.6 4.9 0.8 0.1 -0.9 -0.6 -3.7 -2.3 1.0 0.6 2.1 2.9 4.2 3.9 4.1 3.1 18.3 14.4 4.8 5.8 -2.0 -2.8 -0.9 0.3 1.1 1.4
1971-82(F,R): mostly in USD or national currency and the ratio had to be calculated 1971(F, R): not current account but external balance in goods and services
1978(F) L: obtained by imputing the bias of 0.1 (change in method; original: 1.6) 1983(F) L: obtained by imputing the bias of 0.1 (change in method; original: 15.8)
1972(R): 73-VIII 1972(R) EU: 1.3 for EUR9 1985(R) EU: 0.5 for EUR12
1973(F): 73-VIII 1974(R) L: 75-IX 1980(R) EU: -1.2 for EUR10 1994(R) EU: idem for EUR1566
Table B12: Current account as % of GDP - year ahead
Belgium Denmark Germany Greece Spain France Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Un. Kingd. Eur. Union
FRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFRFR
1969
1970
1971 0.2 3.1 0.2 1.3 -0.2 0.8 -0.6 1.6 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 1.2
1972 0.9 3.1 1.2 0.1 -0.7 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 2.1 0.3 0.3
1973 2.6 2.8 1.0 2.7 0.9 0.7 1.5 -1.7 1.5 6.4 1.6 2.9 1.2 1.3
1974 2.6 1.5 -1.1 -3.5 1.5 2.4 -0.5 2.5 -5.4 -10.4 0.0 -5.3 5.3 4.4 -0.8 2.4 1.8 -4.6 0.7 -1.4
1975 0.4 -0.4 -1.9 -4.6 3.5 0.7 -1.2 -1.9 -9.9 -4.5 -2.6 -1.6 4.6 -6.7 3.0 3.0 -3.1 -1.6 -0.1 -0.7
1976 1.2 -0.4 -2.1 -5.1 0.8 0.7 -0.6 -1.6 -2.9 -3.4 -0.7 -1.6 -8.8 -4.7 1.9 2.8 -1.2 -1.2 -0.1 -0.6
1977 0.0 -0.1 -3.3 3.8 0.7 0.8 -1.3 -0.8 -4.1 -2.0 0.4 0.9 0.0 -0.8 3.5 0.4 -0.7 0.2 0.0 0.3
1978 0.4 -1.6 -2.7 -2.7 0.6 1.5 -0.5 0.8 -5.7 -2.2 0.3 2.1 14.7 15.4 1.8 -0.6 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.7
1979 -0.2 -3.0 1.7 -4.6 0.9 -0.7 0.3 0.1 -2.4 -8.8 1.2 1.4 15.2 19.1 -0.3 -1.3 0.0 -1.2 0.6 -0.4
1980 -2.2 -5.1 -4.1 -3.8 -0.5 -1.8 -0.2 -1.3 -6.9 -7.2 1.1 -2.2 16.0 13.1 0.0 -1.4 -0.1 1.2 -0.2 -1.4
1981 -5.1 -5.3 -4.5 -3.1 -1.4 -1.1 -1.0 -2.0 -5.4 -11.5 -0.7 -2.0 13.7 16.7 -0.9 2.3 0.2 2.4 -1.0 -0.9
1982 -7.3 -3.6 -3.3 -4.2 -0.5 0.5 -2.5 -3.8 -1.7 -2.9 -10.7 -8.3 -1.3 -1.6 14.0 38.8 2.5 2.7 0.2 1.5 -1.0 -0.6
1983 -3.3 -0.9 -3.9 -2.1 0.3 0.7 -2.1 -4.5 -2.0 -1.5 -7.7 -5.9 -0.5 0.1 38.3 39.0 5.4 2.8 -0.3 1.0 -0.5 0.1
1984 -1.5 -0.3 -1.3 -3.2 0.9 1.0 -5.5 -4.0 -1.2 -0.7 -0.6 -5.1 -0.2 -0.9 36.3 33.2 4.4 4.1 -0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1
1985 0.5 0.4 -2.2 -4.4 1.1 2.2 -4.9 -8.4 -0.7 -0.8 -3.3 -3.2 0.0 -1.1 37.5 29.6 4.4 4.3 0.2 1.0 0.4 0.4
1986 2.0 2.4 -2.7 -5.1 2.0 4.1 -4.1 -5.4 -0.3 0.6 -2.0 -1.8 -1.1 0.8 30.8 40.4 4.5 2.8 0.9 -0.3 0.6 1.4
1987 2.8 1.9 -3.6 -3.0 2.1 4.0 -3.7 -3.4 3.7 0.1 0.4 -0.3 -1.3 1.3 0.9 -0.1 30.7 38.0 2.8 1.7 4.2 1.8 -0.6 -0.6 0.9 1.0
1988 2.3 1.0 -2.2 -1.8 3.2 4.1 -4.1 -1.5 -0.4 -1.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.3 2.0 0.0 -0.6 37.8 16.4 1.8 2.4 -1.0 -1.4 -0.8 -3.2 0.8 0.3
1989 1.9 1.0 -2.3 -1.3 4.2 4.7 -3.7 -4.8 -2.1 -2.9 0.1 -0.2 3.5 1.6 -0.6 -1.3 36.5 31.5 1.8 3.6 -1.7 -1.2 -3.4 -3.7 0.3 0.2
1990 0.8 1.0 -1.1 0.8 5.8 3.2 -3.5 -6.1 -4.0 -3.5 -0.5 -1.0 1.8 3.4 -1.4 -1.4 14.5 31.2 2.1 3.8 -3.4 -0.3 -3.3 -2.6 0.2 -0.2
1991 -0.3 1.7 0.3 1.3 0.7 1.2 -5.1 -5.1 -4.0 -3.5 -0.4 -0.5 0.4 6.0 -1.7 -1.9 24.1 27.9 3.4 3.9 -1.7 -3.5 -2.0 -1.8 -0.8 -0.5
1992 1.1 1.8 2.2 3.0 1.2 1.6 -3.4 -4.4 -3.2 -3.7 -0.8 0.2 2.0 3.6 -1.5 -2.1 26.1 27.6 4.4 3.2 -1.5 -2.1 -1.4 -2.3 -0.5 -0.3
1993 1.8 4.6 3.0 3.7 -1.1 -1.2 -3.0 -3.6 -3.4 -1.9 0.2 0.9 6.6 6.5 -1.8 1.1 18.7 28.9 3.8 3.7 -2.3 -4.0 -2.9 -2.5 -0.9 -0.1
1994 1.1 4.3 2.7 2.0 -0.8 -1.3 -4.1 -2.5 -2.4 -1.8 0.3 1.1 5.4 5.1 0.9 1.8 25.0 30.0 3.5 4.4 -2.8 -1.4 -2.0 -2.2 -0.3 0.1
1995 5.0 4.5 2.2 0.6 -1.1 -1.2 -2.6 -2.7 -1.6 0.9 0.5 1.5 6.0 4.3 2.6 2.5 28.5 18.0 4.2 5.2 1.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.4 0.5 0.7
1996 5.0 4.5 1.9 0.8 -1.0 -1.2 -2.9 -2.6 -1.4 0.3 1.3 1.6 6.1 3.8 2.5 3.5 28.6 16.0 4.8 5.7 -2.0 -2.5 -1.1 -0.1 0.6 0.9
1997 4.5 5.0 1.1 0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -3.2 -2.6 1.2 0.4 1.7 3.1 3.4 4.1 5.1 3.2 15.9 14.1 5.1 5.8 -1.0 -2.0 -0.5 1.0 1.4 1.5
1978(F) L: obtained by imputing the bias of -0.7 (change in method; original: -3.4) 1983(F) L: obtained by imputing the bias of -0.7 (change in method; original: 15.8)
1971-1983(F,R): mostly in USD or national currency and the ratio had to be calculated
1974(F) DK, D, IRL, L: 73-VIII 1977(F) B: B+L; L: 76-VII 1973(R) EU: 0.7 idem for EUR9 1985(R) EU: 0.5 for EUR12
1975(F) L: 74-VIII 1977(R) L: 78-VI 1980(R) EU: -1.2 for EUR10 1986(R) EU: 1.5 for EUR12
1975(R) B: B+L; L: 76-VII 1972(R) EU: idem for EUR9 1981(R) EU: -0.7 EUR10 1994(R) EU: idem for EUR15
1995(F) EU: in fact EUR1667
Table B13: International context
a - current year
US Japan World Rest world European Union
Prices Notes on EU export volumes:
Export Import Export Import 1972(R) EU: 8.1 for EUR9
FRFRFRFRFRFRFRFR 1980(R) EU: 2.3 for EUR10
1969 10.5 13.7 13.6 16.0 1.4 2.4 1.1 3.0 1985(R) EU: 5.7 for EUR12
1970 10.4 10.5 12.3 12.9 3.0 4.4 2.8 3.2 1994(R) EU: 9.6 for EUR15
1971 7 . 67 . 97 . 66 . 62 . 12 . 62 . 63 . 0
1972 6.8 10.4 7.0 10.0 2.0 1.7 1.2 0.5 Notes on EU import volumes:
1973 12.1 12.4 12.5 12.1 4.6 8.8 6.4 13.3 1972(R) EU: 9.8 for EUR9
1974 0.5 -2.2 2.0 -1.8 5.5 8.0 6.0 8.5 8.9 8.7 5.5 0.6 15.6 25.6 26.9 45.3 1980(R) EU: idem for EUR10
1975 -5.0 -2.0 0.0 2.0 1.5 -8.5 1.5 -9.5 1.3 -5.1 0.0 -6.8 12.1 10.1 8.1 5.9 1985(R) EU: idem for EUR12
1976 7.0 6.2 4.5 5.8 7.5 10.0 7.5 8.5 9.5 10.2 8.2 12.6 10.9 10.8 14.6 14.0 1994(R) EU: 7.7 for EUR15
1977 5.0 4.9 5.5 5.0 7.0 4.5 8.0 5.0 7.6 4.5 4.6 1.1 9.5 9.8 10.7 10.0
1978 4.0 4.0 5.5 5.6 4.5 4.8 4.5 4.5 4.3 5.0 5.3 6.2 3.8 6.6 1.6 -0.4 Notes on EU export prices:
1979 2.5 2.3 5.3 5.9 4.8 6.7 4.0 4.7 5.4 6.5 6.4 10.7 4.7 9.2 5.0 10.6 1972(R) EU: 2.4 for EUR9
1980 -0.7 -0.2 4.3 4.2 3.0 2.0 3.4 1.7 4.0 1.8 2.5 2.4 12.5 12.0 17.0 15.6 1980(R) EU: 11.4 for EUR10
1981 1.6 2.0 3.5 2.9 -0.2 0.1 1.4 2.3 0.1 3.5 -3.0 -3.7 11.6 11.0 14.7 15.2 1985(R) EU: 3.8 for EUR12
1982 -1.7 -2.2 2.3 2.9 3.4 -0.9 3.0 -2.6 4.6 0.8 3.9 2.3 8.1 8.6 6.9 5.8 1994(R) EU: 1.4 for EUR15
1983 2.4 3.3 3.3 2.9 0.5 2.0 0.2 1.7 0.5 0.8 0.9 2.7 4.3 4.4 2.4 2.7
1984 5.9 6.8 4.7 5.9 6.7 9.3 7.3 10.2 6.9 7.9 5.6 7.3 5.4 6.8 5.2 7.8 Notes on EU import prices:
1985 2.7 2.2 5.1 4.6 5.3 3.3 5.6 1.9 6.4 5.6 4.5 5.5 5.0 4.3 5.4 3.2 1972(R) EU: 1.5 for EUR9
1986 2.5 2.5 3.2 2.5 3.8 4.7 2.3 3.6 2.9 2.1 6.2 6.7 -6.0 -6.9 -12.6 -14.6 1980(R) EU: 13.9 for EUR10
1987 2.3 2.9 2.7 4.2 3.7 5.6 2.5 4.2 2.2 3.8 5.8 8.0 -2.0 -1.5 -3.7 -3.8 1985(R) EU: 2.4 for EUR12
1988 3.1 3.9 4.6 5.7 6.5 9.6 6.6 9.8 3.6 5.8 6.2 9.1 0.6 3.1 -0.2 1.9 1994(R) EU: 1.9 for EUR15
1989 2.6 3.0 4.3 4.8 6.8 7.9 6.5 7.4 6.3 8.3 7.2 8.7 6.3 5.4 6.6 6.2
1990 2.1 1.0 4.2 5.6 6.1 4.6 5.8 4.1 7.1 4.4 6.7 5.5 1.5 -0.4 0.4 -1.1
1991 0.1 -0.7 3.8 4.4 3.3 3.3 2.8 2.2 2.1 5.5 4.0 5.5 1.1 0.2 0.4 -0.6
1992 1.9 2.1 1.7 1.3 4.4 4.8 4.7 6.1 4.5 4.3 4.3 3.3 0.9 -0.7 0.2 -2.4
1993 2.6 3.0 0.6 0.1 3.8 3.5 6.0 9.0 1.0 -0.9 0.7 -4.6 2.2 2.2 3.1 -0.3
1994 3.7 4.1 0.8 0.6 6.2 10.1 8.2 11.6 5.5 9.4 3.2 7.3 2.3 1.8 2.4 2.4
1995 3 . 22 . 01 . 60 . 98 . 69 . 29 . 6 1 1 . 07 . 97 . 37 . 16 . 20 . 82 . 70 . 72 . 5
1996 2.1 2.4 2.9 3.6 6.6 6.0 8.2 7.4 4.1 4.5 4.1 3.8 2.0 1.5 1.9 1.1
1997 2 . 83 . 81 . 61 . 07 . 19 . 67 . 9 1 0 . 46 . 29 . 35 . 88 . 41 . 31 . 31 . 61 . 8
a: Annual percentage change; trade data: goods only, EU includes intra trade
Notes on all 1969-1973(F,R): occasionally goods and services when goods only were not available
trade variables: 1969-1977(F,R) EU: CAL 1981(R): 81-I
1974,1975(F) World: approximated 1982(F): 81-I
1974(R) World: approximated
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Table B14: International context
a -y e a ra h e a d
US Japan World Rest world European Union
Prices Notes on EU export volumes:
Export Import Export Import 1972(R) EU: 8.5 for EUR9
FRFRFRFRFRFRFRFR 1973(R) EU: 13.4 idem for EUR9
1969 1980(R) EU: 2.4 for EUR10
1970 9.2 10.2 12.2 1.8 1.7 5.4 1.4 4.6 1981(R) EU: 4.0 EUR10
1971 8.7 8.4 10.3 8.1 3.3 2.8 1.1 2.9 1985(R) EU: 5.6 for EUR12
1972 5.9 10.7 6.0 10.2 1.9 1.6 1.3 0.7 1986(R) EU: 2.0 for EUR12
1973 9.9 13.9 10.6 12.8 2.8 6.7 3.4 10.6 1994(R) EU: 9.9 for EUR15
1974 5.0 5.5 8.0 8.5 9.8 9.1 8.6 1.8 6.0 25.3 8.4 42.1
1975 0.5 -1.8 5.0 2.1 7.0 -4.0 7.0 -3.0 5.9 -5.3 4.2 -2.3 11.4 10.2 10.6 5.0 Notes on EU import volumes:
1976 5.0 6.3 6.0 6.0 5.0 11.0 4.5 9.0 5.4 10.6 6.1 12.7 8.5 10.7 8.9 13.9 1972(R) EU: 10.3 for EUR9
1977 5.0 4.9 6.0 5.1 6.5 4.5 7.0 5.5 7.8 4.7 3.8 1.2 9.4 9.5 10.0 10.0 1973(R) EU: 13.1 idem for EUR9
1978 4.5 4.0 6.0 5.6 7.0 5.1 7.0 4.6 6.5 5.1 6.0 6.2 5.8 2.6 5.6 -0.5 1980(R) EU: idem for EUR10
1979 2.8 2.3 5.3 6.0 4.8 6.6 4.5 4.5 4.6 6.6 5.3 10.8 4.7 9.2 4.1 10.5 1981(R) EU: -2.6 EUR10
1980 0.0 -0.2 4.5 4.1 3.7 1.9 3.3 1.9 4.2 1.9 3.3 1.9 8.2 11.8 9.4 15.8 1985(R) EU: 5.5 for EUR12
1981 0.1 2.0 3.9 3.0 1.9 2.1 2.5 4.6 2.1 4.1 0.7 -2.8 8.5 11.4 8.2 15.3 1986(R) EU: 6.7 for EUR12
1982 1.5 -1.7 4.8 2.9 4.3 -0.7 4.4 -2.3 5.9 0.8 4.3 2.5 9.3 8.6 9.8 5.8 1994(R) EU: 8.4 for EUR15
1983 2.0 3.3 3.3 2.9 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.7 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.3 7.5 4.2 6.4 2.8
1984 4.3 6.8 3.6 5.7 3.7 9.3 4.6 10.4 3.5 7.7 2.1 7.1 5.1 6.7 6.0 7.5 Notes on EU export prices:
1985 3.0 2.8 4.4 4.5 5.2 3.4 5.6 2.2 6.0 5.5 4.4 5.4 3.9 4.2 4.0 3.2 1972(R) EU: 2.3 for EUR9
1986 2.5 2.9 4.2 2.4 4.8 4.9 4.5 3.8 4.8 1.9 6.1 5.7 -0.2 -6.0 -1.2 -12.6 1973(R) EU: 8.0 for EUR9
1987 2.3 3.4 2.4 4.2 4.4 6.1 3.1 5.0 3.7 3.5 6.4 8.0 -1.6 -1.4 -2.8 -3.7 1980(R) EU: 11.2 for EUR10
1988 2.7 4.4 3.5 5.8 3.9 9.5 3.5 9.8 3.3 6.2 4.6 9.1 1.5 2.5 1.6 1.6 1981(R) EU: 11.0 EUR10
1989 2.3 3.0 3.8 4.8 6.0 7.7 5.7 7.3 5.5 8.0 6.4 9.1 3.4 5.3 3.6 6.1 1985(R) EU: 3.9 for EUR12
1990 2.0 0.9 4.2 5.6 6.1 3.5 6.1 1.6 6.7 6.0 6.2 5.9 3.7 0.3 3.8 -0.4 1986(R) EU: -6.8 for EUR12
1991 0.3 -1.3 4.2 4.4 4.6 3.1 4.3 2.5 5.3 5.7 5.2 5.1 3.7 0.4 3.6 0.2 1994(R) EU: 1.3 for EUR15
1992 2.1 2.6 3.5 1.4 5.1 5.0 5.1 6.5 5.4 4.2 5.1 3.4 2.7 -0.3 2.8 -1.6
1993 2.4 3.0 1.5 0.1 4.3 4.3 5.7 9.9 3.7 -0.2 2.3 -4.2 2.8 2.7 4.1 2.0 Notes on EU import prices:
1994 2.6 4.1 1.3 0.5 5.5 10.4 7.5 11.5 3.7 9.6 3.0 8.0 2.5 1.2 2.9 2.4 1972(R) EU: 1.2 for EUR9
1995 2.7 2.0 2.2 0.8 7.6 9.8 8.2 11.0 7.5 8.2 6.6 7.0 2.0 4.0 2.2 4.2 1973(R) EU: 13.6 for EUR9
1996 2.3 2.8 2.3 3.5 8.0 7.7 9.2 9.9 6.6 4.8 6.0 4.0 2.6 0.6 2.7 0.2 1980(R) EU: 13.4 for EUR10
1997 2.3 4.0 1.8 0.9 7.0 10.2 8.1 10.9 6.0 9.9 5.3 9.0 1.8 0.7 1.7 0.9 1981(R) EU: 13.7 EUR10
a: Annual percentage change; trade data: goods only 1985(R) EU: 2.3 for EUR12
Notes on all 1970-1973(F,R): occasionally goods and services when goods only were not available 1986(R) EU: -14.5 for EUR12
trade variables: 1989-1997(R): The outturn data for the import volumes of the World and the Rest 1994(R) EU: idem for EUR15
of the World and for the EU export and import prices are latest available data.
From 90-XI onwards first settled estimates were dropped as t+2 forecasts
were added in the published tabled.
1970-1977(F,R) EU: CAL 1995(F) EU: in fact EUR16
1975(F) World: 74-VIII
Volumes Import volume Real GDP